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Respondent Fresno County District Attorney’s Office Motion to Quash Plaintiff’s Deposition Subpoena
(47) Tentative Ruling
Re: A. M. v. Fresno Unified School District Case No. 22CECG02656
Hearing Date: May 13, 2026 (Dept. 502)
Motions: Respondent Fresno County District Attorney’s Office Motion to Quash Plaintiff’s Deposition Subpoena
Tentative Ruling:
Respondent, Fresno County District Attorney’s Office Motion to Quash Deposition Subpoena is granted.
Respondent, Fresno County District Attorney’s Office request for sanctions is denied.
Explanation:
On February 13, 2026, respondent, Fresno County District Attorney’s Office (“Respondent”) received the Subpoena for Personal Appearance and Documents from plaintiff, A.M. (“plaintiff”). (Declaration of Jamie Kalebjian, ¶ 5, Exhibit “A” (hereinafter “Kalebjian Decl.”).)
Respondent moved to quash the Subpoena on procedural defects, as well as other grounds such as being overly broad, and privilege.
Defective as Location of Deposition is Too Far
Respondent first argues that the deposition of a nonparty organization must be taken only within 75 miles of the organization’s principal office in California, unless the organization consents to a more distant location. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.250, subd. (c).)
Respondent challenges and seeks to quash to plaintiff’s “Deposition Subpoena for Personal Appearance and Production of Documents and Things,” dated February 11, 2026. (Kalebjian Decl., Ex. A.) Paragraph 1 of the Subpoena by its own terms ordered Respondent’s Custodian “TO APPEAR IN PERSON TO TESTIFY AS A WITNESS in this action at the following date, time, and place.” (Ibid.) The date, time and place state: 3/4/2026; 10:00am; and 24151 Ventura Blvd., Ste 230, Calabasas, California 91302. (Ibid.) Paragraph 2 goes on to warn that “[t]he personal appearance of the custodian or other qualified witness and the production of original records are required by this subpoena.” (Ibid.)
The Respondent’s principal office is located at 2100 Tulare Street, Fresno, California 93721. (Kalebjian Decl., ¶ 8.) The location of the deposition is 217 miles from the Respondent’s principal office. (Id., ¶ 9.)
Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.250 requires that “[u]nless the court orders otherwise under Section 2025.260, the deposition of a natural person, whether or not a party to the action, shall be taken at a place that is, at the option of the party giving notice of the deposition, either within 75 miles of the deponent's residence, or within the county where the action is pending and within 150 miles of the deponent's residence.”
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Calabasas is more than 150 miles from respondent’s principal office in the City of Fresno. Therefore, the Court cannot enforce compliance with a subpoena that is defective on its face.
Defective as Notice Requirements to Consumer Not Met
Respondent further objects to plaintiff’s Subpoena for failure provide notice to potential “consumers” as per Code of Civil Procedure section 1985.3.
Respondent correctly points out, the consumer notice requirements apply to all requests for “personal information” tendered to a state agency. (Code of Civ. Proc., § 1985.4) The term “personal information” in this contexts refers to any information that is maintained by an agency that identifies or describes an individual, including, but not limited to, his or her name, social security number, physical description, home address, home telephone number, education, financial matters, and medical or employment history. (Civ. Code, § 1798.3(a)) A “consumer,” in this context, means any natural person. (Code of Civ. Proc., § 1985.4.)
Plaintiff seeks various types of records requested containing personal information for the civil plaintiffs, and the victims, witnesses and defendants in the prior criminal proceedings. Plaintiff correctly points out that he cannot provide notice to consumers whose identity he does not know. (Plaintiff’s Opposition Papers, pg. 3, lns. 6-17.) In such instances, Code of Civil Procedure section 1983.5, subdivision (h) provides guidance:
Upon good cause shown and provided that the rights of witnesses and consumers are preserved, a subpoenaing party shall be entitled to obtain an order shortening the time for service of a subpoena duces tecum or waiving the requirements of subdivision (b) where due diligence by the subpoenaing party has been shown.
A party issuing a subpoena can petition the Court to waive the consumer notice requirement upon demonstrating that they have no other way to learn the identity of the person to be noticed. In order to do so, the issuing party would need to demonstrate due diligence in otherwise obtaining the necessary information. Here, plaintiff’s opposition does not demonstrate due diligence.
In the alternative, Code of Civil Procedure section 1985.3, subdivision (b) states, “[p]rior to the date called for in the subpoena duces tecum for the production of personal records, the subpoenaing party shall serve or cause to be served on the consumer whose records are being sought a copy of the subpoena duces tecum, of the affidavit supporting the issuance of the subpoena ...[.] (emphasis added).”
Code of Civil Procedure section 1985.3, subdivision (b) can be met if plaintiff serves the consumer or causes the consumer to be served. This requirement can be met with an order issued by this Court to respondent, which has possession of the information necessary to comply with Code of Civil Procedure section 1985.3, subdivision (h), in order to serve the notice requirements. This balances the needs of the plaintiff to obtain discoverable information and comply with the statute, the requirement to protect the consumer, and the desire of respondent not to release information without compliance with the statute.
Therefore, the Court cannot currently enforce compliance with a subpoena that is defective on its face, and has not met the notice requirements.
Certain Categories of Identified Records Are Overly Broad and Unenforceable
Respondent argues that certain categories of identified records are overly broad and unenforceable. Respondent argues that the overly broad subject document requests are analogous to those in Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, where the defendant claimed that gun mounts it contracted with the plaintiff to manufacture did not meet the designated specifications, refused to accept the gun mounts, and contracted with a third party to supply them. (Calcor, 53 Cal.App.4th at 219.)
In Calcor, the plaintiff served the third party manufacturer with a document subpoena that included 32 document demands, “to, in effect, produce all materials in its possession relating to gun mounts, going back nearly ten years.” (Ibid.) The Court of Appeal found that the “12–page demand might as well be condensed into a single sentence: Produce everything in your possession which in any way relates to gun mounts.” (Id. at 222.) The Court of Appeal concluded that the subpoena was impermissibly overbroad because, “although facially detailed and particularized, the demand, in effect, is very simple.
It orders Calcor to produce everything in its possession which has anything to do with gun mounts (including the gun mount assemblies themselves).” (Id. at 220.)
The Court agrees with Respondent that Items 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11 to compel production of all records pertaining to (1) “all evidence booked or recovered”, (2) “Maximo Donato Parayno III”, (3) “Superior Court of California, County of Fresno, Court Case No. F03901491-1”, (4) Fresno County DA File No. 2003S7675”, (5) “G.V.”, (6) “S.N.”, (7) “A.M.”, and (8) “Sarah Sawdey-Ochoa”, is overly broad.
Plaintiff stating the purposes of why plaintiff seeks those documents, (Plaintiff’s Opposition Papers, pg. 5, lns. 1-5), doesn’t ameliorate the requests being overbroad, where the requests are not tailored to plaintiff’s explanation.
For instance, Item 4 in the Subpoena regarding “(a)ny and all evidence booked or recovered” has no bounds of time or scope. (Kalebjian Decl., ¶¶ 5, 12, Ex. A.) The other categories of identified documents in the Subpoena simply demand everything in respondent’s possession related to the criminal prosecution of Maximo Doanto Parayno III and the related criminal case in Frenso County Superior Court case No. F03901491-1. Therefore, these requests for production are unenforceable as being overly broad. (Calcor, supra, 53 Cal.App.4th at 223.)
Privilege
Given the Court’s determination that plaintiff’s requests are overly broad and unenforceable, the issue of privilege is premature to consider.
When information protected by the right to privacy under Article I, Section 1 of the California Constitution is sought by way of discovery, the burden falls on the party asserting a privacy interest to show that their privacy interests are so serious that they outweigh the interests of the requesting party’s prospective invasion. (Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 557.)
A public entity has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent others from disclosing official information, if an authorized person claims the privilege and disclosure is either (1) prohibited by an act of Congress or a California statute, i.e., absolutely privileged (Evid. Code, § 1040, subd. (b)(1)), or (2) against the public interest, i.e., conditionally privileged, subject to the judge’s discretion (Id. at subd. (b)(2)). Official information is information acquired in confidence by a public employee during his or her duty and not open, or officially disclosed, to the public before the claim of privilege is made. (Id. at subd. (a).)
Here, respondent does not claim any absolute privilege under Evidence Code section 1040, subdivision (b)(1). If the requested information is conditionally privileged, and “the public entity satisfies the threshold burden of showing that the information was acquired in confidence, the statute requires the court next to weigh the interests and to sustain the privilege only if there is a necessity for preserving the confidentiality of the information that outweighs the necessity for disclosure in the interest of justice.” (Marylander v. Superior Court (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1119, 1126 [internal quotations omitted].)
Since plaintiff’s requests are overly broad and unenforceable, the Court does not see a purpose of entertaining this issue. If plaintiff chooses to focus their requests, the Court can analyze specific assertions of privilege to specific items requested, accordingly.
Sanctions
Respondent moves for monetary sanctions against plaintiff pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1987.2. Although plaintiff unsuccessfully opposed this motion, the Court finds that plaintiff acted with substantial justification, and made reasonable arguments in support of their position. No sanctions are appropriate.
Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), and Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5, subdivision (a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will serve as the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.
Tentative Ruling
Issued By: KCK on 05/12/26. (Judge’s initials) (Date) 11