LOCHRIDGE vs RUSHMORE SERVICING, LLC

The Trustee’s Deed Upon Sale (Exhibit 3 to the Fourth Amended Complaint) states that the purchaser of the property is Liong, and it attaches a Declaration of Eligible Bidder (pursuant to Civil Code § 2924m) signed by Liong. These documents clearly reflect that the “Prospective Owner Occupant” was Liong, not Artis Stewart. Plaintiff has not alleged any facts suggesting that Liong was acting as the agent of another person or entity in purchasing Plaintiff’s former property, or that Rushmore or US Bank would have any reason to doubt the information in Liong’s Declaration of Eligible Bidder.

Civil Code § 2924m(d) provides that a trustee may reasonably rely on affidavits and declarations regarding bidder eligibility.

Although Liong used an agent (Artis Stewart) to place the bid at the trustee’s sale, Plaintiff cites 24CV066873: LOCHRIDGE vs RUSHMORE SERVICING, LLC, A LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY 07/16/2026 Hearing on Demurrer DEMURRER TO FOURTH AMENDED COMPLAINT BY DEFENDANTS RUSHMORE SERVICING AND U.S. BANK, NA; filed by RUSHMORE SERVICING, LLC, a Limited Liability Company (Defendant) + CRS# 169263375727 in Department 24 no provision of Civil Code § 2924m (or of §2924h, which governs the bidding process at trustee’s sales) that prohibits an eligible buyer from using a disclosed agent to place the bid. Again, the documents prepared in connection with the trustee’s sale identified Artis Stewart as the representative of purchaser Liong, who submitted a Declaration of Eligible Bidder. Rushmore and US Bank were entitled to rely on that Declaration. (Civil Code § 2924m(d).)

The demurrer to the Fourth Cause of Action for Wrongful Foreclosure is SUSTAINED, WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. To the extent that the Fourth Cause of Action is based on an alleged violation of Civil Code § 2924m, it fails for the reasons set forth above. To the extent that the Fourth Cause of Action is based on an alleged violation of Civil Code § 2923.6 or § 2923.7, it is duplicative of the First and Second Causes of Action. To the extent that the Fourth Cause of Action is intended as a common law cause of action for wrongful foreclosure, it fails because Plaintiff has not alleged that she tendered payment of the amount owed on the secured loans, as required by, e.g., Lona v. Citibank NA (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 89, 112-114, nor has Plaintiff alleged facts suggesting that any of the exceptions to the tender requirement set forth in Lona apply.

Tender requires an unambiguous offer to pay the amount due, together with the ability to perform. (See, e.g. Nguyen v. Calhoun (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 428, 439 and Civil Code § 1494 - § 1495.) Plaintiff’s allegation that “[h]ad Defendants and its agents not violated the Civil Code as alleged herein, Plaintiffs [sic] would have tendered the amount due” (Fourth Amended Complaint, paragraph 99) is not an unambiguous offer the pay the full amount due on the secured loan. Nor is Fourth Amended Complaint paragraph 105, which alleges Plaintiff “could” tender any suns due to reinstate the loan if she obtains any monetary damages in this lawsuit.

Plaintiff may be excused from the tender requirement if (1) she attacks the validity of the underlying debt, (2) she has a counterclaim or setoff against the beneficiary, (3) where it would be inequitable to impose a tender requirement, and (4) where the trustee’s deed is void on its face. (See Lona, supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at 112-114.) Plaintiff has not alleged facts demonstrating that any of these exceptions apply. Plaintiff has not alleged any facts that would support an attack on the validity of the secured debt or suggesting that the trustee’s deed upon sale is void on its face.

Plaintiff’s contention that she has a counterclaim or setoff against Defendants is not entirely clear, but it appears to be based on a monetary judgment she speculates that she might obtain against Defendants if she wins this case. This is putting the cart before the horse. In order to allege a viable claim for wrongful foreclosure, a plaintiff must allege that she is currently willing and able to tender the amount due; the tender cannot be based on any amount she may later obtain if she eventually prevails on her wrongful foreclosure claim.

Finally, Plaintiff has not alleged any facts suggesting why it would be inequitable to require her to pay the amount owed on her secured loan.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

24CV066873: LOCHRIDGE vs RUSHMORE SERVICING, LLC, A LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY 07/16/2026 Hearing on Demurrer DEMURRER TO FOURTH AMENDED COMPLAINT BY DEFENDANTS RUSHMORE SERVICING AND U.S. BANK, NA; filed by RUSHMORE SERVICING, LLC, a Limited Liability Company (Defendant) + CRS# 169263375727 in Department 24 The demurrer to the Sixth Cause of Action for Violation of the Rosenthal Act (Civil Code § 1788 et seq.) is OVERRULED. Plaintiffs adequately allege this claim, based on purported misrepresentations as to the amount due on her secured loan. (See Fourth Amended Complaint, paragraphs 114-118 and 128-130.)

The Court rejects Defendants’ argument that the Sixth Cause of Action is barred by judicial estoppel. Defendants fail to sufficiently identify where (if at all) Plaintiff took an “inconsistent position” in her prior bankruptcy case from the position she is asserting in this case. The Court also observes that Plaintiff’s Rosenthal Act claim is based, in part, on events occurring after Plaintiff’s bankruptcy case was dismissed.

The demurrer to the Seventh Cause of Action for Slander of Title is SUSTAINED, WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. The Seventh Cause of Action is based on the recording of the trustee’s deed upon sale. (Fourth Amended Complaint, paragraph 157.) Plaintiff alleges no facts disputing that her former property was in fact sold to Defendant Liong on the date indicated. Nor does Plaintiff allege facts showing that Rushmore and US Bank knew that Liong was purportedly not an “eligible bidder” under Civil Code § 2924m.

As discussed above, Rushmore and US Bank were entitled to rely on affidavits and declarations regarding bidder eligibility. (See Civil Code § 2924m(d).) Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to allege either a “false statement” that was published by Rushmore and/or US Bank, or that any such statement was made with malice so as to overcome the conditional privilege provided by Civil Code § 2924(d)(2). (See Schep v. Capital One NA (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 1331, 1336-1138.)

Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice is GRANTED.

The Court will prepare the order. Rushmore and US Bank shall file and serve their Answer to Plaintiff’s Fourth Amended Complaint by July 27, 2026.

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