MCKAGUE LAW GROUP, PC vs SHIRLEY

A Stipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) is required to be signed by each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the hearing, if not using a reporter from the Court’s Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list.

24CV019993: MCKAGUE LAW GROUP, PC vs SHIRLEY 07/14/2026 Hearing on Motion to Vacate Void Order in Department 16D

Once the form is signed it must be filed with the clerk. If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided.

****NOTICE: EFFECTIVE APRIL 13, 2026, THIS DEPARTMENT HAS MOVED TO THE TANI G. CANTIL-SAKAUYE COURTHOUSE LOCATED AT 500 G. ST. SACRAMENTO, CA. MOTIONS NOTICED FOR DEPARTMENT 53 WILL BE HEARD IN DEPARTMENT 16D OF THE NEW COURTHOUSE. PARTIES MAY CONTINUE TO APPEAR REMOTELY IN DEPARTMENT 16D UNLESS SPECIFICALLY ORDERED OTHERWISE.*****

TENTATIVE RULING:

Moving party’s notice of motion does not provide notice of the Court’s tentative ruling system, as required by Local Rule 1.06. Moving counsel is directed to contact opposing counsel and advise counsel of Local Rule 1.06 and the Court’s tentative ruling procedure and the manner to request a hearing. If moving party is unable to contact opposing counsel prior to hearing, moving party is ordered to appear at the hearing.

Defendant in pro per Nathan Cole’s (“Defendant”) “motion to vacate void orders” is DENIED.

The Court need not rule on Defendants / Cross-Complainants Lori McCracken, Gary Shirley, and Elaine Shirely’s (“Cross-Complainants”) objections to Defendant’s declarations offered in support of the motion as they are not material to the disposition of the motion.

Background

This is an action for interpleader by a law firm which previously negotiated a settlement on behalf of its clients, who were ultimately unable to agree on a distribution of the settlement proceeds. The case-initiating interpleader complaint was filed on October 2, 2024. On December 2, 2024, Cross-Complainants filed a cross-complaint against Defendant Cole for declaratory relief, common counts and accounting. Cross-

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV019993: MCKAGUE LAW GROUP, PC vs SHIRLEY 07/14/2026 Hearing on Motion to Vacate Void Order in Department 16D

Complainants also filed their verified answer to the complaint on the same day. Defendant filed an answer to the interpleader complaint on December 19, 2024.

On March 25, 2025, Defendant filed a motion to quash service of the cross-complaint, setting the motion for hearing on June 23, 2025. On May 14, 2025, Cross-Complainants had filed a Request for Entry of Default on the cross-complaint and Defendant’s default was entered effective the same day. On June 23, 2025, the Court (Judge Yap) denied Defendant’s motion to quash on the merits. As explained in the order, Cross- Complainants satisfied their burden to establish proper service and Defendant failed to establish any evidence to the contrary. (See Minute Order, dated 6/23/25.)

On July 16, 2025, the Court (Judge Yap) ordered Defendant to provide verified responses without objections to Cross-Complainant’s requests for production of documents, form interrogatories, special interrogatories served on January 8, 2025. (See Minute Orders, date 7/16/2025.) The Court granted Cross-Complainant’s motion to deem matters admitted against Defendant. (Minute Order re: Motion to Deem Request for Admissions Admitted, dated 7/16/2025.) On December 16, 2025, the Court (Judge Sueyoshi) again ordered Defendant to provide verified responses without objections to Cross-Complainant’s requests for production of documents, form interrogatories, special interrogatories served on January 8, 2025 as the responses filed[1] by Defendant on July 29, 2025 did not comply with the Court’s July 16, 2025 order. (See Minute Orders, 12/16/2025.)

The Court did not alter the prior ruling with respect to the admitted matters. (Minute Order re: Motion to Deem Request for Admissions Admitted, dated 12/16/2025.) Defendant did not timely move for reconsideration pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1008, subdivision (a) regarding either the July 16 or the December 16 rulings.

Defendant now moves “to vacate” the Court’s July 16, 2025 and December 16, 2025 discovery orders pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (d). Defendant argues that the Court never acquired “personal jurisdiction” over Defendant with respect to the cross-complaint due to its defective service. Based upon such premise, Defendant also argues the Court’s discovery-related orders were premature and unauthorized because no statutory response period had commended when the discovery was propounded and enforced.

Cross-Complainants oppose, arguing that the Court obtained personal jurisdiction over Defendant when he filed his answer to the complaint. Cross-Complainants also contend that all of the parties to this motion made general appearances in this case by the filing of their respective answers to the underlying complaint and were entitled to serve discovery on each other.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV019993: MCKAGUE LAW GROUP, PC vs SHIRLEY 07/14/2026 Hearing on Motion to Vacate Void Order in Department 16D

Discussion

Initially, although Defendant appears to state in reply (at p. 3:3-4) that he is not seeking reconsideration of the Court’s discovery orders, the Court notes that any such motion pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1008 would be untimely in any event as Defendant did not seek reconsideration by 10 days after the Court’s original orders.[2] Code of Civil Procedure section 1008, subdivision (a) states, in relevant part, “When an application for an order has been made to a judge, or to a court, and refused in whole or in part, or granted, or granted conditionally, or on terms, any party affected by the order may, within 10 days after service upon the party of written notice of entry of the order and based upon new or different facts, circumstances, or law, make application to the same judge or court that made the order, to reconsider the matter and modify, amend, or revoke the prior order.” As a result, the Court’s prior orders and the content therein are not subject to reconsideration or modification by Defendant’s present motion.

Instead, Defendant persists in arguing that while the Court’s prior orders cannot be reconsidered under section 1008, they are “void” for the reason that they were made without “personal jurisdiction” over Defendant. Defendant refers to Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (d) which states “The court may, upon motion of the injured party, or its own motion, correct clerical mistakes in its judgment or orders as entered, so as to conform to the judgment or order directed, and may, on motion of either party after notice to the other party, set aside any void judgment or order.” “Section 473 empowers a trial court to set aside any judgment or order that is void as a matter of law, for example, because the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, or because the summons and complaint were not properly served, so that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over a defendant, or otherwise because the judgment or order violated a party’s due process rights to notice and an opportunity to be heard. [Citations.]” (Brown v.

Williams (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 182, 186-187, fn. 4.) Thus, a “void” judgment or order is created when a court fails to meet all of the fundamental prerequisites necessary to give that court the power to act in a particular case or proceeding.

Again, Defendant contends that the July 16, 2025 and December 16, 2025 discovery orders are “void” because the Court’s lacks “personal jurisdiction” over him due to a failure of Cross-Complainants to properly serve him with their cross-complaint. As referenced above, the Court has already denied Defendant’s motion to quash service of the cross-complaint on the merits (e.g., as opposed to dropping the motion for procedural defects). Despite the fact that the Court has already denied Defendant’s motion to quash service of the cross-complaint, Defendant persists in reply that “[t]he issue is whether Cross-Complainants . . . established jurisdiction over Defendant in the

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV019993: MCKAGUE LAW GROUP, PC vs SHIRLEY 07/14/2026 Hearing on Motion to Vacate Void Order in Department 16D

separate procedural capacity of Cross-Defendant under their Cross-Complaint before obtaining default, deemed admissions, discovery enforcement orders, and monetary sanctions in that posture.” (Rely at 2:10-12 [emphasis added].)

Defendant’s framing of what he believes to be the issue is misguided. Whether the Court has personal jurisdiction over a party to make orders that are binding on that party is not dependent upon a “separate procedural capacity” of Defendant as crossdefendant. The fact that a party may have more than one “posture” in a case, i.e., as a defendant, as a cross-defendant, etc., does not dictate whether the Court has personal jurisdiction over such party in the action itself. Indeed, as relevant here, even if Cross- Complainants did not file a cross-complaint at all or failed to properly serve the crosscomplaint, the Court would nevertheless have personal jurisdiction over Defendant in this matter to make orders binding Defendant.

Defendant and Cross-Complainants were all named as defendants in the interpleader complaint filed on October 2, 2024. Defendant filed his answer on December 19, 2024. “Filing an answer on the merits constitutes a general appearance.” (Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Sparks Construction, Inc. (2004) 114 Cal.App.4th 1135, 1145; Code Civ. Proc., § 1014 [“A defendant appears in an action when the defendant answers . . .”].) “A general appearance operates as a consent to jurisdiction of the person, dispensing with the requirement of service of process, and curing defects in service.” (Fireman's Fund Ins., at p. 1145 [emphasis added].)

Thus, by filing an answer to the interpleader complaint, Defendant has consented to the Court’s personal jurisdiction for this action. While it is true that if Defendant had prevailed on its motion to quash, such a determination would temporarily (until proper service had been made) preclude Cross-Complainants from pursuing the ultimate relief prayed for in the cross-complaint, such a determination still would not vitiate the Court’s personal jurisdiction over Defendant in this case, nor (as explained below) prevent discovery from occurring.

But here Defendant’s motion to quash service was specifically denied and Defendant made no timely or proper motion for reconsideration of that order.[3]

Additionally, as to the discovery Cross-Complainants propounded and the Court’s rulings on the successive motions filed by Cross-Complainants, there is no issue of personal jurisdiction as argued by Defendant. Again, because Defendant and Cross- Complainants were named as defendants in the interpleader complaint, either defendant was permitted to propound discovery to each other or any other party “without leave of court at any time.” (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2030.020, subd. (a) [interrogatories], 2031.020, subd. (a) [inspection demands], and 2033.020, subd. (a) [requests for admissions] [emphasis added].) Plaintiff has cited no legal authority (nor does any exist) that prevented Cross-Complainants from propounding their written discovery requests upon Defendant, who had generally appeared in this case. Nor is

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV019993: MCKAGUE LAW GROUP, PC vs SHIRLEY 07/14/2026 Hearing on Motion to Vacate Void Order in Department 16D

there any authority that prevents the Court from issuing orders on related discovery motions directed at a party that has made a general appearance in the case. Notably, even if Defendant believed it should not be required to answer certain discovery requests on grounds that they somehow exceeded the scope of discovery set by the interpleader complaint (and related solely to the allegations of the cross-complaint which Defendant contended was not properly served), Defendant’s recourse was to serve timely objections to the individual discovery requests at issue.

Again, such is not an issue of personal jurisdiction given Defendant’s appearance in the case, nor does it preclude Cross-Complainant’s ability to serve discovery in this action. Thus, regardless of whether a cross-complaint was filed and served by Cross-Complainants, Cross- Complainants were still entitled to propound the discovery requests that were at-issue in the Court’s July 16, 2025 and December 16, 2025 discovery orders as they were serve by a defendant named in the action on another party to the action.

Accordingly, the Court’s July 16, 2025 and December 16, 2025 discovery orders are not “void” for lack of personal jurisdiction over Defendant.

Thus, the motion is DENIED.

This minute order is effective immediately. No formal order or other notice is required. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1019.5; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1312.)

[1] Neither the Discovery Act nor the Court’s July 16, 2025 orders required Defendant to

file his further responses to discovery. Both required only that Defendant serve his responses by the deadline. [2] The Court’s orders specifically dispensed with any further notice or necessity of a

formal order and thus, were effective immediately upon affirmance.

[3] Defendant appears to argue in reply that he does not seek reconsideration of the

Court’s June 23, 2025 order denying his prior motion to quash service of the crosscomplaint (“Defendant is not asking the Court to disregard the prior ruling”) but yet at the same time, Defendant states, “[t]hat evidentiary deficiency [in his prior motion to quash] has now been corrected. The Court now has sworn declarations from Defendant Nathan Cole, Florida Cole, and Summer Simpson. These declarations directly challenge the factual foundation of the substituted service relied upon by Cross-Complainants.” (Reply at 2:25-3:2; 3:22-23 [brackets added].) Clearly, Defendant’s request to review evidence related to whether service of the cross-complaint was proper is, in fact, a request for reconsideration of the Court’s June 23, 2025 order which denied Defendant’s motion to quash and found that Cross-Complainants satisfied their burden

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV019993: MCKAGUE LAW GROUP, PC vs SHIRLEY 07/14/2026 Hearing on Motion to Vacate Void Order in Department 16D

to establish proper service while Defendant failed to refute such evidence. Indeed, Defendant presently seeks the same finding which he sought in his motion to quash – that service of the cross-complaint was not proper. The Court did not deny Defendant’s motion to quash “without prejudice” to remaking the motion, nor did Defendant file a timely motion for reconsideration.