Starks, Kristen v. NPH Medical Services et al.

9. 24CV03535 Starks, Kristen v. NPH Medical Services et al.

EVENT: Gridley Healthcare & Wellness Centre, LLC’s Motion for Sanctions Pursuant to CCP 128.5 and 128.7

CCP 128.7 The motion is GRANTED. Bucur v. Ahmad (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 175, 189: Under section 128.7, a court may impose sanctions if it concludes a pleading was filed for an improper purpose or was indisputably without merit, either legally or factually. ... A claim is factually frivolous if it is “not well grounded in fact” and is legally frivolous if it is “not warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law. ... Thus, a plaintiff's attorney cannot “just cling tenaciously to the investigation he had done at the outset of the litigation and bury his head in the sand.” (Ibid.) Instead, “to satisfy [the] obligation under [section 128.7] to conduct a reasonable inquiry to determine if his [or her] client's claim was well-grounded in fact,” the attorney must “take into account [the adverse party's] evidence.” (Ibid.)

Here, the opposition does not dispute the contention that Defendant stopped operating in 2017, roughly 5 years before Plaintiff’s employment relevant to this lawsuit. The opposition does not dispute the contention that Defendant’s license was transferred to Orchard Hospital. In fact, in one of the meet and confer letters, Plaintiff’s counsel indicated that they were going to name Orchard Hospital as a Defendant. However, it appears that that has not occurred to date. Plaintiff states they had questions about whether a new entity was operating under the Gridley name. However, that is simply not relevant to the issue at hand: whether Defendant Gridley Healthcare and Wellness Center, LLC should be dismissed.

The Court concludes that, because Plaintiff is not disputing Defendant ceased operations prior to Plaintiff’s employment, that fact is undisputed. The law aspect of this is not complicated: if Defendant was not operating a business during the time in which Plaintiff was employed, then Defendant cannot be liable in any way shape or form as a matter of law. Thus, because it is undisputed that Defendant ceased operations in 2017, Plaintiff’s consistent refusal to dismiss Defendant is frivolous.

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CCP 128.5 The motion is DENIED. The Court finds the moving papers fail to provide sufficient evidence of subjective bad faith on the part of Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s counsel.

Sanctions Based on the Court’s finding that Plaintiff’s refusal to dismiss Defendant is completely without merit, pursuant to CCP 128.7(d) Defendant is hereby dismissed with prejudice. Additionally, Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s counsel are directed to pay Defendant’s reasonable attorney fees incurred in the amount of $6,300. Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s counsel are jointly and severally liable for that amount. Defendant shall prepare and submit a form of order consistent with this ruling within two weeks.

10. 25CV05051 Nadine C Bourell-Montoya, Trustee of the NRT Revocable Living Trust v. Young, James

EVENT: Petition for Partition in Kind (Continued from 2/4/26)

The Court acknowledges Petitioner has attempted to serve Respondents through substitute service (governed by CCP 415.20(b)) and through mail (governed by CCP 415.30).

Substitute Service CCP 415.20 Alternate summons service; Office, mail, and diligence requirements (b) (1) If a copy of the summons and complaint cannot with reasonable diligence be personally delivered to the person to be served, as specified in Section 416.60, 416.70, 416.80, or 416.90, a summons may be served by leaving a copy of the summons and complaint at the person’s dwelling house, usual place of abode, 9|Page