IMMIGRANT RIGHTS DEFENSE COUNCIL, LLC., A CALIFORNIA LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY vs FILATOVA, et al.

26CV006554: IMMIGRANT RIGHTS DEFENSE COUNCIL, LLC., A CALIFORNIA LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY vs FILATOVA, et al. 07/16/2026 Hearing on Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings in Department 16D

A Stipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) is required to be signed by each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the hearing, if not using a reporter from the Court’s Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list.

Once the form is signed it must be filed with the clerk. If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided.

*** NOTICE: EFFECTIVE APRIL 13, 2026, THIS DEPARTMENT HAS MOVED TO THE TANI G. CANTIL-SAKAUYE COURTHOUSE LOCATED AT 500 G. ST. SACRAMENTO, CA. ALL MOTIONS NOTICED FOR DEPARTMENT 53 WILL BE HEARD IN DEPARTMENT 16D OF THE NEW COURTHOUSE. ALL PAPERS FOR THIS DEPARTMENT MUST BE FILED AT THIS NEW LOCATION AND WILL NOT BE ACCEPTED AT THE HALL OF JUSTICE. ALL HEARINGS WILL TAKE PLACE AT THIS NEW LOCATION. PARTIES MAY CONTINUE TO APPEAR REMOTELY IN DEPARTMENT 16D UNLESS SPECIFICALLY ORDERED OTHERWISE. ***

TENTATIVE RULING:

Self-represented Defendant Natalia Filatova’s motion for judgment on the pleadings is denied.

Defendant’s unopposed request for judicial notice is granted for the limited purposes permitted for judicial notice. (See, Evid. Code §451, subd. (a); §452, subds. (b)-(d); see also, Johnson & Johnson v. Superior Court (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 757, 768 [court may take judicial notice of the existence of court documents but not the truth of the statements contained therein]; Kilroy v. State of California (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 140, 145-148; Sosinsky v. Grant (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1548, 1569-70.)

Plaintiff Immigrant Rights Defense Council, LLC filed a complaint against Defendant alleging a single cause of action for violation of the Immigration Consultant Act (Bus. & Prof. Code § 22440 et seq.)

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

26CV006554: IMMIGRANT RIGHTS DEFENSE COUNCIL, LLC., A CALIFORNIA LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY vs FILATOVA, et al. 07/16/2026 Hearing on Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings in Department 16D

Defendant now moves for judgment on the pleadings.

A defendant may move for judgment on the pleadings if the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against that defendant. (CCP § 438(b)(1), (c)(1)(B)(ii).) Except as provided by statute, a motion for judgment on the pleadings is analyzed like a general demurrer. (Cloud v. Northrop Grumman Corp. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 995, 999.) Thus, on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the Court may extend consideration to matters that are subject to judicial notice; in doing so, the Court performs essentially the same task as ruling on a general demurrer. (Smiley v. Citibank (1995) 11 C.4th 138, 146.) The Court therefore sets out the general rules governing demurrers below.

A demurrer “tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters.” (SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 902, 905.) The purpose of a demurrer is to test the legal sufficiency of a claim. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal. App. 4th 968, 994.) For the purpose of determining the effect of a complaint, its allegations are liberally construed, with a view toward substantial justice. (CCP § 452; Amarel v. Connell (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 137, 140-141; Quelimane Co. v.

Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 43, fn. 7.) The Court treats the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law, and considers matters which may be judicially noticed. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318; Poseidon Development, Inc. v. Woodland Lane Estates, LLC (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1106, 1111-1112.) A general demurrer does not admit contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law alleged in the complaint; facts impossible in law; or allegations contrary to facts of which a court may take judicial notice. (Blank, supra, 39 Cal. 3d at 318, William S.

Hart Union High School Dist. v. Regional Planning Com. (1991) 226 Cal. App. 3d 1612, 1616 fn.2.) Extrinsic evidence may not properly be considered on demurrer or on a motion to strike. (Ion Equipment Corp. v. Nelson (1980) 110 Cal. App. 3d 868, 881; Hibernia Savings & Loan Soc. v. Thornton (1897) 117 C. 481, 482.)

A demurrer may be sustained only if the complaint lacks any sufficient allegations to entitle the plaintiff to relief. (Financial Corp. of America v. Wilburn (1987) 189 Cal. App. 3d 764, 778.) “Plaintiff need only plead facts showing that he may be entitled to some relief . . ., we are not concerned with plaintiff's possible inability or difficulty in proving the allegations of the complaint.” (Highlanders, Inc. v. Olsan (1978) 77 Cal. App. 3d 690, 696-697.) “[Courts] are required to construe the complaint liberally to determine whether a cause of action has been stated, given the assumed truth of the facts pleaded.” (Picton v. Anderson Union High School

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

26CV006554: IMMIGRANT RIGHTS DEFENSE COUNCIL, LLC., A CALIFORNIA LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY vs FILATOVA, et al. 07/16/2026 Hearing on Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings in Department 16D

Dist. (1996) 50 Cal. App. 4th 726.) A demurrer admits the truth of all material facts properly pled and the sole issue raised by a general demurrer is whether the facts pled state a valid cause of action - not whether they are true. (Serrano v. Priest (1971) 5 Cal. 3d 584, 591.)

First Cause of Action (Violation of the ICA)

Defendant’s motion is denied.

Business & Professions Code § 22440 provides that “[i]t is unlawful for any person, for compensation, other than persons authorized to practice law or authorized by federal law to represent persons before the Board of Immigration Appeals or the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services, to engage in the business or act in the capacity of an immigration consultant within this state except as provided by this chapter.”

Business & Professions Code § 22446.5(a) provides that “[a] person claiming to be aggrieved by a violation of this chapter by an immigration consultant may bring a civil action for injunctive relief or damages, or both.” Further, “[a]ny other party who, upon information and belief, claims a violation of this chapter has been committed by an immigration consultant may bring a civil action for injunctive relief on behalf of the general public and, upon prevailing, shall recover reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs.” (Bus. & Prof. Code § 22446.5(b).)

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s allegations are vague and conclusory, fail to identify which specific provisions of the ICA she violated, and fails to allege any facts justifying injunctive relief.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant provides immigration services for compensation to the general public and that she assists customers with the preparation of immigration applications and petitions for more than a nominal fee. (Comp. ¶ 8.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant is engaging in the “practice”, “preparation” and “representation” as those terms are defined in federal immigration law and is thus engaging in the unauthorized practice of law in violation of Business & Professions Code § 22441(d). (Id.)

Plaintiff alleges that starting in September 2024, Defendant began offering “immigration legal services in exchange for compensation, including services such as assistance with the preparation of petitions and applications for immigration benefits, as well as the provision of legal advice.” (Id. ¶ 9.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant maintains a web site to market and advertise and identifies herself as a “Licensed Immigration Specialist” even though she has not taken the immigration specialization exam or obtained a law degree. (Id. ¶

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

26CV006554: IMMIGRANT RIGHTS DEFENSE COUNCIL, LLC., A CALIFORNIA LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY vs FILATOVA, et al. 07/16/2026 Hearing on Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings in Department 16D

10.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant’s advertisements do not include a clear and conspicuous statement that she is not an attorney as required by Business & Professions Code § 22442.2. (Id. ¶ 11.) Plaintiff seeks a judgment permanently enjoining Defendant from further violations of the ICA. (Id. ¶ 13.)

Plaintiff’s allegations set forth in the above paragraph are more than sufficient. They are neither vague nor conclusory. Further, contrary to Defendant’s argument, Plaintiff specifically alleges that Defendant violated Business & Professions Code § 22441(d) which provides that persons engaged in the business of an immigration consultant shall only offer nonlegal assistance. Notably, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant assisted with the preparation of immigration applications and petitions. As the State Bar Court has indicated, “[w]e further hold that the preparation and filing of immigration applications, pleadings, and documents by the nonattorney providers in this proceeding fall within California's definition of the unauthorized practice of law (accord Unauthorized Practice Committee, State Bar of Texas v.

Cortez (Tex. 1985) 692 S.W.2d 47, 50; [*43] Oregon State Bar v. Ortiz (Or.Ct.App. 1986) 713 P.2d 1068, 1070) and that those nonattorney providers, therefore, engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.” (In re Valinoti (2002) 2002 Calif. Op. LEXIS 9, *42-43, 4 Cal.State Bar Ct.Rptr. 498.) The Third District Court of Appeal has cited this State Bar Court opinion favorably. (In re White (2004) 121 Cal. App. 4th 1453, 1487, fn. 23.)

Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant violated § 22442.2 which requires immigration consultants “conspicuously display in his or her office a notice that shall be at least 12 by 20 inches with boldface type or print with each character at least one inch in height and width in English and in the native language of the immigration consultant’s clientele” certain information including that the consultant is not an attorney. (Bus. & Prof. Code § 22442.2(a)(2).) Plaintiff has alleged that Defendant failed to display this information and has held herself out as a “Licensed Immigration Specialist”.

While Defendant argues that Plaintiff improperly makes allegations on “information and belief”, the allegations set forth above are not made on “information and belief.” Regardless, as discussed above, “[a]ny other party who, upon information and belief, claims a violation of this chapter has been committed by an immigration consultant may bring a civil action for injunctive relief on behalf of the general public and, upon prevailing, shall recover reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs.” (Bus. & Prof. Code § 22446.5(b) [emphasis added].) Defendant’s opposition recognizes that a plaintiff may make allegations on information and belief. Moreover, “[p]laintiff may allege on information and belief any matters that are not within his personal knowledge, if

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

26CV006554: IMMIGRANT RIGHTS DEFENSE COUNCIL, LLC., A CALIFORNIA LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY vs FILATOVA, et al. 07/16/2026 Hearing on Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings in Department 16D

he has information leading him to believe that the allegations are true.” (Doe v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 42 Cal. 4th 531, 550 [citations omitted].) Allegations on information and belief would only be insufficient where the pleading” merely asserted the facts so alleged without alleging such information that “lead[s] [the plaintiff] to believe that the allegations are true. (Id. at 551, fn. 5 [citations omitted].) Again, none of the allegations setting forth Defendant’s alleged violations of the ICA are made on information and belief and in any event, Plaintiff has set forth sufficient information regarding the alleged violations.

Further, the only allegation made on information and belief related to Defendant’s violations of the ICA is the allegation that based on the conduct set forth in the complaint, Defendant has likely “on information and belief, violated other provisions of the ICA, to be determined at trial.” (Comp. ¶ 12.) That allegation, however, has no bearing on the sufficiency of the other allegations setting forth the violations of specific provisions of the ICA.

Defendant appears to suggest that the complaint is deficient because Plaintiff has not identified any specific client she offered services to, or the specific dates on which those services were rendered. Defendant cites no authority requiring such level of detail at the pleading stage. “To survive a demurrer, the complaint need only allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action; each evidentiary fact that might eventually form part of the plaintiff's proof need not be alleged.” (C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal. 4th 861, 872.) Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient.

The Court also rejects Defendant’s argument that Plaintiff has not set forth facts sufficient to support a request for injunctive relief. Defendant contends that Plaintiff has not alleged a present controversy or presently occurring conduct. However, here, the requested injunction is authorized by statute. “The courts of this state have adopted similar reasoning, that is, where an injunction is authorized by statute, a violation thereof is good and sufficient cause for its issuance.” (Paul v. Wadler (1962) 209 Cal.

App. 2d 615, 625.) “The theory is that when a legislative body has authorized the injunctive remedy for the violation of a statute, it has determined as a matter of law that irreparable injury attends the violation of the statute.” (Id.) “It was not necessary for respondent to allege or prove the existence of the usual equitable grounds for the issuance of an injunction nor to allege a threatened repetition of the acts. ‘Where an injunction is authorized by statute it is enough that the statutory conditions are satisfied.’” (Porter v.

Fiske (1946) 74 Cal. App. 2d 332, 338.) Bus. & Prof. Code § 22446.5(b) authorizes injunctive relief and Plaintiff was not required to allege any equitable grounds for an injunction or a potential for recurrence. Rather, Plaintiff was required to allege a violation of the ICA which it has done sufficiently here.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

26CV006554: IMMIGRANT RIGHTS DEFENSE COUNCIL, LLC., A CALIFORNIA LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY vs FILATOVA, et al. 07/16/2026 Hearing on Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings in Department 16D

To the extent that Defendant argues that she is registered and bonded with the Secretary of State, this extrinsic evidence cannot be considered on this motion. As stated above, motions for judgment on the pleadings are analyzed like demurrers and extrinsic evidence is not permitted on a demurrer. (Ion Equipment Corp., supra, 110 Cal. App. 3d at 881.) Therefore, such evidence is also not permitted on this motion. While the Court granted Defendant’s request for judicial notice as set forth above, it stated that it may only take judicial notice of the existence of the documents on file with the Secretary of State, but not the truth of the matters asserted therein. (See Johnson & Johnson v.

Superior Court (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 757, 768 [court may take judicial notice of the existence of court documents but not the truth of the statements contained therein]; Kilroy v. State of California (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 140, 145-148; Sosinsky v. Grant (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1548, 1569-70.) In any event, Plaintiff has not alleged that Defendant is not registered and bonded such that there is no allegation putting such matter in issue even if this were an evidence-based motion.

In sum, Defendant’s motion is denied.

This minute order is effective immediately. No formal order pursuant to CRC Rule 3.1312 or other notice is required.