Doe vs. Crossline Community Church

finds that an overriding interest will likely be prejudiced without use of a pseudonym, and that it is not feasible to protect the interest with less impact on the constitutional right of access. In deciding the issue the court must bear in mind the critical importance of the public’s right to access judicial proceedings. Outside of cases where anonymity is expressly permitted by statute, litigating by pseudonym should occur ‘only in the rarest of circumstances.’ [Citation.]” (Dep’t of Fair Employment & Housing, supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at 111–12 (footnote omitted.).)

The Dep’t of Fair Employment & Housing court recognized Does I thru XXIII v. Advanced Textile Corp. (9th Cir. 2000) 214 F.3d 1058, 1067 (Advanced Textile) as “setting out factors courts should consider in response to a party’s request for anonymity.” (Dep’t of Fair Employment & Housing, supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at 112.) Specifically, Advanced Textile states courts “have permitted plaintiffs to use pseudonyms in three situations: (1) when identification creates a risk of retaliatory physical or mental harm [citations]; (2) when anonymity is necessary ‘to preserve privacy in a matter of sensitive and highly personal nature,’ [citations]; and (3) when the anonymous party is ‘compelled to admit [his or her] intention to engage in illegal conduct, thereby risking criminal prosecution,’ [citations].” (Advanced Textile, supra, 214 F.3d 1058, 1068.)

In Poway Unified School Dist. V. Superior Court (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 1496, the court held:

Balanced against the public's right to know is the victim's right to privacy. (See Welf. & Inst.Code, § 676, subd. (b) [barring the public from juvenile court hearings, even on serious crimes, upon request of the victim]; Pen.Code, § 293.5 [analogous protections in criminal proceedings]; § 6254, subd. (f)(2) [allowing a state or local agency compiling law enforcement records to withhold the name of a minor victim of enumerated crimes at the request of his parent]; and § 54961, subd. (b) [Brown Act exception to disclosure requirements in sex crime cases].) People v. Ramirez (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 47, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 9, eloquently articulated the privacy concern for these types of crimes:

“There can be little dispute that the state's interest in protecting the privacy of sex offense victims is extremely strong and fully justified. ‘No *1502 crime is more horribly invasive or more brutally intimate than rape.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 53, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 9.)

“ ‘Privacy’ is not an insignificant interest -— it is described in our state Constitution as one of our ‘inalienable rights.’ (Cal. Const., art. I, § 1.) In the context of the victim of a sex offense, 39

our Legislature ... has likewise determined that the privacy interest of such a victim is significant.... [M]any victims are reluctant to report sex offenses ‘because of fear they will be publicly identified and humiliated.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 56, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 9.)

Plaintiff alleged in her Complaint that she was a minor child attending Crossline with her family in or around 2006. (Compl., ¶ 10). Crossline hired an employee, Mr. Hart, as its Production, Web, and Media Director, despite his prior voyeurism conviction and admitted sexual addiction. (Compl., ¶¶ 20). Around 2012 or 2013, Jane Doe needed a new computer to start the school year. Mr. Hart offered Jane Doe’s family a refurbished computer from him. (Compl., ¶ 30).

In June 2025, Federal investigators determined that Mr. Hart installed software enabling remote access and monitoring of the device he had given Jane Doe. (Compl., ¶ 33). On June 21, 2025, Mr. Hart was detained at Miami International Airport after arriving from Haiti, returning from a mission trip. A search of his devices by U.S. Customs and Border Protection revealed thirty-three (33) videos of child sexual abuse material and approximately 160 AI-generated sexual images of minors. (Compl., ¶ 35).

After Mr. Hart’s arrest on federal charges, Homeland Security conducted additional searches of his devices and, on October 8, 2025, notified Jane Doe’s family that seven videos of Jane Doe had been recovered. These included nude videos of her getting in and out of the shower and in her room in the nude. Investigators stated Mr. Hart deleted other content but retained material that served his purposes and confirmed Jane Doe’s images were stored for his own sexual exploitation and gratification. (Compl., ¶ 36).

Plaintiff’s Contentions:

Plaintiff contends that because she was a minor and was subjected to sexual exploitation and nude video recordings, she has expressed fear that public disclosure of her legal name in connection with this action would increase the likelihood of dissemination and cause additional emotional harm.

Defendants Contentions:

Defendant contends the sensitive nature of the allegations which has already been addressed by the terms of the Protective Order. (See ROA 70). Defendant contends that it is prejudiced and the public has the right to know who is making accusations against a church for conduct committed by a non-party criminal. Defendant also contends that Plaintiff herself has not submitted a declaration and, therefore, has not provided admissible evidence. 40

Weighing all of the factors and arguments of the parties the court finds protecting the privacy of the victim under the circumstances presented extremely strong and fully justified.

Moving party shall provide notice. 9 Adjemian vs. Gallo Defendant John Mussen’s motion to compel answers to special interrogatories is DENIED.

Moving party shall provide notice. 10 Diversified Search Plaintiff Diversified Search Group, Inc.’s motion for leave to file a second Group amended complaint is GRANTED. vs. Invoy Technologies LLC. The court sets an OSC re service of second amended complaint on defendants or dismissal on October 08, 2026, at 09:00 am in Department C10.

Leave to amend should be granted liberally to accomplish substantial justice for both parties. (Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (a); Hirsa v. Superior Court (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 486, 488- 489 (“Hirsa”).) “If the motion to amend is timely made and the granting of the motion will not prejudice the opposing party, it is error to refuse permission to amend....” (Morgan v. Sup. Ct. (1959) 172 Cal.App.2d 527, 530.) Prejudice includes “delay in trial, loss of critical evidence, or added costs of preparation.” (Solit v.

Tokai Bank, Ltd. New York Branch (1999) 68 Cal.App.4th 1435, 1448.) “The power to permit amendments is interpreted very liberally as long as the plaintiff does not attempt to state facts which give rise to a wholly distinct and different legal obligation against the defendant.” (Herrera v. Superior Court (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 255, 259.) “Allowing the filing of [_] an amendment is in furtherance of justice and in keeping with the fundamental policy of our courts that cases should be decided on their merits.” (Hirsa, supra, at p.490.)

It is “an abuse of discretion to deny leave to amend where the opposing party was not misled or prejudiced by the amendment.” (Kittredge Sports Co. v. Superior Court (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 1045, 1048.)

Under California Rules of Court Rule 3.1324(a), a motion to amend a pleading shall (1) include a copy of the proposed amendment or amended pleading, which must be serially numbered to differentiate it from previous pleadings or amendments; (2) state what allegations in the previous pleading are proposed to be deleted, if any, and where, by page, paragraph and line number, the deleted allegations are located; and (3) state what allegations are proposed to be added to the previous pleading, if any, and where, by page, paragraph, and line number, the additional allegations are located. Under California Rule of Court Rule 3.1324(b), a separate declaration must accompany the motion and must specify (1) the effect of the amendment; (2) why the amendment is necessary and proper;

(3) when the facts giving rise to the amended allegations were discovered; and (4) the reasons why the request for amendment was not made earlier.

Here, Plaintiff has substantially complied with the requirements for leave to amend under Rule 3.1324. Plaintiff seeks leave to amend to add new defendants and to add a cause of action to hold successor entities liable for the debts of the original defendants. Plaintiff contends that Plaintiff discovered additional facts that the Invoy Technologies is a forfeited by the California FTB. As such, Plaintiff seeks to hold its successor liable. Plaintiff argues that, at this time, the case is not at issue and the defendants have not been served such that granting relief will not cause prejudice.

Given the liberal policy to allow amendments, and given that no prejudice will occur, the motion is GRANTED. Plaintiff is ordered to file the second amended complaint, attached as Exhibit1 of the motion, within 5 days of this order.

The court notes that this case was initiated on October 2, 2025. To avoid any further delay, the court sets an OSC re service of second amended complaint on defendants or dismissal on October 8, 2026.

The Case Management Conference is continued to October 08, 2026, at 09:00 am in Department C10.

Moving party shall provide notice.

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