Aaron Trout et al. v. Jose Paz-Leja et al.

SUPERIOR COURT, STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA Department 10 Honorable Jeffrey B. El-Hajj Blanca Than, Courtroom Clerk 191 North First Street, San Jose, CA 95113 Telephone: 408-882-2210

DATE: July 9, 2026 TIME: 9:00 A.M. / 9:01 A.M. To contest the ruling, call (408) 808-6856 before 4:00 P.M. Make sure to let the other side know before 4:00 P.M. that you plan to contest the ruling. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1308(a)(1); Local Rule 8.D.)

**Please specify the issue to be contested when calling the Court and counsel**

9:00 A.M. LINE # CASE # CASE TITLE RULING Line 1 23CV417765 Lynley Hogan v. Brian Click LINE 1 or scroll down for ruling. Bernasconi et al. Line 2 24CV443761 Aaron Trout et al. v. Click LINE 2 or scroll down for ruling. Jose Paz-Leja et al. Line 3 24CV443761 Aaron Trout et al. v. Click LINE 2 or scroll down for ruling. Jose Paz-Leja et al. Line 4 24CV445461 Oscar Hernandez Plaintiff Oscar Hernandez Ochoa’s motion to deem admitted requests Ochoa v. Johnny Yan for admission, set one, against defendant Johnny Yan. (Code Civ. et al. Proc., § 2033.280.) At a hearing on another motion in this case on July 7, 2026, plaintiff orally withdrew all pending discovery motions based on defendants serving code-compliant responses. The motion is taken OFF CALENDAR.

Calendar Lines 2 and 3 Case Name: Aaron Trout et al. v. Jose Paz-Leja et al. Case No.: 24CV443761

This is a lawsuit brought by plaintiffs Aaron Trout and Anastasia Destiny Chavez (Plaintiffs) arising from an assault and battery by individual defendants Jose Paz-Leja, Eduardo Paz-Leja, and Eduardo Paz-Garcia (collectively, individual defendants) that occurred in a parking lot at Levi’s Stadium in Santa Clara County after a soccer game in September 2022.

Plaintiffs filed the original complaint in July 2024. In addition to the individual defendants, the complaint named as defendants the City of Santa Clara, Santa Clara Stadium Authority (collectively, City Defendants); the DeBartolo Corporation, Forty Niners Football Company LLC, Forty Niners SC Stadium Company LLC, Forty Niners Stadium Management Company LLC, SI 41, LLC, The Sobrato Organization, LLC, Citrix Systems, Inc. (collectively, Stadium Defendants), and Landmark Event Staffing Services, Inc.

The original complaint alleged six causes of action: (1) negligence; (2) negligent hiring, retention and supervision; (3) premises liability; (4) dangerous condition of public property; (5) assault; and (6) battery. Different groups of defendants demurred to the complaint in 2025. The earliest filed, a demurrer by the City Defendants to the first, second, and fourth causes of action, was heard by the court (Judge Chung) in September 2025. The court sustained the demurrer to the first and second causes of action with leave to amend because they failed to state any statutory basis for being brought against public entities.

The court overruled the demurrer to the fourth cause of action. The court’s September 18, 2025 order stated that if an amended complaint were filed, it would render two other pending demurrers to the complaint moot. The court takes judicial notice of the prior demurrer order on its own motion. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d).)

The operative first amended complaint (FAC) was filed in October 2025. The FAC alleges eight causes of action: (1) negligence; (2) negligence—public entities (“statutory negligence”); (3) negligent hiring, retention and supervision; (4) negligent hiring, retention and supervision—public entities; (5) premises liability; (6) dangerous condition of public property; (7) assault; and (8) battery.

At issue are two demurrers to the FAC, both opposed by Plaintiffs. The first is a demurrer by the City Defendants. The second is a demurrer by the Stadium Defendants.

REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

“Judicial notice may not be taken of any matter unless authorized or required by law.” (Evid. Code, § 450.) A precondition to judicial notice in either its permissive or mandatory form is that the matter to be noticed be relevant to the material issue before the court. (Silverado Modjeska Recreation and Park Dist. v. County of Orange (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 282, 307.) Evidence Code section 453, subdivision (b), requires a party seeking notice to “[furnish] the court with sufficient information to enable it to take judicial notice of the matter.”

The Stadium Defendants request judicial notice of the purported number of events at Levi’s Stadium prior to the assault on Plaintiffs, citing Evidence Code section 452, subdivision 14

(h). Subdivision (h) does not apply to that request. (Gould v. Md. Sound Indus. (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1137, 1145 [“Judicial notice under Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (h) is intended to cover facts which are not reasonably subject to dispute and are easily verified. These include, for example, facts which are widely accepted as established by experts and specialists in the natural, physical, and social sciences which can be verified by reference to treatises, encyclopedias, almanacs and the like or by persons learned in the subject matter.”].)

In addition, a website maintained by the Stadium Defendants does not qualify as a source of reasonably indisputable accuracy. (Jolley v. Chase Home Finance LLC (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 872, 889 [“[W]e know of no ‘official web site’ provision for judicial notice in California.”]; Huitt v. Southern California Gas Co. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1586, 1605, fn. 10 [“Simply because information is on the Internet does not mean that it is not reasonably subject to dispute.”].) The request for judicial notice is denied.

LEGAL STANDARDS FOR DEMURRER

In ruling on a demurrer, the court accepts as true all properly pleaded material factual allegations but does not accept as true contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. (Valero v. Spread Your Wings, LLC (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 243, 253.) Code of Civil Procedure section 430.60 states that “[a] demurrer shall distinctly specify the grounds upon which any of the objections to the complaint, cross-complaint, or answer are taken. Unless it does so, it may be disregarded.” The California Rules of Court also require that the demurrer itself (distinct from a supporting memorandum) specify the target of any objection and the grounds. (See Cal.

Rules of Court, rules 3.1103(c), 3.1112(a), 3.1320(a) [“Each ground of demurrer must be in a separate paragraph and must state whether it applies to the entire complaint, cross-complaint, or answer, or to specified causes of action or defenses.”].)

Where a demurrer is to an amended complaint or cross-complaint, the court “may consider the factual allegations of prior complaints, which a plaintiff may not discard or avoid by making contradictory averments, in a superseding, amended pleading.” (Berg & Berg Enterprises, LLC v. Boyle (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 1020, 1034, internal quotations omitted (Berg & Berg); see also Doe v. United States Youth Soccer Assoc. (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 1118, 1122.)

The court cannot consider extrinsic evidence when ruling on a demurrer. This includes declarations. The court has considered the declarations from City Defendants’ counsel and from Stadium Defendants’ counsel only to the extent they describe the meet and confer efforts required by statute. Finally, “points raised in the reply brief for the first time will not be considered, unless good reason is shown for failure to present them before.” (Proctor v. Vishay Intertechnology, Inc. (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 1258, 1273.)

CITY DEFENDANTS’ DEMURRER

The City Defendants demur to the FAC’s first, second, and fourth causes of action on the ground that they fail to state sufficient facts as brought against them. (See Notice of Demurrer and Demurrer.) The demurrer to the first cause of action is overruled because it is not alleged against the City Defendants.

Regarding the second and fourth causes of action, the demurrer to the prior version of these claims was sustained because (1) no statutory basis for them was alleged, and (2) they 15

were included in the same cause of action as the common law negligence claims made against other defendants. Neither the City Defendants nor Plaintiffs make any distinction between the second and fourth causes of action in their briefing on the instant demurrer; their arguments are presented as purportedly applicable to both causes of action.

As an initial matter, the immunity in Government Code section 845 does not provide a basis for sustaining a demurrer as to the second or fourth causes of action in the FAC. Neither cause of action can reasonably be described as based solely on a failure to establish or provide a police service, or a failure to provide sufficient police service. “[A] general demurrer may not be sustained, nor a motion for judgment on the pleadings granted, as to a portion of a cause of action.” (Daniels v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1150, 1167, disapproved in part on another ground by Sheen v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2022) 12 Cal.5th 905.)

“Except as otherwise provided by statute ... [a] public entity is not liable for an injury, whether such injury arises out of an act or omission of the public entity or a public employee or any other person.” (Gov. Code, § 815, subd. (a).) Our Supreme Court has consistently confirmed that the purpose and effect of this statute is that the only liability for a public entity is “by statute.” (See, e.g., Hampton v. County of San Diego (2015) 62 Cal.4th 340, 347; Guzman v. County of Monterey (2009) 46 Cal.4th 887, 897 [“there is no common law tort liability for public entities in California”]; Zelig v. County of Los Angeles (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1112, 1127-1128 (Zelig) [reaffirming intent of Act to “confine potential governmental liability to rigidly delineated circumstances”].)

Direct “tort liability of public entities must be based on a specific statute declaring them to be liable, or at least creating some specific duty of care, and not on the general tort provisions of Civil Code section 1714. Otherwise, the general rule of immunity for public entities would be largely eroded by the routine application of general tort principles.” (Eastburn v. Regional Fire Protection Authority (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1175, 1183.) “As Zelig observed, ‘“‘[t]he intent of the [Government Claims Act (§ 810 et seq.)] is not to expand the rights of plaintiffs in suits against governmental entities, but to confine potential governmental liability to rigidly delineated circumstances.’”’” (Summerfield v. City of Inglewood (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 983, 999 (Summerfield), quoting Zelig, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 1127.)

Second Cause of Action (Negligence)

The second cause of action fails to state sufficient facts against the City Defendants. The only statutes cited in the second cause of action are Government Code sections 815.2 and 815.6. (See FAC at ¶¶ 77-87.) Government Code section 815.2 codifies vicarious liability against public entities; it is not an independent source of liability. Government Code section 815.6 provides that where “a public entity is under a mandatory duty imposed by an enactment that is designed to protect against the risk of a particular kind of injury, the public entity is liable for an injury of that kind proximately caused by its failure to discharge the duty unless the public entity establishes that it exercised reasonable diligence to discharge the duty.” It is also not an independent source of liability.

The second cause of action fails to identify a specific statutory duty of care. The FAC alleges City Defendants “owed mandatory statutory duties,” but does not identify any. (FAC, ¶ 80.) It also fails to allege how the City Defendants breached that unidentified statutory duty. 16

Generic references to unspecified public safety measures, plans, or ordinances are insufficient, as is the incorporation by reference of prior general allegations. Plaintiffs’ argument in opposition that they are not required to identify a specific statute or statutes making the City Defendants liable is incorrect. The Summerfield court rejected a plaintiff’s argument, similar to Plaintiffs’ argument here, “that ‘there is no need to cite to any statute which creates liability.’” (Summerfield, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 999 [affirming dismissal following sustained demurrer; complaint alleged a city “breached its duty of care by maintaining a dangerous/unsafe condition and for its failure to warn of the dangers thereon”].) The demurrer to the second cause of action is sustained.

A plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that a defect identified on demurrer could be cured through amendment. (Schifando v. City of Los Angeles (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1074, 1081; Shaeffer v. Califia Farms, LLC (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 1125, 1145 [“The onus is on the plaintiff to articulate the ‘specifi[c] ways’ to cure the identified defect, and absent such an articulation, a trial or appellate court may grant leave to amend ‘only if a potentially effective amendment [is] both apparent and consistent with the plaintiff’s theory of the case. [Citation.]’”].)

The opposition fails to meet that burden. Plaintiffs contend that they can “readily” “identify additional statutory enactments supporting their Government Code § 815.6” if leave to amend is granted. (Opposition, 12:12-17.) But leave to amend was previously granted to do just that. And neither the FAC nor the opposition to the instant demurrer identify any specific statutory duty. Further leave to amend this cause of action is DENIED. (Accord, Summerfield, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 1000–1001 [denying leave to amend where the plaintiffs did not “propose any new facts addressing the main issue of the FAC as we see it, i.e., how the City’s alleged failure to install surveillance cameras in the parking lot of Darby Park amounts to a dangerous condition”].)

If Plaintiffs believe the assault was caused by some specified physical condition of public property, their exclusive means for pursuing that theory against the City Defendants is the sixth cause of action. Government Code section 835 “sets out the exclusive conditions under which a public entity is liable for injuries caused by a dangerous condition of public property,” otherwise precluding any general negligence claim on this subject. (Brown v. Poway Unified School Dist. (1993) 4 Cal.4th 820, 829.) If Plaintiffs believe the assault was caused by the negligent hiring, retention, or supervision of an identified employee of the City Defendants, their exclusive means of pursuing that theory is the fourth cause of action.

Fourth Cause of Action (Negligent Supervision)

The fourth cause of action is a recognized claim that may be brought against public entities under Government Code section 815.2, if sufficiently alleged. Negligent supervision is usually framed as an issue of whether a business or organization adequately supervised a specific employee or agent who intentionally or negligently injured someone else. To be liable for negligent supervision, the defendant must typically be the employer of the specific individual alleged to have been negligently supervised. (Jackson v.

AEG Live, LLC (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 1156, 1187-1188.) “An employer can be liable to a third person for negligently hiring, supervising, or retaining an unfit employee. Liability is based upon the fact that the employer knew or should have known that hiring the employee created a particular risk or hazard and that particular harm materializes. To establish negligent supervision, a plaintiff must show that a person in a supervisorial position over the actor had prior knowledge of the

actor’s propensity to do the bad act.” (Alexander v. Community Hospital of Long Beach (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 238, 264, internal citations omitted, emphasis in original.)

The FAC alleges that City Defendants acted negligently by: hiring or retaining unidentified personnel responsible for security, public safety, and crowd control; by failing to properly train unidentified employees in the “identification and management of dangerous, intoxicated, or aggressive individuals”; by failing to supervise unidentified “employees and contractors responsible for coordination and enforcement” within the parking lot; and by failing to enforce or required adherence to mandatory safety and operational standards. (FAC, ¶ 98.)

The FAC alleges, on information belief, that City Defendants knew or should have known that “their employees and contracted personnel were incompetent, unqualified, or otherwise until to perform their assigned safety functions.” (FAC, ¶ 99.) The problem with the FAC is that it never identifies any actions by any specific individual employed by (or under contract with) City Defendants that committed a bad act against Plaintiffs. The court acknowledges that the specific name of any such individual may not be available to Plaintiffs at the pleading stage.

But that would not prevent Plaintiffs from attributing the conduct to a Doe defendant and then substituting the true name after discovery. The fourth cause of action does not state a cause of action against City Defendants as currently pleaded.

The fourth cause of action also depends on allegations made only on information and belief. (See FAC at ¶¶ 24, 26, 51, 52, 56, and 99.) Even when it is permissible to allege an ultimate fact on the basis of information and belief, a party cannot simply include the phrase “information and belief” without more. (Gomes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 1149, 1158-1159.) To plead an allegation on the basis of information and belief properly, a plaintiff must allege the facts or information that led it to infer or believe the truth of the ultimate factual allegation. (Gomes, supra, 192 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1158-59; see also Brown v.

USA Taekwondo (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 100, 1106 [“where factual allegations are based on information and belief, the plaintiff must allege ‘information that “lead[s] [the plaintiff] to believe that the allegations are true”’”].) Allegations made on information and belief that lack supporting information are not accepted as true on demurrer.

C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861 (Hart) is distinguishable. The case involved legal issues not present here, such as the special relationship between a school district, its employees, and the district’s minor students. Hart determined that “a public school district may be vicariously liable under [Government Code] section 815.2 for the negligence of administrators or supervisors in hiring, supervising and retaining a school employee who sexually harasses and abuses a student.” (Hart, supra, at 879.) The instant case does not involve a school district’s custodial duty of care owed to minor students and a negligent failure to protect those students. The Hart decision also involved an identified employee who the plaintiff alleged had been negligently supervised or retained.

The opposition does not meet Plaintiffs’ burden to explain how this defect could be cured through amendment. But because there is still a reasonable possibility of amendment, the court will grant leave to amend the fourth cause of action.

STADIUM DEFENDANTS’ DEMURRER

The Stadium Defendants’ demurrer states that they challenge “Plaintiffs’ complaint and all causes of action therein,” while their Notice of Demurrer states that they challenge the first, 18

third, and fifth causes of action on failure to state sufficient facts grounds. (See Demurrer and Notice of Demurrer.)

First and Fifth Causes of Action (Negligence and Premises Liability)

The analysis of the first and fifth causes of action is the same because premises liability is a variety of negligence. “An action in negligence requires a showing that the defendant owed the plaintiff a legal duty, that the defendant breached the duty, and that the breach was a proximate or legal cause of injuries suffered by the plaintiff.” (Ann M. v. Pacific Plaza Shopping Center (1993) 6 Cal.4th 666, 673.) “The issue of whether a legal duty exists is an issue of law, not an issue of fact for the jury.” (Kentucky Fried Chicken of California, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 14 Cal.4th 814, 819.) The existence of a legal duty can be challenged on demurrer.

“Broadly speaking, premises liability alleges a defendant property owner allowed a dangerous condition on its property or failed to take reasonable steps to secure its property against criminal acts by third parties.” (Delgado v. American Multi-Cinema, Inc. (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1406.) “Premises liability is a form of negligence ... and is described as follows: The owner of premises is under a duty to exercise ordinary care in the management of such premises in order to avoid exposing persons to an unreasonable risk of harm. A failure to fulfill this duty is negligence.” (Brooks v. Eugene Burger Management Corp. (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 1611, 1619.)

There is also a separate notice requirement for premises liability: “An owner is liable for harm caused by a dangerous condition, of which the owner had actual or constructive knowledge. An injured plaintiff has the burden of showing that the owner had notice of the defect in sufficient time to correct it, but failed to take reasonable steps to do so.” (Howard v. Omni Hotels Management Corp. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 403, 431, citations omitted.) “Although no two accidents happen in the same way, to be admissible for showing notice to a landowner of a dangerous condition, evidence of another similar accident must have occurred under substantially the same circumstances.” (Id. at p. 432.)

“An owner of real property is ‘not the insurer of [a] visitor’s personal safety . . .’ However, an owner is responsible ‘for an injury occasioned to another by [the owner’s] want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his or her property . . .’ Accordingly, landowners are required ‘to maintain land in their possession and control in a reasonably safe condition,’ and to use due care to eliminate dangerous conditions on their property.” (Taylor v. Trimble (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 934, 943-944, internal citations and quotations omitted.) “The proper test to be applied to the liability of the possessor of land . . . is whether in the management of his property he has acted as a reasonable man in view of the probability of injury to others.” (Alcaraz v. Vece (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1149, 1156.)

California law treats “third party criminal acts differently from ordinary negligence, and require[s] us to apply a heightened sense of foreseeability before we can hold a defendant liable for the criminal acts of third parties. There are two reasons for this: first, it is difficult if not impossible in today’s society to predict when a criminal might strike. Also, if a criminal decides on a particular goal or victim, it is extremely difficult to remove his every means for achieving that goal.” (Wiener v. Southcoast Childcare Centers, Inc. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1138, 1149-1150, internal citations omitted.) “In each case . . . the existence and scope of a property 19

owner’s duty to protect against third party crime is a question of law for the court to resolve.” (Casteneda v. Olsher (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1205, 1213.) “In assessing whether the facts show ‘heightened foreseeability’ of third party crimes, our precedents have focused on whether there were prior similar incidents from which the property owner could have predicted the third party crime would likely occur, though we have recognized the possibility that ‘other indications of a reasonably foreseeable risk of violent criminal assaults’ could play the same role. (Id. at pp. 1220-1221; See also Alvarez v.

Jacmar Pacific Pizza Corp. (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1190, 1207-1212 (Alvarez) [stating that “a duty to take affirmative action to control the wrongful acts of a third party will be imposed only where such conduct can be reasonably anticipated”; also stating that “[f]oreseeability is the crucial factor in determining the existence of this duty”; and that “the requisite degree of foreseeability rarely, if ever, can be proven in the absence of prior similar incidents of violent crime on the landowner’s premises”]; Melton v.

Boustred (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 521, 536-538 [stating “‘[i]n the case of criminal conduct by a third party, an extraordinarily high degree of foreseeability is required to impose a duty on the landowner’ for the resulting harm. . . . When the court engages ‘in any analysis of foreseeability, the emphasis must be on the specific, rather than more general, facts of which a defendant was or should have been aware.’”; also stating that “in cases involving liability for third party criminal conduct, ‘the requisite degree of foreseeability rarely, if ever, can be proven in the absence of prior similar incidents.’ . . .

Common sense is not the standard for determining duty. Nor is hindsight.”])

“[A] general knowledge of the possibility of violent criminal conduct is not in itself enough to create a duty under California law.” (Williams v. Fremont Corner, Inc. (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 654, 668, emphasis in original.) “Knowing there is a general potential for rowdy or troublesome conduct by bar patrons, however, does not make the category of aggressive parking lot assaults reasonably foreseeable, any more so than the presumed awareness of previous assaults and robberies or problems with transients on the property establishes the foreseeability of a violent sexual assault.” (Id. at pp. 6711-672.) “To establish heightened foreseeability for third party criminal conduct, our authorities have consistently required actual knowledge—not constructive, inferential, or knowledge by association—to impose a burdensome legal duty.” (Hanouchian v.

Steele (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 99, 111 [affirming sustained demurrer].)

The first and fourth causes of action are both based on the alleged failure of the Stadium Defendants to protect Plaintiffs from third-party criminal activity––the assault alleged to have been committed by the individual defendants. (See FAC at ¶¶ 60-62, 71-72, 112, 114- 115, and 121.) The FAC fails to allege sufficient facts to establish the existence of such a duty of care. The FAC fails to sufficiently identify any prior similar incidents of violent crime in the parking lot where Plaintiffs were assaulted. And the first and fifth causes of action largely depend upon allegations made only on information and belief, which are insufficient to support either cause of action. (See FAC at ¶¶ 18, 24, 26, 51, 52, 56, 62-68, 112, 114, 116, and 119.)

That these two causes of action also allege other failures (e.g., to maintain equipment or to train personnel) does not provide a basis for overruling the demurrer. “[P]laintiffs cannot attempt to circumvent governing decisional law about a commercial enterprise’s liability for criminal acts by recasting their claim in some other sub-theory of negligence. The dispositive issue remains the foreseeability of the criminal act. Absent foreseeability of the particular criminal conduct, there is no duty to protect the plaintiffs from that particular type of harm.”

(Alvarez, supra, 100 Cal.App.4th at 1212; see also Rinehart v. Boys & Girls Club of Chula Vista (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 419, 431.)

The Stadium Defendants’ demurrer to the first and fifth causes of action on the ground that they fail to state sufficient facts is sustained. The opposition to this demurrer fails to meet Plaintiffs’ burden to show how the defect could be cured. But because this is the first pleading challenge by the Stadium Defendants to be heard in this case, the court will grant leave to amend.

Third Cause of Action (Negligent Supervision)

The Stadium Defendants’ demurrer to this cause of action is sustained on the ground of failure to state sufficient facts for the same reason as the City Defendants’ demurrer to the fourth cause of action is sustained. The FAC does not identify any bad act by any employee who was negligently hired or supervised by the Stadium Defendants. The opposition does not meet Plaintiffs’ burden to explain how the identified defect could be cured through amendment. But because this is the first pleading challenge by the Stadium Defendants to be heard by the court, the court will grant leave to amend the third cause of action.

CONCLUSION

The Stadium Defendants’ request for judicial notice is denied.

The City Defendants’ demurrer to the FAC’s first cause of action is overruled. Their demurrer to the second cause of action is sustained without further leave to amend. Their demurrer to the fourth cause of action is sustained with leave to amend.

The Stadium Defendants’ demurrer to the FAC’s first, third, and fifth causes of action is sustained with leave to amend.

Any amended pleading must be filed and served no later than August 7, 2026. The court does not grant leave to add any new parties or causes of action.

The court will prepare the order.

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