John L. Dubois through his Successor in Interest Tami L. Early vs. Colusa Medical Center, LLC

34-2023-00332501-CU-PO-GDS: John L. Dubois through his Successor in Interest Tami L. Early vs. Colusa Medical Center, LLC 04/22/2026 Hearing on Motion to Quash Service of Summons in Department 8D

a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will be forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided

***NOTICE: EFFECTIVE APRIL 13, 2026, THIS DEPARTMENT HAS MOVED TO THE TANI G. CANTIL-SAKAUYE COURTHOUSE LOCATED AT 500 G. ST. SACRAMENTO, CA. ALL MOTIONS NOTICED FOR DEPARTMENT 25 WILL BE HEARD IN DEPARTMENT 8D OF THE NEW COURTHOUSE. ALL PAPERS FOR THIS DEPARTMENT MUST BE FILED AT THIS NEW LOCATION AND WILL NOT BE ACCEPTED AT THE HALL OF JUSTICE. ALL HEARINGS WILL TAKE PLACE AT THIS NEW LOCATION****

Defendant Gurpreet Singh Randhawa’s (“Defendant”) Motion to Quash Service of Summons is ruled upon as follows.

Factual Background

This is an elder abuse action, in which Plaintiffs allege that, from approximately December 28, 2020 through February 2, 2021, Mr. Dubois (“Decedent”), then 73, was in the 24-hour care and custody of Defendant Colusa Medical Center LLC and suffered fatal pressure ulcers at a result of neglect. Plaintiffs Tami L. Early, individually and as Successor-In-Interest to John L. Dubois, and Dawn Dubois Patti (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) allege that Defendants knowingly understaffed the unit where Mr. Dubois was a patient and failed to train and supervise the staff to ensure the prevention of pressure ulcers. Plaintiffs filed their initial complaint on January 4, 2023, alleging causes of action for: (1) elder abuse; (2) negligent infliction of emotional distress; (3) violation of Patient’s Bill of Rights; and (4) wrongful death.

On October 20, 2025, Plaintiffs filed an amendment to the complaint, naming Defendant as DOE 3.

Defendant moves to quash service of summons on the grounds that Plaintiffs were not ignorant of his identity at the time the initial complaint was filed and consequently the statute of limitations did not stop running on that date. Defendant argues that when Plaintiffs amended the complaint to name Defendant as DOE 3, the statute of limitations

34-2023-00332501-CU-PO-GDS: John L. Dubois through his Successor in Interest Tami L. Early vs. Colusa Medical Center, LLC 04/22/2026 Hearing on Motion to Quash Service of Summons in Department 8D

had already run with respect to all causes of action, and therefore the summons must be quashed.

Plaintiffs oppose.

Legal Standard

When a complaint sets forth cause of action against a DOE defendant because “the plaintiff is genuinely ignorant of his name or identity and his true name thereafter is discovered and substituted by amendment, he is considered a party to the action from its commencement so that the statute of limitations stops running as of the date the original complaint was filed.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 474; General Motors Corp. v. Superior Court (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 580, 589; Austin v. Massachusetts Bonding & Insurance Co. (1961) 56 Cal.2d 596, 602.)

Ignorance of the facts is the critical issue, and whether it be due to misinformation or negligence is not relevant. Under section 474, therefore, a plaintiff has no duty to exercise reasonable diligence prior to filing the complaint to discover the defendant's identity. (Balon v. Drost (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 483.) Plaintiff's ignorance of the defendant's name must be genuine (in good faith) and not feigned. (Stephens v. Berry (1967) 249 Cal.App.2d 474, 477.) A plaintiff is entitled to the benefits of section 474 unless substantial evidence shows she was not ignorant of the facts she needed to know. (General Motors Corp. v.

Superior Court (1996) 48 CaI.App.4th 580, 595.) “The question is whether [the plaintiff] knew or reasonably should have known that he had a cause of action against [the defendant].” (McClatchy v. Coblentz, Patch, Duffy & Bass, LLP (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 368, 372 (quoting Wallis v. Southern Pac. Transportation Co. (1976) 61 Cal.App.3d 782, 786).)

The McClatchy Court explained:

“Ignorance of the facts giving rise to a cause of action is the ‘ignorance’ required by section 474, and the pivotal question is, ‘“did plaintiff know facts?” not “did plaintiff know or believe that [he] had a cause of action based on those facts?”’” (General Motors Corp. v. Superior Court (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 580, 594[55 Cal.Rptr.2d 871] (General Motors), quoting Scherer v. Mark (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 834, 841[135 Cal.Rptr. 90]; see Hazel v. Hewlett (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 1458, 1464–1465[247 Cal.Rptr. 723] (Hazel).) “Although it is true that a plaintiff’s ignorance of the defendant’s name must be genuine (in good faith) and not feigned

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2023-00332501-CU-PO-GDS: John L. Dubois through his Successor in Interest Tami L. Early vs. Colusa Medical Center, LLC 04/22/2026 Hearing on Motion to Quash Service of Summons in Department 8D

[citations] and that a plaintiff need not be aware of each and every detail concerning a person's involvement before the plaintiff loses his ignorance [citations], it is equally true that the plaintiff does not relinquish [his] rights under section 474 simply because [he] has a suspicion of wrongdoing arising from one or more facts [he] does know.” (General Motors, at pp. 594-595, 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 871.)

(Ibid.) “Section 474 allows a plaintiff in good faith to delay suing particular persons as named defendants until he has knowledge of sufficient facts to cause a reasonable person to believe liability is probable.” (McOwen v. Grossman (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 937, 943 (quoting Dieckmann v. Superior Court (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 345, 363, 220 Cal.Rptr. 602).) Section 474 “does not impose upon the plaintiff a duty to go in search of facts she does not actually have at the time she files her original pleading.” (McOwen, supra, 153 Cal.App.4th at p. 944.)

A motion to quash service of summons on a DOE defendant is proper where the statute of limitations has run and plaintiff knew the name of the DOE defendant at the time the complaint was filed. (Maier Brewing Co. v. Flora Crane Service, Inc. (1969) 270 Cal.App.2d 873, 875-876.)

Additionally, “section 474 includes an implicit requirement that a plaintiff may not 'unreasonably delay' his or her filing of a Doe amendment after learning a defendant's identity.” (A.N. v. County of Los Angeles (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1058, 1066-1067.) “[U]nreasonable delay includes a prejudice element, which requires a showing by the defendant that he or she would suffer prejudice from plaintiff's delay in filing the Doe amendment.” (Id. at 1067.) “[A] defendant named in an action by a Doe amendment under section 474 may challenge the amendment by way of an evidence-based motion, which argues that the plaintiff 'unreasonably delayed' his or her filing of the challenged amendment.” (Ibid.) “Improper service of a defendant under section 474 may be attacked by a motion to quash.” (McClatchy, supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at p. 375.)

Discussion

Defendant presents two grounds for the instant motion: (1) Plaintiffs were not truly ignorant of Defendant’s identity at the time the complaint was filed; and (2) Plaintiffs engaged in an unreasonable delay before the filing of the DOE amendment naming Defendant.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2023-00332501-CU-PO-GDS: John L. Dubois through his Successor in Interest Tami L. Early vs. Colusa Medical Center, LLC 04/22/2026 Hearing on Motion to Quash Service of Summons in Department 8D

In support of the instant motion, Defendant presents evidence which Defendant argues shows that Plaintiffs were not ignorant of Defendant’s identity at the time of filing of their complaint. Exhibit I includes Colusa Medical Center LLC’s statement of information, which identifies Defendant as a manager. (Bressler Decl., ¶ 10, Ex. I.) Defendant further argues that Plaintiffs’ complaint identifies Defendant as an owner of Defendant American Specialty Healthcare, Inc., and alleges that executives of American Specialty Healthcare, Inc., including Defendant, “decide the budget.” (Compl., ¶¶ 6, 11.)

Plaintiffs oppose, offering evidence to show that they were genuinely ignorant of facts giving rise to Defendant’s liability until late July of 2025. (Dawson Decl., ¶¶ 3-22.)

Plaintiffs’ claims are subject to two-year statutes of limitations pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 335.1. Thus, if, as Defendant contends, Plaintiff was not genuinely ignorant of Defendant’s name when they filed suit on January 4, 2023, the statute of limitations would continue to run. As a result, service of the complaint on Defendant on October 20, 2025 would be properly quashed.

The Court finds that while Defendant cites to the complaint, which names Defendant as the owner of American Specialty Healthcare, Inc., the complaint does not allege any specific facts with respect to his ownership or whether he had any involvement in the operation of American Specialty Healthcare, Inc. Similarly, the Court is not persuaded by the Colusa Medical Center LLC Secretary of State filings, as Exhibit I identifies Defendant as a former manager/member, but his name is crossed out and replaced by Gurpreet S. Randhawa. Plaintiffs have presented extensive evidence documenting their efforts to ascertain the leadership and management of Colusa Medical Center LLC, and their difficulties in obtaining a clear answer. This Court cannot on the present record conclude that Plaintiffs long ago knew of those facts which justified naming Defendant as a Doe defendant.

The Court finds that Plaintiff has presented evidence that they were genuinely ignorant of facts regarding Defendant’s involvement in the management of Colusa Medical Center LLC that would support a cause of action against him in his individual capacity. Plaintiffs appear to have learned for the first time the extent of Defendant’s involvement in late July 2025. While Plaintiffs may have known the name of Defendant, that he was the owner of American Specialty Healthcare, Inc., and that he was an executive that decided the budget at the time of the filing of the Complaint, this does not equate to the knowledge of facts regarding Defendant’s individual role in the alleged injury suffered by the Decedent or Plaintiffs while in the care of CMC. (See McOwen, supra, 153 Cal.App.4th at p. 942 [“In keeping with th[e] liberal interpretation of section 474, it is now

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2023-00332501-CU-PO-GDS: John L. Dubois through his Successor in Interest Tami L. Early vs. Colusa Medical Center, LLC 04/22/2026 Hearing on Motion to Quash Service of Summons in Department 8D

well established that even though the plaintiff knows of the existence of the defendant sued by a fictitious name, and even though the plaintiff knows the defendant's actual identity (that is, his name), the plaintiff is “ignorant” within the meaning of the statute if he lacks knowledge of that person's connection with the case or with his injuries.”].) Rather, Plaintiffs present evidence that, after contrary or equivocal testimony in depositions[1], Plaintiffs received information indicating that Defendant had a high level of control over CMC and knowledge regarding its operations and deficiencies.

The Court also finds that Plaintiffs did not engage in unreasonable delay after learning of Defendant’s identity before serving him. The Court finds that a delay of 3-4 months is not unreasonable given the facts of the case. Defendant has provided no evidence which shows that Plaintiffs had learned of these facts prior to July 2025, nor does he cite to any authority which would persuade the Court that a 3-4 month delay is unreasonable or would prejudice Defendant.

As such, the Court does not find that Plaintiffs are barred from invoking section 474 due to their knowledge at the time of the filing of the Complaint. Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendant’s motion to quash.

The minute order is effective immediately. No formal order pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312 or further notice is required.

[1] Indeed, it appears some deponents testified that CMC functioned independently

without significant oversight from Defendant. (See Dawson Decl. ¶¶ 14-16, 19.)