Rosa Yolanda Mejia v. Westfield, LLC, et al.

the allegations of the complaint or statement of damages, the clerk may enter the default judgment for that amount. However, if the relief requested in the complaint is more complicated, consisting of either nonmonetary relief, or monetary relief in amounts which require either an accounting, additional evidence, or the exercise of judgment to ascertain, the plaintiff must request entry of judgment by the court. In such cases, the plaintiff must affirmatively establish his entitlement to the specific judgment requested.¿ (Kim v. Westmoore Partners, Inc. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 267, 287.)

Section 585 also allows for interest, costs and attorney fees, where otherwise allowed by law. (Code of Civ. Proc. section 585(a).) Multiple specific documents are required, such as: (1) form CIV 100, (2) a brief summary of the case; (3) declarations or other admissible evidence in support of the judgment requested; (4) interest computations as necessary; (5) a memorandum of costs and disbursements; (6) a proposed form of judgment; (7) a dismissal of all parties against whom judgment is not sought or an application for separate judgment under CCP § 579, supported by a showing of grounds for each judgment; (8) exhibits as necessary; and (9) a request for attorneys’ fees if allowed by statute or by the agreement of the parties. (CRC Rule 3.1800.)

Here, Plaintiff served Dolphin more than 30 days prior to requesting entry of default and default judgment, correctly completed JC Form CIV-10 0 in a manner that would not void or put at issue the entry of default, provided a declaration of non-military status, dismissed all fictitious defendants, requested damages in amounts supported by the filings and not in excess of the amount stated in the Complaint, and filed a proposed judgment (JUD-100). Plaintiff has also filed a verified memorandum of costs in the amount of $ 2,838.74 as set forth in Item 7 of the CIV-10 0 form.

The only substantive issue for purposes of this hearing is the amount of attorneys’ fees to be awarded. In calculating the amount of attorneys’ fees, the Court uses the lodestar method which multiplies a reasonable hourly rate by reasonable time spent. The hourly rates charged by Plaintiff’s counsel have been found reasonable by other courts, including this Court. (See Plaintiff’s Ex. 7.) However, there is no adequate explanation as to the amount of time spent. There are 5 attorneys and 3 paralegals who worked on the case.

Three of the attorneys are partners who billed at hourly rates of $700-$750. The other two associates bill ed at rates of $450-$500 per hour. There is no reason why such a simple case requires this type of over staffing, particularly with three partners billing at or above $700. In total, counsel spent 30.1 hours, and the paralegals spent 18.8 hours. But this case was not heavily litigated. Plaintiff filed a complaint and a demurrer to the answer. There were no other motions, including motions for summary judgment.

There does not appear to have been any discovery. And there were two status conferences. Given that Plaintiff’s attorneys routinely file these types of actions, and have done so on behalf of Plaintiff herself, the Court does not believe that 48.9 hours is reasonable to prepare a complaint, conduct an investigation and prepare the default package. Accordingly, the Court will award 20 hours of attorney time at a blended hourly rate of $600, and 8 hours of paralegal time at the rate of $200.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff “s Request for Default Judgment is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Default judgment in the amount of $ 24,438.74 is awarded in favor of Plaintiff.

Case Number: 24SMCV04693 Hearing Date: May 18, 2026 Dept: 205 Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles? West District Beverly Hills Courthouse / Department 20 5 rosa yolanda mejia, Plaintiff, v. WESTFIELD, LLC, et al., Defendant s. Case No.: 2 4 SM CV0 4693

Hearing Date: May 18, 2026 [TENTATIVE] order RE: D EFENDANT culver city mall, llc’s MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, FOR Summary adjudication

BACKGROUND

This is a slip and fall case. Plaintiff Rosa Yolanda Mejia claims that she slipped on a clear liquid on the floor of a shopping mall which she believes was water. (Undisputed Material Facts (? UMF ”) No. 2.) Culver City Mall, LLC owns the shopping center. (UMF No. 3.) The surveillance camera at the mall captured the subject incident, which shows that Plaintiff fell at 3:24 p.m., on October 16, 2022. (UMF No. 4.) Plaintiff has no evidence of when any liquid first appeared on the floor. (UMF No. 5.) No one notified Culver City Mall regarding the presence of a liquid on the floor prior to the accident. (UMF No. 6.) Culver City Mall only learned of the alleged substance on the floor after Plaintiff’s fall. (UMF No. 7.)

Culver City Mall contracts with UG2, LLC (“UG2”) to provide janitorial services to the common areas of the subject property. (UMF No. 8.) As part of its normal business operations, UG2 conducts cleanings of the common areas of the mall on a daily basis during the entirety of the time that the mall is open. (UMF No. 9.) The UG2 staff are trained to look for spills, hazards, and safety concerns. (UMF No. 10.) UG2?s policy is that if any substance, including liquid, is found on the floor it must be cleaned up before leaving the area. (UMF No. 11.)

Moreover, UG2 regularly maintains sweep logs. (UMF No. 12.) Once an employee cleans an area and confirms that the area is free of any liquid or other potential hazards, then that employee makes a note on the sweep log to indicate that he/she cleaned the area and notes the time that the cleaning occurred. (UMF No. 13.) UG2?s staff followed that policy on the date of the incident by creating and maintaining a sweep log. (UMF No. 14.)

Plaintiff claims that the slip and fall incident occurred near the entrance to the food hall. (UMF No. 15.) A sweep log shows that a UG2 employee, Alma Samayoa, inspected and cleaned an area called “Restroom Location: Food Core 30 Piso,” at 3:15 p.m., approximately nine (9) minutes before the fall. (Exhibit G.) According to UG2?s account manager, Bertha Martinez, the sweep log covers the area where Plaintiff fell and reflects that the area was cleaned at 3:15 p.m. (Martinez Decl. ¶ 16.) Plaintiff disputes that the sweep log covers the relevant area.

She points out that the only sweep log produced by Defendant is a restroom inspection log. (Plaintiff’s Additional Material Facts “AMF? No. 3.) Plaintiff’s engineering expert, Samuel Attal, measured the distance between the area where Plaintiff fell to the nearest restroom, which was 123 feet and 7 inches. (AMF No. 24.) Ms. Samayoa (who inspected the area reflected in the sweep log) testified that the 3:15 time entry on the log reflects the time she completed her restroom inspection, and it was only after 3:15 p.m. that she went to inspect the food cour t. (AMF No. 32.)

Ms. Samayoa testified that she began her food court inspection at 3:17 p.m. (Samayoa Depo. 31:19-22.) However, s he also testified she has no specific memory of walking through past the food hall entrance stairs between 3:00 and 3:30 p.m. on the day of the accident, and when asked if she specifically saw no liquid in the food hall entrance area at 3:15 p.m., she testified:” No. I don’t remember.” (AMF No. 33.)

1 This hearing is on Culver City Mall’s motion for summary judgment. Culver City Mall argues that Plaintiff’s negligence and premises liability claims fails because Plaintiff cannot show that Defendant had constructive or actual notice of a dangerous condition and because Plaintiff cannot prove that any act or omission by Defendant caused her injuries.

LEGAL STANDARD

In evaluating a motion for summary judgment, the Court engages in a three-step process. First, the Court identifies the issues framed by the pleadings. The pleadings define the scope of the issues on a motion for summary judgment. (FPI Dev. Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 381-382.) Because a motion for summary judgment is limited to the issues raised by the pleadings (Lewis v. Chevron (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 690, 694), all evidence submitted in support of or in opposition to the motion must be addressed to the claims and defenses raised in the pleadings.

The court cannot consider an impleaded issue in ruling on a motion for summary judgment. (Roth v. Rhodes (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 530, 541.) The papers filed in response to a defendant's motion for summary judgment may not create issues outside the pleadings and are not a substitute for an amendment to the pleadings. (Tsemetzin v. Coast Federal Savings & Loan Assn. (1997) 57 Cal. App.4th 1334,1342.)

Second, the Court must determine whether the moving party has met its burden. A defendant moving for summary judgment bears the burden of persuasion that one or more elements of the plaintiff’ s cause of action cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850 (quoting Code Civ. Proc, § 437c, subd. (p)(2)) .)

Third, once the moving party has met its initial burden, the burden shifts to the opposing party to show that a material factual issue exists as to the cause(s) of action alleged or the affirmative defense(s) claimed. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p); see generally Bush v. Parents without Partners (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 322, 326-327.) In ruling on the motion, the Court must consider the evidence and inferences reasonably drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the opposing party. (Aguilar, 25 Cal.4th at 843.) Summary judgment is properly granted only if the moving party's evidence establishes that there is no issue of material fact to be tried. (Lipson v. Super. Ct. (1982) 31 Cal.3d 362, 374.)

DISCUSSION

Defendant argues that Plaintiffs cannot show it had actual or constructive notice of a dangerous condition. The Court agrees. “To impose liability for injuries suffered by an invitee due to [a] defective condition of the premises, the owner or occupier must have either actual or constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition or have been able by the exercise of ordinary care to discover the condition, which if known to him, he should realize as involving an unreasonable risk to invitees on his premises ...”. (Ortega v. K-Mart Corp. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1200, 1206.) Plaintiff has the burden of showing that the owner had notice of the defect in sufficient time to correct it. (Id. at 1205.)? [S] peculation and conjecture with respect to how long a dangerous condition has existed are insufficient to satisfy a plaintiff's burden.” (Id.)

To prove that Culver City Mall had actual notice of an alleged dangerous condition, Plaintiff must present evidence that Culver City Mall had actual knowledge of the alleged substance on the floor and that Culver City Mall knew of its dangerous character. (Hilts v. County of Solano (1968) 265 Cal.App.2d 161; see also Drummond v. City of Redondo Beach (1967) 255 Cal.App.2d 715 [holding actual notice not established when employee previously observed apparent defect but did not recognize it as being dangerous].)

Here, the undisputed facts establish that Culver City Mall had no actual notice of the allegedly dangerous condition that caused Plaintiff’s fall. (UMF 6.) Plaintiff claims she slipped on a clear liquid that appeared to be water. (UMF 2.) Plaintiff has no facts as to how any liquid allegedly ended up on the floor or how long it was on the floor. (UMF 5.) Plaintiff’s Response to UMF 5 does not contradict that she has no facts as to how long the liquid substance was on the floor. She points to “circumstantial evidence,” but the evidence she cites does not show how long the liquid substance was on the floor. (Response to UMF 5.)

She notes that Defendant’s person most knowledgeable, Joshua Morton, testified he had never seen the sweep log before the deposition and he does not know what area the sweep log covers. (Id.) But this says nothing about whether there is any evidence how long the substance was on the floor.

If a plaintiff cannot prove actual notice, then she has the burden of proving that the defendant had constructive notice of the alleged dangerous condition. To establish constructive notice, the critical test is whether’ the condition has existed long enough that it may be inferred that a reasonable inspection would have ascertained its existence.” Here, Plaintiff cannot show how long the liquid substance was on the floor, and accordingly, she cannot show that the allegedly dangerous condition had existed for a sufficient period of time before the accident occurred to permit its discovery through reasonable inspection. (Strongman v. County of Kern (1967) 255 Cal.App.2d 308, 313.)

In Strongman v. County of Kern, the plaintiff was injured when she stepped onto a missing plank on a dock maintained by the County of Kern. The plaintiff presented considerable evidence concerning the in adequacy of the County’s inspection plan. However, t he Strongman court concluded that in determining constructive notice, the method of inspection is secondary; the primary and indispensable element of constructive notice is a showing that the condition existed before the accident.¿ (Id. at 31 0.) Without this element of proof, the court concluded that the plaintiff failed to establish constructive notice as a matter of law, and the court affirmed a judgment for nonsuit. (Id. at 316.)

Similarly, in Cheyney¿ v. ¿City of Los Angeles, 119 Cal.App.2d 75, the plaintiff was injured when she descended a stairway leading from a parking lot to a beach at night. The parking lot, the stairway and the beach were under supervision of the defendant city. Sand had drifted or washed away below the last step. The plaintiff stepped from the last step and fell into the sand. The beach supervisor, whose duty it was to watch all portions of the beach to protect the safety of visitors and to inspect and keep in repair the stairway, had no knowledge the sand had eroded below the level of the bottom¿step. The appellate court affirmed the nonsuit, stating that? [i] n the instant case there is no evidence that the alleged defective condition was either conspicuous or notorious or as to how long it had existed.” (Id. at 77 (emphasis added) .)

Kotronakis ¿ v. ¿City & County of San Francisco, 192 Cal.App.2d 624 is also instructive. There, the plaintiff slipped in a puddle of vomit and sustained injuries. A judgment in his favor was reversed, although there was testimony that frequently there was vomit on the sidewalk and bottles were strewn about the area. The court noted that while the occurrence of vomit where the plaintiff fell is frequent,” there is a total lack of evidence that the particular vomit on which respondent slipped had been there longer than overnight . . . .” (Id. at 629-630.)

Similarly, in State of California v. Superior Court (1968) 263 Cal.App.2d 396, the plaintiff was burned by hot coals left on a state beach. While there was some evidence that the State’ s system of inspection was faulty, and despite knowledge by state employees that concealed coals were not unusual on the beach, the court held that as a matter of law the plaintiff had failed to establish that a dangerous condition existed for a sufficient time before the injury to support a holding of constructive notice. (Id.) Because “there was no evidence (direct or circumstantial) that the danger was obvious nor that the situation had existed for any particular length of time before the accident”,” the requirements of constructive notice, as defined in § 835.2, subdivision (b), were not met.” (Id. at 400.)

Plaintiff’s opposition spends much time on the sweep log and whether it even covers the relevant area. While the Court agrees with Plaintiff that the log does not prove or disprove that the area where she fell was cleaned shortly before her accident, the critical issue is really whether there is a triable issue as to how long the liquid substance -- that allegedly caused her fall -- was on the floor. As to that question, Defendant met its burden to show Plaintiff has no evidence as to how long the liquid substance was on the floor based on Plaintiff’s own deposition testimony. (UMF 5.) The burden then shifted to Plaintiff to show that there is a triable issue on this point. Plaintiff failed to meet her burden because she never cites to any evidence as to how long the liquid was on the floor.

To be sure,” if a plaintiff can show the owner did not make an inspection within a time period that was reasonable under the circumstances, the plaintiff could raise the inference that the defective condition existed long enough so that the failure to discover it was not reasonable.” (Ortega v. Kmart Corp. (2001) 26 Cal.4 th 1200, 1209 ¿ (citing Bridgman v. Safeway Stores, Inc.¿ (1960) 53 Cal. 2d 44 3, 447.) As support for the fact that Defendant’s inspection procedures were inadequate, Plaintiff relies on its expert, Mark Burns.

Mr. Burns attests that? Defendant failed to implement an adequate inspection and hazard detection system, failed to maintain reliable inspection records, and failed to provide objective evidence (including meaningful surveillance footage leading up to the incident), that would have demonstrated the area of Ms. Mejia’s fall was ever accounted for.” (Burns Decl. ¶ 14.)

Mr. Burns’s opinion, however, rests largely on the fact that the sweep log does not actually show that the area where Plaintiff fell was cleaned shortly before her accident and no sweep logs were maintained to document when the area where Plaintiff fell was being cleaned. (Burns Decl. 13.) This opinion, however, does not refute the declaration of Ms. Martinez (UG2?s account executive) which states that cleanings of the mall’s common areas occur at intervals of approximately 15 to 45 minutes during peak hours of 2 p.m. to 4 p.m. (Martinez Decl. ¶¶ 5-6.)

There is no evidence presented by Plaintiff that cleanings at these intervals is unreasonable or inadequate. Mr. Burns expresses no opinion on this issue, and his statement that’ any inspections performed by Defendant or an agent thereof were likely improper and/or incomplete’ is based solely on the lack of sweeping logs for the common areas. Accordingly, because there is no triable issue that Defendant had actual or constructive notice of the spill, the Court grants summary judgment in favor of Defendant.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS Defendant’ s motion for summary judgment. IT IS SO ORDERED. DATED: May 18, 2026 ___________________________ Edward B. Moreton, Jr. Judge of the Superior Court Home -->)" -->