Gonzales v. City of Fresno

Summary adjudication is the proper mechanism for challenging a particular, “cause of action, an affirmative defense, a claim for punitive damages, or an issue of duty.” (Paramount Petroleum Corp. v. Superior Court (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 226, 242.) However, “[a] motion for summary adjudication shall be granted only if it completely disposes of a cause of action, an affirmative defense, a claim for damages, or an issue of duty.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (f)(1); see also Catalano v. Superior Court (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 91, 97 [piecemeal adjudication prohibited].) 26

Individual Officers’ Liability

Public employees are “not liable for civil damages on account of personal injury to or death of any person or damage to property resulting from the operation, in the line of duty, of an authorized emergency vehicle while responding to an emergency call or when in the immediate pursuit of an actual or suspected violator of the law ...” (Veh. Code, § 17004.) At the time of the accident, defendant Officers Clapper and Saldana were in their patrol vehicle in pursuit of a suspected violator of the law. Plaintiff does not challenge this. The Court grants summary adjudication on the issue of Officers Clapper and Saldana’s immunity pursuant to Vehicle Code section 17004.

City’s Immunity

Vehicle Code section 17001 imposes a statutory exception to a public entity’s general tort immunity for death or injury caused by negligent operation of a vehicle by an employee within the scope of employment. Vehicle Code section 17004.7 provides public entities with a means of obtaining immunity where the entity adopts a vehicle pursuit policy. (Veh. Code, § 17004.7, subd. (a).) Such immunity is available if the entity “adopts and promulgates a written policy on, and provides regular and periodic training on an annual basis for, vehicular pursuits...” (Veh.

Code, § 17004.7, subd. (b)(1).) Promulgation includes a requirement that all officers “certify in writing that they have received, read, and understand the policy.” (Veh. Code, § 17004.7, subd. (b)(2).) Adoption of a vehicle pursuit policy is discretionary, not mandatory, but is the means by which an entity can obtain immunity. (Ramirez v. City of Gardena (2018) 5 Cal.5th 995, 1001.) This code section incentivizes public entities to adopt a pursuit policy and providing training on it. (Ibid.)

The California Supreme Court has held that “a public agency’s pursuit policy must contain the written certification requirement, but the agency does not have to prove total compliance with that requirement as a condition of obtaining immunity...” (Id. at p. 1002.) However, the Supreme Court noted that it was only addressing whether an agency must show that every officer has complied with the certification requirement. (Ibid.) It was not making any determination as to “meaningful implementation of the pursuit policy.” (Ibid.)

Vehicle Code section 17004.7, subdivision (f) articulates that compliance with regards to training is a question of law for the court. (Veh. Code, § 17004.7, subd. (f); Flores v. City of San Diego (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 360, 375.) The training is mandatory if an entity wants the benefits of immunity. (Flores v. City of San Diego, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at p. 384.) The training must cover all the subjects set forth in Vehicle Code section 17004.7, subdivision (c) and comply with training guidelines found in Penal Code section 13519.8. (Ibid.) A “one-hour annual minimum time standard” applies for entities seeking this immunity. (Id. at p. 391.) To demonstrate that immunity applies, an entity “must present undisputed facts demonstrating that its vehicle pursuit policy training was at least one hour in duration in the training year prior to the incident.” (Id. at p. 392.)

Here, it is disputed whether the City provided the minimum of one-hour of training to its officers. (UMF Nos. 96-98.) The Court denies the summary adjudication as to the issue of the City’s immunity. The Court would note that as this is a matter in which the 27

Court is to make a determination as a matter of law, the Court will entertain any discussion or stipulation regarding addressing this issue separate from a jury trial.

Government Claim

Failure to present a timely government tort claim acts as a bar from a lawsuit against a government entity. (Gong v. City of Rosemead (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 363, 374.) Defendant relies on Nelson v. County of Los Angeles (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 783, 797 to argue that plaintiff here submitted an insufficient government claim subject to summary adjudication. The court in Nelson noted an estate did not file a claim and there was nothing in the claim that was filed to suggest it was filed in any capacity other than individually. (Ibid.)

Where a claim is deficient, the doctrine of substantial compliance may act to validate the claim. (Connelly v. County of Fresno (2006) 146 Cal.App.4th 29, 28.) Substantial compliance meets the purpose of the claims statute of giving the entity “timely notice of the nature of the claim” in order to investigate and potentially settle claims. (Ibid.) The test is whether the claim disclosed “sufficient information to enable the public entity to make an adequate investigation of the claim’s merits and settle it without the expense of litigation.” (Ibid.)

Here, in the box for the name of the claimant in the amended claim it says, “Megan Gonzales, Guardian for Victor Cardenas III”. (Def. Statement of Evidence, Exh. K.) It also refers to the attached Traffic Collision Report. (Ibid.) The naming of the claimant alone suggests that this may be for both Megan Gonzales and on behalf of Victor Cardenas III. The claim also makes it apparent that Cardenas was killed following a high speed chase. (Ibid.) As such, the City had sufficient notice of the bases of the claim. Thus, the Court denies summary adjudication as to this issue.

Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), and Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5, subdivision (a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will serve as the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Tentative Ruling

Issued By: JS on 5/5/2026. (Judge’s initials) (Date)

28