| Case | County / Judge | Motion | Ruling | Indexed | Hearing |
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Defendants’ Demurrer to the Second Amended Complaint
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6. 23CV01439 Linoz, Roberta Jean et al v. Mains’l California, LLC et al.
EVENT: Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action and PAGA Settlement
Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action and PAGA Settlement.
A Final Approval Hearing is scheduled for July 22, 2026 at 9:00am. The Court will sign the proposed order with this modification.
7. 24CV00371 995 Nord Retail, LLC v. Ballesteros, Tina
EVENT: Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment
Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.
Plaintiff has met its initial burden by submitting evidence that no triable issue of fact exists on each element of the breach of contract claim and the motion is unopposed.
Plaintiff shall prepare and submit a form of order within 2 weeks.
8. 24CV00397 Lau, Crystal v. Feathers, Robin et al.
EVENT: Defendants’ Demurrer to the Second Amended Complaint
Second Cause of Action - Harassment
Preliminarily, Defendants argue for the first time in the reply brief that ADHD is not a disability under FEHA. Because this legal issue was not raised in the moving papers, it will not be addressed here. (See American Indian Model Schools v. Oakland Unified School Dist. (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 228, 275-276 [“We will not ordinarily consider issues raised for the first time in a reply brief.”]
The SAC sufficiently alleges Plaintiff was harassed “based on” her disability
Plaintiff contends that the “based on” language does not necessarily require the harasser be aware of Plaintiff’s disability at the time the harassing conduct occurred. However, as it specifically pertains to disability, existing authority suggests Plaintiff must plead Defendants’ knowledge of the disability prior to the harassing conduct, see Pensinger v. Bowsmith, Inc.,
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(1998) 60 Cal. App. 4th 709.
Although Pensinger involved allegations of termination because of a disability, the Court finds the principle that the defendant must have had knowledge of the disability prior to the conduct equally applicable here.
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The question then becomes whether the SAC sufficiently alleges knowledge of the disability prior to the alleged conduct. In reviewing the SAC as a whole, the Court finds that it does.
Conceding the allegation in paragraph 22 that Plaintiff raised the issue (again) in October 2022 is a bit vague as to time, on demurrer we draw all reasonable inferences from the facts in favor of the plaintiff. (Kruss v. Booth (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 699, 713)
Further, less specificity is required when ‘it appears from the nature of the allegations that the defendant must necessarily possess full information concerning the facts of the controversy. (Miles v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 394, 403.
Here, as it pertains to the defendants’ knowledge of plaintiffs’ disability, the defendants ne cessarily possess full information as to when that knowledge was acquired.
The SAC does not sufficiently allege severe or pervasive conduct
As Plaintiff acknowledged, per Reno v. Baird, 18 Cal.4th 640 harassment does not include conduct necessary for performance of a supervisory job.
The SAC makes extensive allegations that Plaintiff was essentially criticized for her work performance. There is ambiguity in the pleading as to whether the individual defendants were acting within the scope of their duties when making these criticisms.
We have to accept the truth of all allegations no matter how improbable. (Del E. Webb Corp. v. Structural Materials Co. (1981) 123 CA3d 593, 603)
However, the Court is not finding any allegations in the SAC that defendants were acting outside the scope of their duties when they engaged in this conduct. Absent such allegations, the SAC fails to allege actionable conduct.
Plaintiff seems to suggest that it wasn’t just the criticisms, but the manner in which the criticisms were conveyed, i.e., “belittling”, “yelling”, criticizing in front of customers, etc.
As Defendants noted the FEHA “is not a civility code”. (Sheffield v. Los Angeles County (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 153, 161)
The allegations concerning the manner in which Plaintiff was criticized for her job performance sound in civility.
Thus, the demurrer is sustained with leave to amend (as to all defendants) for failure to sufficiently allege severe or pervasive conduct.
Plaintiff, if she so chooses, shall amend within 20 days’ notice of this order.
Defendants shall prepare and submit a form of o rder within two weeks.
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9. 24CV03535 Starks, Kristen v. NPH Medical Services et al.
EVENT: Gridley Healthcare & Wellness Centre, LLC’s Motion for Sanctions Pursuant to CCP 128.5 and 128.7
CCP 128.7
The motion is GRANTED.
Bucur v. Ahmad (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 175, 189: Under section 128.7, a court may impose sanctions if it concludes a pleading was filed for an improper purpose or was indisputably without merit, either legally or factually. ... A claim is factually frivolous if it is “not well grounded in fact” and is legally frivolous if it is “not warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law. ...
Thus, a plaintiff's attorney cannot “just cling tenaciously to the investigation he had done at the outset of the litigation and bury his head in the sand.” (I bid.)
Instead, “to satisfy [the] obligation under [section 128.7] to conduct a reasonable inquiry to determine if his [or her] client’s claim was well-grounded in fact,” the attorney must “take into account [the adverse party's] evidence.” (Ibid.)
Here, the opposition does not dispute the contention that Defendant stopped operating in 2017, roughly 5 years before Plaintiff’s employment relevant to this lawsuit.
The opposition does not dispute the contention that Defendant’s license was transfe rred t o Orchard Hospital.
In fact, in one of the meet and confer letters, Plaintiff’s counsel indicated that they were going to name Orchard Hospital as a Defendant. However, it appears that that has not occurred to date.
Plaintiff states they had questions about whether a new entity was operating under the Gridley name. However, that is simply not relevant to the issue at hand: whether Defendant Gridley Healthcare and Wellness Center, LLC should be dismissed.
The Court concludes that, because Plaintiff is not disputing Defendant ceased operations prior to Plaintiff’s employment, that fact is undisputed.
The law aspect of this is not complicated: if Defendant was not operating a business during the time in which Plaintiff was employed, then Defendant cannot be liable in any way shape or form as a matter of law.
Thus, because it is undisputed that Defendant ceased operations in 2017, Plaintiff’s consistent refusal to dismiss Defendant is frivolous.