CTM IRON WORKS, INC. v. ASSOCIATED CONSTRUCTION LLC, et al.

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - NORTHWEST DISTRICT CTM IRON WORKS, INC., A California Corporation, Plaintiff, vs. ASSOCIATED CONSTRUCTION LLC, a California limited liability company; 6801 CANOGA LLC, a California limited liability company. Defendant.)))))))))))))))) CASE NO.: 26VECV00008 Related Case: 25VECV04584 ORDER OVERRULING DEFENDANTS 6801 CANOGA LLC AND ASSOCIATED CONSTRUCTION, LLC?S DEMURRER TO FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff CTM Iron Works, Inc. (“Plaintiff”) claims it is owed an outstanding balance of $553,545.18 for structural steel construction work performed at 6801 Canoga Avenue, Canoga Park, California (the “Project”), a construction project allegedly owned by Defendant 6801 Canoga, LLC (“Canoga LLC”). Plaintiff alleges it entered into a subcontract agreement with Defendant Associated Construction, LLC (“Construction”). Plaintiff further alleges it recorded a Claim of Mechanic’s Lien on October 10, 2025, in the amount of $553,545.18. Canoga LLC and Construction (jointly “Defendants”) demurrer to the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”).

Defendants also moved to strike the Complaint. This Motion is moot since Plaintiffs thereafter filed their FAC.

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On January 2, 2026, Plaintiff filed a Complaint. On February 17, 2026, Plaintiff filed a Notice of Lis Pendens. On March 19, 2026, Plaintiff filed a FAC alleging: (1) Mechanic’s Lien Foreclosure; (2) Breach of Contract; (3) Open Book; and (4) Reasonable Value. On April 1, 2026, the Court related this action to Case No. 25VECV04584. On April 21, 2026, Defendants filed the instant Demurrer. On May 4, 2026, Plaintiff filed an Opposition. On May 11, 2026, Defendants filed a Reply. On May 13, 2026, Plaintiff amended the FAC to designate Doe 35 as Parkview 2020 FCC LLC, a Delaware limited liability company and Doe 36 as Parkview REIT FCC LLC, a Delaware limited liability company.

III. MEET AND CONFER

Before filing a demurrer or motion to strike, the moving party shall meet and confer in person, by telephone, or by video conference with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to demurrer or motion to strike for the purpose of determining whether an agreement can be reached that would resolve the objections to be raised in the demurrer or motion to strike. (See Code Civ. Proc. § 430.41(a), §435.5(a).) [1] A declaration must be filed with a demurrer regarding the results of the meet and confer process. (See Code Civ. Proc. § 430.41(a)(3).)

Defendants’ counsel attests to his meet and confer efforts with Plaintiff’s counsel by email. (See Declaration of Simran Tiwana filed April 21, 2026, ¶ 3.) Defendants’ counsel attests he called Plaintiff’s counsel to meet and confer but was unable to speak with him. (See id.) The parties determined over email they could not resolve their dispute. (See id.) The Court finds Defendants satisfied their meet and confer obligation.

IV. LEGAL STANDARD

A demurrer may be brought if insufficient facts are stated to support the cause of action asserted. (See Code Civ. Proc. § 430.10(e).) “A demurrer tests the sufficiency of a complaint as a matter of law.” ¿ (Durell v. Sharp Healthcare ¿ (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1350, 1358.) Allegations are to be liberally construed. (See Code Civ. Proc. § 452.)

In testing the sufficiency of the complaint, the court must assume the truth of (1) the properly pleaded factual allegations; (2) facts that can be reasonably inferred from those expressly pleaded; and (3) judicially noticed matters. (See Blank v. Kirwan ¿ (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. (See SKF Farms v. Superior Court ¿ (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 902, 905.) To the extent factual allegations conflict with the content of the exhibits to the complaint, we rely on and accept as true the contents of the exhibits and treat as surplusage the pleader’s allegations as to the legal effect of the exhibits. (See Barnett v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 500, 505.)

Leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (See Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 348.) The burden is on the complainant to show the Court a pleading can be amended successfully. (See id.) However,”[i]f there is any reasonable possibility that the plaintiff can state a good cause of action, it is error to sustain a demurrer without leave to amend.” (Youngman v. Nevada Irrigation Dist. (1969) 70 Cal.2d 240, 245.) /// ///

V. JUDICIAL NOTICE

The Court GRANTS Defendants’ request for judicial notice. (See Evid. Code § 452(h).) But the Court takes judicial notice only as to the existence, content, and authenticity of such documents, not the truth of the factual matters asserted therein. (See Dominguez v. Bonta (2022) 87 Cal.App.5th 389, 400.)

VI. ANALYSIS

“A mechanic's lien is a claim against the real property upon which the claimant has bestowed labor or furnished materials. (Kim v. JF Enterprises ¿ (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 849, 854 [50 Cal.Rptr.2d 141] (Kim ¿).) A mechanic's lien is perfected by filing a claim of lien within certain time limitations and by meeting other statutory requirements. (Ibid.) One such statutory requirement is the service of a preliminary 20-day notice.” ¿ (Shady Tree Farms, LLC v. Omni Fin., LLC ¿ (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 131, 135.) ¿ Under Civil Code § 8200, before recording a lien claim, a claimant shall give preliminary notice to the owner, the direct contractor to which the claimant provides work, and the construction lender if any. (See Civ.

Code § 8200(a).) “A claimant with a direct contractual relationship with an owner is required to give preliminary notice only to the construction lender or reputed construction lender, if any.” (Id., § 8200(e)(2).) A preliminary notice shall be given no later than 20 days after the claimant has first furnished work. (See Civ. Code § 8204(a).) Under Civil Code § 8460,”[t]he claimant shall commence an action to enforce a lien within 90 days after recordation of the claim of lien. If the claimant does not commence an action to enforce the lien within that time, the claim of lien expires and is unenforceable.”

Defendants argue Plaintiff’s first cause of action for foreclosure of mechanic’s lien fails to state a claim because it expired under Civil Code § 8460. Defendants argue Plaintiff’s initial complaint was filed in propria persona and was thus void, as a result, Plaintiff did not commence its action to enforce the lien within the 90-day period prescribed by § 8460. Defendants argue the FAC, which was filed with the assistance of counsel, cannot cure this defect. (See Dem. at 9:9-23.) Defendants argue even though a corporation’s failure to appear through counsel is a correctible defect under CLD Construction, Inc. v. City of San Ramon (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 1141, 1149, this relief cannot extend to Plaintiff’s circumstances, because the defect here was not merely procedural, it was substantive. (See Dem. at 13:10-13.)

Second, Defendants argue the first claim fails because the FAC contains no allegations Plaintiff served a valid preliminary notice as required by Civil Code § 8200(c). (See id., at 9:24-26.)

In opposition, Plaintiff argues it timely commenced its action as its initial Complaint was not void under CLD Construction and it subsequently cured the procedural defect of its initial pleading. (See Opp. at 2:6-10, 3:1-5 citing CLD Construction, 120 Cal.App.4th at 1149.) Plaintiff also argues paragraph 21 of the FAC alleges Plaintiff complied with Civil Code § 8200. (See Opp. at 4:12-18.)

Defendants argue though CLD Construction held the procedural rule mandating a corporation must be represented by counsel is a curable defect in the complaint, Plaintiff’s reliance on CLD Construction is misplaced. Defendants argue by the time Plaintiff obtained counsel and filed its FAC, the lien had already expired by operation of law under § 8460. (See Reply at 3:1-20, 4:16-21, citing Automatic Sprinkler Corp. v. Southern Cal. Edison Co. (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 627, 635 [holding action to foreclose the lien was neither commenced in the proper court nor transferred to the proper court within 90 days thus foreclosure was barred].) Defendants also argue the FAC does not allege strict compliance with § 8200, as Plaintiff was required to affirmatively allege it actually served a preliminary notice in the correct form, by the correct method, on the correct parties. (See Reply at 5:11-18.)

The Court is unpersuaded by Defendants’ argument Plaintiff did not “commence an action to enforce a lien within 90 days after recordation of the claim of lien.” (Civ. Code § 8460.) First, Defendant’s reliance on Automatic is misplaced, as that case held that foreclosure of a mechanic’s lien was barred because the plaintiff failed to commence its action in the proper court within 90 days. (See Automatic, 216 Cal.App.3d at 635.) There is no dispute here about whether Plaintiff filed this action in the correct county. Here, Plaintiff commenced this action on January 2, 2026, when it filed its Complaint. (See Code Civ. Proc. § 350.) Plaintiff alleges it recorded a Claim of Mechanic's Lien October 10, 2025. (See FAC, ¶ 18.)

The Court finds Plaintiff commenced this action within the 90-day period after recording the lien despite that the initial pleading was filed without representation of counsel. CLD Construction rejected the argument a pleading is void because it was filed on behalf of a corporation by a non-attorney, “Given the weight of nationwide authority and this state’s increasing acceptance of the view that representation of the corporation by an attorney is not an absolute prerequisite to the court’s fundamental power to hear or determine a case, we are persuaded it is more appropriate and just to treat a corporation’s failure to be represented by an attorney as a defect that may be corrected, on such terms as are just in the sound discretion of the court?

The rule requiring representation by an attorney’is not a fact essential to the corporation's cause of action or an element constituting its right of action.” (CLD Construction, 120 Cal.App.4th at 1149-50.)

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Complaint, which was filed within the 90-day period, was not void by virtue of having been filed without representation. Plaintiff then obtained counsel and filed its FAC to foreclose the identical lien, for the identical work, labor, and materials, arising out of the identical transaction and covering the same property. In an action to foreclose mechanic’s lien, where amended complaint does not change cause of action, the time to which 90?day statute of limitations runs is the filing of original complaint. (See Kirman v. Borzage (1946) 75 Cal.App.2d 865, 871 (discussing Ginsberg v. Faraone (1932) 126 Cal.App. 337, 343).) Thus, having cured the lack of representation defect and filing the FAC to foreclose the identical lien, the Court finds Plaintiff timely commenced its action to foreclose its lien within the 90-day period prescribed by Civil Code § 8460.

Second, the Court finds Plaintiff properly alleges compliance with § 8200. The FAC alleges “Plaintiff has performed all conditions precedent to the enforcement of its Mechanic’s’ and “Plaintiff has complied with all of the statutory prerequisites to maintaining this action for enforcement of its mechanic’s lien.” (FAC, ¶¶ 21, 28.) ¿ This is sufficient at the pleadings stage. (See Southern Cal. Edison Co. v. Industrial Accident Com. (1926) 78 Cal.App.584, 590 [pleadings in civil actions need not be couched in the exact language of the statute provided sufficient facts be shown to bring them within its plain intent].) ¿ Defendants provide no authority supporting their position Plaintiff must specifically plead it served a preliminary notice in the correct form, by the correct method, on the correct parties to survive demurrer.

Thus, the Court OVERRULES Defendants? Demurrer to the First Cause of Action for Foreclosure of Mechanic’s Lien.

VII. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court OVERRULES Defendants? Demurrer to the First Cause of Action for Foreclosure of Mechanic’s Lien. IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: May 18, 2026 Hon. Michael R. Amerian Judge, Superior Court

[1] All statutory references are to California codes unless stated otherwise. Home -->)" -->