Motion to vacate default judgment and stay enforcement of writ of execution
SUPERIOR COURT, STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA Department 10 Honorable Jeffrey B. El-Hajj Blanca Than, Courtroom Clerk 191 North First Street, San Jose, CA 95113 Telephone: 408-882-2210
DATE: July 16, 2026 TIME: 9:00 A.M. / 9:01 A.M. To contest the ruling, you must call (408) 808-6856 before 4:00 P.M. Make sure to let the other side know before 4:00 P.M. that you plan to contest the ruling. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1308(a)(1); Local Rule 8.D.)
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Line 3 25CV468863 Sinpo Corp. v. Plaintiff Sinpo Corp.’s motion to compel initial responses to form Raksham, LLC interrogatories, set one; special interrogatories, set one; and requests for production, set one. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2030.290, 2031.300.) Notice is proper and the motion is unopposed. Defendant did not respond to the discovery requests. On good cause shown, the motion is GRANTED. Defendant is ordered to respond to the requested discovery, without objections, no later than August 17, 2026.
The request for sanctions is GRANTED IN PART. Defendant and its counsel of record are jointly and severally responsible to pay plaintiff sanctions in the amount of $660 ($60 filing fee plus two hours of attorney fees at $300/hour) no later than August 17, 2026. Plaintiff does not explain the basis for its claimed $90 filing fee. The court will prepare the order. Line 4 23CV423336 Online Brands, LLC Click LINE 4 or scroll down for ruling. v. SJS Group, LLC Line 5 24CV454280 Channel Partners Click LINE 5 or scroll down for ruling.
Capital, LLC v. Sukhjeev Singh et al.
Calendar Line 5 Case Name: Channel Partners Capital LLC v. Sukhjeev Singh et al. Case No.: 24CV454280
Defendant Sukhjeev Singh’s (Singh) motion to vacate default judgment and stay enforcement of writ of execution. Notice is proper and the motion is opposed by plaintiff Channel Partners Capital, LLC.
Plaintiff sued Singh and ISO Beers, LLC in 2024. The complaint alleged a single cause of action for breach of contract, based on a master equipment financing agreement signed by ISO Beers, LLC and a guaranty of that agreement signed by Singh. (Complaint, ¶ 17.) The complaint alleged Singh personally guarantied performance of that agreement. (Ibid.) The complaint attached copies of the master equipment financing agreement and guaranty, both signed by Singh. (Exh. A to Complaint.) The complaint sought $77,416.07; prejudgment interest; attorney fees; and costs of suit. (Complaint, prayer, p. 3.)
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A proof of service of summons indicates Singh was personally served with the complaint in his individual capacity in January 2025. (Proof of service of summons, filed 1/15/26.) Singh was also served on behalf of ISO Beers, LLC. (Proof of service of summons, filed 1/15/26.) Court defaults were entered in February 2025.
Plaintiff sought default judgment against defendants by declaration filed in February 2025. The declaration (by a litigation and recovery specialist employed by plaintiff) described the declarant’s review of the company file associated with defendants. The declarant authenticates the master equipment financing agreement and guaranty that were also attached to the complaint. (Serreyn dec., filed 2/20/25, ¶ 6.) The declarant confirmed defendants owed $77,416.07 on the account; included a calculation of prejudgment interest at 10 percent, leading to $2,311.89 in accrued interest; requested $3,148.32 under the local default attorney fee schedule; and requested $626.59 in costs (which were itemized on the request for entry of court default). (Id. at ¶¶ 10-13.)
Default judgment in the preceding amounts was signed, and filed on June 24, 2025. A notice of entry of default judgment with proof of service by U.S. Mail to a California address was filed June 25, 2025. Singh filed the instant motion on December 30, 2025.
Request to Stay Enforcement of the Writ of Execution
Singh requests that the court stay execution of judgment pending resolution of the motion to vacate. Other than referring to the court’s inherent authority, Singh cites neither statutory nor case law supporting this request. It is denied.
Code of Civil Procedure Section 473.5
A defendant may move to set aside default judgment under Code of Civil Procedure section 437.5, subdivision (b). That subdivision requires the motion to be “accompanied by an affidavit showing under oath that the party’s lack of actual notice in time to defend the action was not caused by the party’s avoidance of service or inexcusable neglect.” Defendant bears the burden to demonstrate entitlement to relief. (Rios v. Singh (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 871, 885.) Importantly, the defendant must file the motion within “180 days after service on the party of a written notice that the default or default judgment has been entered.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 473.5, subd. (a); Code Civ. Proc., § 1005, subd. (b) [five calendar days added for U.S. 15
Mail service within California].) And the moving party “shall serve and file with the notice a copy of the answer, motion, or other pleading proposed to be filed in the action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 473.5, subd. (b).)
Singh’s motion is untimely under Code of Civil Procedure section 473.5, having been filed more than 185 days after the notice of entry of judgment. The motion is also not accompanied by a proposed pleading. And even if the court reached the merits, Singh cannot claim lack of actual notice of the lawsuit. He was personally served with the summons and complaint. Singh’s declaration does not contest the validity of the proofs of service of summons.
Code of Civil Procedure Section 473, Subdivision (b)
Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b) gives trial courts discretion to set aside a judgment “taken against the party through the party’s mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.” But that section is not a “ ‘ “catch-all remedy for every case of poor judgment.” ’ ” (Hearn v. Howard (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1193, 1206.) Relief under that section is appropriate only “ ‘where a party is unexpectedly placed in a situation to his injury without fault or negligence of his own and against which ordinary prudence could not have guarded.’ ” (Ibid.)
The party seeking relief bears the burden of proof. (Id. at p. 1205.) And self-represented litigants “are held to the same standards as attorneys.” (Kobayashi v. Superior Court (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 536, 543.) The motion “shall be made within a reasonable time, in no case exceeding six months, after the judgment, dismissal, order, or proceeding was taken.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (b).) And the motion “shall be accompanied by a copy of the answer or other pleading proposed to be filed therein.” (Ibid.)
Singh’s motion is untimely under Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b), having been filed more than 185 days after the notice of entry of judgment. The motion is also not accompanied by a proposed pleading. And even if the court reached the merits, Singh fails to meet his burden to show excusable neglect. The complaint made clear that Singh was a named defendant and that it was seeking to enforce the guaranty he signed.
Code of Civil Procedure Section 473, Subdivision (d)
A party may move to set aside a void judgment under Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (d). There is no time limit to move to set aside a void judgment. (California Capital Ins. Co. v. Hoehn (2024) 17 Cal.5th 207, 212.) “But a ‘trial court has no statutory power under [Code of Civil Procedure] section 473, subdivision (d) to set aside a judgment that is not void.’ ” (First American Title Ins. Co. v. Banerjee (2022) 87 Cal.App.5th 37, 44.) “Long-standing Supreme Court precedent dictates that ‘a judgment is not void if the court has jurisdiction of the parties and of the subject matter, irrespective of whether or not the complaint states a cause of action so long as it apprises the defendant of the nature of the plaintiff’s demand.’ ” (Ibid., citing Christerson v.
French (1919) 180 Cal. 523, 525; Trans-Pacific Trading Co. v. Patsy Frock & Romper Co. (1922) 189 Cal. 509, 513–514.)
Singh argues the default judgment is void as to Singh because the complaint did not allege a separate breach of guaranty cause of action against Singh. (Motion, 4:16-28.) But a guaranty is a form of contract. The breach of contract cause of action was alleged against both defendants. The complaint alleges “Defendant SUKHJEEV SINGH, individually, guarantied
performance of the Master Equipment Finance Agreement by ISO: BEERS, LLC.” (Complaint, ¶ 8.) The complaint attached both the agreement and the guaranty. (Exh. A to complaint.) And the complaint alleges “Defendants have breached said agreements by refusing and failing to pay obligations when due and the accelerated sum of $77,416.07 is now due and owing.” (Complaint, ¶ 11.) The foregoing adequately apprised Singh of the nature of plaintiff’s demand.
The motion is DENIED. The court will prepare the order.
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