In re: The Kathryn Ann Hertogs Revocable Trust

26PR000237: IN RE: THE KATHRYN ANN HERTOGS REVOCABLE TRUST 07/01/2026 Hearing on Motion - Other Demurrer in Department 126

A Stipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) is required to be signed by each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the hearing, if not using a reporter from the Court’s Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list.

Once the form is signed it must be filed with the clerk. If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided.

TENTATIVE RULING Respondent Lori Ann Johnson’s (“Respondent’s”) demurrer to Petitioner Aubree Streich’s (“Petitioner”) Petition for Determination of Heirship is ruled on as follows.

The notice of motion does not provide notice of the Court’s tentative ruling system, as required by Local Rules 4.02.01(C), 4.02.01(D), and 1.06. Moving counsel is directed to contact opposing counsel and/or self-represented litigants and advise them of Local Rule 1.06 and the Court’s tentative ruling procedure and the manner to request a hearing. If moving counsel is unable to contact opposing parties prior to hearing, moving counsel is ordered to appear at the hearing by Zoom or by telephone.

Petitioner and Respondent are the children of Decedent Kathryn Ann Hertogs (“Decedent”). (Petition, ¶ 2.) Decedent established the Kathryn Ann Hertogs Revocable Trust on June 26, 2020, which was restated on May 16, 2023. According to Petitioner, around December 2024, Decedent requested Petitioner’s social security number and “affirmatively communicated to Petitioner that Petitioner would receive a portion of Decedent’s estate.” (Id., ¶ 7.) Petitioner notes the restated trust expressly disinherits Petitioner and states that Petitioner and Decedent were estranged. (Id., ¶ 8.) On November 27, 2024, Decedent executed an amendment to the restated trust. (Id., ¶ 12.)

On October 2, 2025, Petitioner received copies of the restated trust and the 2024 amendment. (Id., ¶ 14.)

On January 28, 2026, Petitioner filed her petition to determine heirship. Petitioner notes she was only provided an unexecuted version of the trust’s “Schedule B.” (Id., ¶ 9.) Respondent did not send any prior trust instruments and did not confirm whether Decedent ever executed the Schedule B. (Id., ¶ 16.) The unexecuted Schedule B states in pertinent part:

“Gift to Aubree Ann Streich

I hereby execute Schedule B of the Kathryn Ann Hertogs Revocable Trust dated June 26, 2020, pursuant to Section 7.01 of the trust as restated on May 16, 2023. By executing this Schedule B, I

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

26PR000237: IN RE: THE KATHRYN ANN HERTOGS REVOCABLE TRUST 07/01/2026 Hearing on Motion - Other Demurrer in Department 126

direct that upon my death, the Trustee of the Trust distribute to Aubree Ann Streich, outright and free of trust, the following general pecuniary gift: Dollar Amount of Gift: $ ____________ or _____ % of the next trust estate, whichever is less.” (Petition, Exhibit B.)

The Schedule B contains signature lines for the grantor, trustee, and a notary certificate, which are all unsigned.

Petitioner alleges that Respondent has withheld a known amendment to the trust. (Petition, ¶ 26.) Petitioner indicates that “Decedent told Petitioner that Petitioner was included as a beneficiary in her trust...” (Id., ¶ 27.) Petitioner seeks an order “[d] eclaring that Schedule B of Restated Trust is to include Petitioner as an equal one-half beneficiary ” (Id., 6:15-16.)

On March 3, 2026, Respondent filed this demurrer pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure, section 430.10(e)-(f) and Probate Code § 1000, on the grounds that the petition “fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, seeks relief unavailable as a matter of law, and is barred by Probate Code § 16061.8.” (Demurrer, 1:16-20.)

A demurrer may be sustained if “the pleading does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 430.10(e).) Demurrers for uncertainty under subdivision (f) are disfavored, being sustained only granted where the pleading is so muddled that the defendant or cross-defendant cannot reasonably respond. (See, e.g., Khoury v. Maly’s of Calif., Inc. (1993) 14 Cal. App. 4th 612, 616; 1 Weil & Brown, Civil Procedure Before Trial (Rutter 2014), sec. 7:85, p. 7(l)-39.)

The function of a demurrer is to test the sufficiency of the pleading it challenges by raising questions of law. (Salimi v. State Comp. Ins. Fund (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 216, 219; Nordlinger v. Lynch (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 1259, 1271.) A demurrer “tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters.” (SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 902, 905.) Extrinsic evidence may not properly be considered on demurrer or on a motion to strike. (Ion Equipment Corp. v. Nelson (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 868, 881; Hibernia Savings & Loan Soc. v. Thornton (1897) 117 Cal. 481, 482.)

For the purpose of determining the effect of a complaint, its allegations are liberally construed, with a view toward substantial justice. (Code Civ. Proc. § 452; Amarel v. Connell (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 137, 140-141; Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 43, fn. 7.) In this respect, the Court treats the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law, and considers matters which may be judicially noticed. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318; Poseidon Development, Inc. v. Woodland Lane Estates, LLC (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1106, 1111-1112.) A demurrer may be sustained only if the complaint lacks any sufficient allegations to entitle the plaintiff to relief. (Financial Corp. of America v. Wilburn (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 764, 778.)

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

26PR000237: IN RE: THE KATHRYN ANN HERTOGS REVOCABLE TRUST 07/01/2026 Hearing on Motion - Other Demurrer in Department 126

“Plaintiff need only plead facts showing that he may be entitled to some relief, we are not concerned with plaintiff’s possible inability or difficulty in proving the allegations of the complaint.” (Highlanders, Inc. v. Olsan (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 690, 696-697.)

“[I]ndividuals who claim that trust amendments eliminating their beneficiary status arose from incompetence, undue influence, or fraud” have standing in probate court. (Barefoot v. Jennings (2020) 8 Cal.5th 822, 825.) Here, Petitioner does not assert that a trust amendment arose from incompetence, undue influence, or fraud. Nor does Petitioner allege she was ever a trust beneficiary, or a disinherited trust beneficiary. (Id., at fn. 2 [“We do not decide here whether an heir who was never a trust beneficiary has standing under the Probate Code to challenge that trust.”].)

Petitioner asserts a theory that a document, the unexecuted Schedule B, purportedly could have been executed, thus making her status as a beneficiary presently unknown. Petitioner also alleges that Respondent has withheld a known amendment to the trust. (Petition, ¶ 26.) Finally, Petitioner alleges Respondent did not send any prior trust instruments, apart from the restated trust and the 2024 amendment, and did not confirm whether Decedent ever executed the Schedule B. (Id., ¶ 16.)

In response, Respondent states “there are no other signed instruments amending or modifying the Restated Trust (other than the First Amendment)” and to the best of her knowledge, “Schedule B to the Restated Trust was never signed.” (Demurrer, 2:22-25.)

The Barefoot v. Jennings court “emphasized the probate court’s inherent power to decide all incidental issues necessary to carry out its express powers to supervise the administration of the trust, as well as the wide latitude granted by section 17206 to make any orders and take any other action necessary or proper to dispose of the matters presented by the petition.’” (Hamlin v. Jendayi (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 1064, 1076 [Citations omitted].) Here, Petitioner alleges no facts indicating a prior amendment or version of the trust exists, or that her beneficial interest from that hypothetical amendment or version was altered in the 2023 restatement or the 2024 amendment. Thus, the demurrer is sustained with leave to amend.

Further, while it is true that “any person claiming to be a beneficiary or otherwise entitled to distribution of a share of the estate[] may file a petition for a court determination of the persons entitled to distribution of the decedent’s estate,” that petition is properly brought “[a]t any time after letters are first issued to a general personal representative and before an order for final distribution is made.” (Prob. Code, § 11700.) However, Petitioner cites only to Probate Code, section 17200(a), which permits a trustee or beneficiary of a trust to petition the court concerning the internal affairs of the trust. (Petition, ¶¶ 18-20.) Thus, it is not clear on the face of the petition whether petitioner seeks a determination of interest as to Decedent’s trust or estate, and on what grounds. The demurrer is sustained with leave to amend.

Respondent next alleges “Petitioner cannot allege a timely and legally cognizable trust contest.” (Demurrer, 8:22.) Petitioner is barred from bringing a trust contest petition “more than 120 days

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

26PR000237: IN RE: THE KATHRYN ANN HERTOGS REVOCABLE TRUST 07/01/2026 Hearing on Motion - Other Demurrer in Department 126

from the date the notification by the trustee is served upon the person, or 60 days from the date on which a copy of the terms of the trust is delivered pursuant to Section 1215 to the person during that 120-day period, whichever is later.” (Prob. Code, § 16061.8.) Petitioner indicates “[o]n or about September 30, 2025, Respondent, through counsel, served notice under Probate Code §16061.7 by mail of the irrevocability of the Restated Trust, and the letter was received on October 2, 2025.” (Petition, ¶ 22.) Importantly, Respondent acknowledges that the “date for a filing of a trust contest therefore expired on January 28, 2026.” (MPA, 2:25-3:1.) The Court’s records reflect the petition was filed on January 28, 2026. Thus, the petition, whether construed as a trust contest, a determination of heirship, or otherwise, is timely, and the demurrer on this basis is overruled.

The demurrer is sustained with leave to amend. Petitioner may file an amended petition no later than August 5, 2026. Although not a requirement, Petitioner is instructed to present this minute order at the time of filing.

This minute order is effective immediately. No formal order or other notice is required. (Code Civ. Proc. §1019.5; CRC, Rule 3.1312.)