Everardo Baltierra v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc.

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Tentative Ruling

Re: Everardo Baltierra v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc. Superior Court Case No. 24CECG03804

Hearing Date: May 6, 2026 (Dept. 503)

Motion: By Defendant for Summary Adjudication

Tentative Ruling:

To grant defendant's motion for summary adjudication as to plaintiffs' third cause of action. Defendant is directed to submit to this court, within 10 days of service of the minute order, a proposed order consistent with the court’s summary adjudication ruling.

Explanation:

Defendant American Honda Motor Co., Inc. (Defendant) moves for summary adjudication in its favor and against plaintiffs Everardo Baltierra and Raquel Haro de Baltierra (Plaintiffs) on Plaintiffs' third cause of action for violation of Civil Code section 1793.2, subdivision (b), on the grounds there no evidence that any repair presentation lasted more than 30 days and no evidence that any dealership failed to commence a warranty repair within a reasonable time.

Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (c) provides that summary judgment "shall be granted if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." A defendant moving for summary judgment has the initial burden of presenting evidence that a cause of action lacks merit because the plaintiff cannot establish an element of the cause of action or there is a complete defense. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2); Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 853 (Aguilar).) If the defendant satisfies this initial burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to present evidence demonstrating there is a triable issue of material fact. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2); Aguilar, at p. 850.)

The trial court must "carefully scrutinize the moving party's papers and resolve all doubts regarding the existence of material, triable issues of fact in favor of the party opposing the motion." (Connelly v. County of Fresno (2006) 146 Cal.App.4th 29, 36.) The court must strictly construe the moving party's declarations and liberally construe the opposing party's declarations. (Villacres v. ABM Industries Inc. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 562, 575 [affirming trial court's granting of employer's summary judgment motion]; Binder v.

Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832, 839 [reversing summary judgment where evidence suggested strong possibility trier of fact would resolve issues in favor of moving defendant, but not necessarily so].) "A triable issue of fact is created when the evidence reasonably permits the trier of fact, under the applicable standard of proof, to find the purportedly contested fact in favor of the party opposing the motion." (Loomis v. 6

Amazon.com LLC (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 466, 475 [reversing summary judgment where genuine issues of material fact existed on consumer's strict products liability claim].)

Defendant Satisfies Its Initial Burden

The Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (the Act or Song-Beverly), popularly known as the "lemon law," provides various remedies to buyers of defective motor vehicles. The Act includes Civil Code section 1793.2, which governs a manufacturer's repair duties for an express warranty.

Defendant's motion for summary adjudication is directed to Plaintiffs' third cause of action for alleged violations of Defendant's duty to repair as required by Civil Code section 1793.2, subdivision (b). Under subdivision (a) of this section, a manufacturer must maintain service and repair facilities or authorize independent facilities to carry out the terms of a warranty. Subdivision (b) of Civil Code section 1793.2 sets forth time limits for the manufacturer to complete warranty repairs:

Where those service and repair facilities are maintained in this state and service or repair of the goods is necessary because they do not conform with the applicable express warranties, service and repair shall be commenced within a reasonable time by the manufacturer or its representative in this state. Unless the buyer agrees in writing to the contrary, the goods shall be serviced or repaired so as to conform to the applicable warranties within 30 days.

Defendant's undisputed facts establish that Plaintiffs' vehicle, a 2023 Honda Civic (Subject Vehicle), was presented for repairs on six separate occasions. For five of the repairs the Subject Vehicle remained at the dealership for one day, and for one repair it remained at the dealership for two days. Defendant's evidence shows the Subject Vehicle was out of service for warranty repairs for total of seven days. (Fact Nos. 2 – 7.)

The parties cite no California case that directly addresses whether the Act's 30- day clock runs cumulatively or for a single repair. In Ramos v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC (2020) 55 Cal. App. 5th 220, after a jury trial, the appellate court expressly declined to decide the question:

We have not been asked to decide whether the 30 days of failure to complete repairs must be 30 consecutive days. For purposes of this appeal, we assume plaintiff proved the 30-day failure to repair requirement without deciding the question.

(Id. at p. 226, fn.

2. Italics added.)

"[T]he California Rules of Court do not prohibit citation to unpublished federal cases, which may properly be cited as persuasive, although not binding, authority.” (Landmark Screens, LLC v. Morgan, Lewis Bockius, LLP (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 238, 251, fn. 6; accord, Travelers Indemnity Company of Connecticut v. Navigators Specialty Insurance Company (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 341, 362, fn. 16 [California courts may cite and rely upon unpublished federal court decisions as persuasive authority].) Defendant 7

properly cites several unpublished federal cases as persuasive authority. (Memo., p.3., fn. 1.)1 For example, in Schick v. BMW of North America, LLC (9th Cir. April 14, 2020, No. 18- 56438) 801 Fed.Appx. 519, 521, the Ninth Circuit held that to state a cause of action under Civil Code section 1793.2, subdivision (b), a plaintiff must allege a single repair attempt took more than 30 days to complete:

[U]nder any reasonable reading of the statute, § 1793.2(b) requires only that [the manufacturer] complete any single repair attempt within 30 days. Because [the manufacturer] never took longer than 30 days to complete any single repair attempt, this claim fails as a matter of law.

(Ibid, italics original [rejecting claim where vehicle was out of service for a total of more than 30 nonconsecutive days]; accord, Brooks v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC (S.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2023, No. 23-CV-01214-BEN-BLM) 2023 WL 7117951, at *2 [nearly all federal district courts have found 30-day requirement runs for a single repair; collecting cases].)

To determine if Defendant meets its initial burden, the court need not decide whether the Act's 30-day clock runs cumulatively or for a single repair because Defendant's undisputed material facts show the Subject Vehicle was never out of service for 30 days regardless of how measured. (Fact Nos. 2-9.) Therefore, the court finds Defendant meets its initial burden to show, as a matter of law, Plaintiffs cannot establish the essential element that any warranty repair took longer than 30 days to complete or that any dealership failed to commence a warranty repair within a reasonable time. The burden then shifts to Plaintiffs to raise a triable issue of material fact as to their third cause of action.

Plaintiffs Fail to Raise a Triable Issue of Material Fact

A party opposing summary judgment must present admissible evidence, including "declarations, admissions, answers to interrogatories, deposition, and matters of which judicial notice" must or may "be taken." (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co., supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 843, quoting Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (b).) Plaintiffs admit Fact Numbers 2, 3, and 4 are undisputed.

Plaintiffs dispute Fact No. 5 to the extent the Subject Vehicle remained at the dealership for five days. Plaintiffs cite exhibit 7 of the declaration of plaintiff Raquel Haro de Baltierra as evidence, but her declaration has only five exhibits. Although the court is not obligated to search through Plaintiffs' evidence, it has also considered paragraph 7 of Ms. Baltierra's declaration, wherein she confirms the Subject Vehicle was presented for repair on May 30, 2024, but mentions nothing about the number of days the Subject Vehicle remained at the dealership or whether the repair was commenced within a reasonable time.

She attaches a repair order as exhibit 4 that could support a finding that the Subject Vehicle remained at the dealership for five days from Thursday, May 30, 2024, to Monday, June 3, 2024, instead of one day, which would change the total number of days the Subject Vehicle was "in the shop" from seven to eleven. Even

1Plaintiffs incorrectly cite California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115, which bars only citation of unpublished California opinions. (See Opp., p. 4:17-19.)

resolving all doubts about the existence of material, triable issues of fact in Plaintiffs' favor as the party opposing the motion, the court finds this limited dispute about Fact No. 5 is immaterial.

Plaintiffs correctly point out an apparent typographical error in Fact No. 6, that the one-day repair required replacement of a waste "gate" connector, not a waste "gas" connector. The court finds this discrepancy is immaterial.

Plaintiffs also suggest a limited dispute in response to Fact No. 7, which provides:

On October 30, 2024, the Subject Vehicle was presented to [Defendant's] authorized repair facility, Clawson Honda, for a concern with multiple lights being illuminated. The dealership did not perform any repairs because Plaintiff refused to leave the vehicle overnight. The Subject Vehicle remained at the dealership for 1 day.

Without citing any additional evidence, Plaintiffs respond that Fact No. 7 is "[d]isputed to the extent the dealership pulled and cleared multiple faults." (Pltfs.' sep. stmt., p. 3:27-28, underscoring original.) The court finds whether pulling and clearing faults constitutes the performance of repairs is an immaterial dispute, at best. The relevant inquiry for purposes of the third cause of action is the number of days required to commence or complete the warranty repair. Under either Plaintiffs' or Defendant's interpretation, the Subject Vehicle remained at the dealership for one day.

Finally, Plaintiffs do not dispute Fact No. 8 that "[n]o repair presentation took more than 30 days to complete," or Fact No. 9, that "[t]he longest time [Plaintiffs'] vehicle was out of service for repairs was 2 days." The court rejects Plaintiffs' contention that these facts are improper argument. These facts are relevant to establish that Defendant has presented the court with a complete list of the applicable warranty repairs and the number of days the Subject Vehicle was out of service. If other repairs exist that Defendant failed to bring to the court's attention, Plaintiffs must provide evidence of such repairs. For example, by failing to dispute Fact No. 9, Plaintiffs appear to concede that the longest time their vehicle was out of service for repairs was two days, not five.

In their opposition memorandum of points and authorities, Plaintiffs claim "[t]he evidence in this case paints a clear picture: Defendant was not able to conform Plaintiffs' Vehicle to warranty within 30 days." (Opp., p. 2:15-17.) Rather than presenting evidence of nonconforming repair attempts, Plaintiffs present only general descriptions of "multiple repair presentations" and "numerous" but "insufficient" opportunities to make "full repairs" within a "reasonable amount of time." (See opp., p. 2:8-24)

Plaintiffs cite no case that holds, as Plaintiffs seem to suggest, that the 30-day requirement includes the time the vehicle is not in the possession of a repair facility. Neither a single five-day repair over a weekend, nor eleven total days out of service support a finding that any repair presentation lasted more than 30 days or was not commenced within a reasonable time.

In sum, Plaintiffs provide no evidence of any repair that Defendant failed to complete within a reasonable time, and no evidence that any repair (or all of the repairs 9

added together) took more than 30 days to complete, whether counting the days consecutively or cumulatively. Therefore, the court finds Plaintiffs fail to meet their burden to raise a triable issue of material fact.

Evidentiary Objections

The court has liberally construed Plaintiffs' submitted declaration and considered the attached exhibits without ruling on Defendant's evidentiary objections. The court now declines to rule on Defendant's objections because the challenged evidence is immaterial to the disposition of Defendant's motion. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (q).)

Conclusion

The court finds Defendant meets its burden to show Plaintiffs cannot prove at least one essential element of Plaintiffs' third cause of action for violations under Civil Code section 1793.2, subdivision (b). The burden then shifts to Plaintiffs to raise a triable issue of material fact, which Plaintiffs fails to do. Therefore, the court grants Defendant's motion for summary adjudication as to Plaintiffs' third cause of action for violation of Civil Code section 1793.2, subdivision (b).

Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), and Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5, subdivision (a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will serve as the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Tentative Ruling

Issued By: JS on 5/4/2026. (Judge’s initials)

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