SHAREEF vs CITY OF CARMICHAEL, et al.

23CV003034: SHAREEF vs CITY OF CARMICHAEL, et al. 07/08/2026 Hearing on Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings in Department 8C

Tentative Ruling

NOTICE:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that any oral arguments regarding this tentative ruling will be heard at 1:30 p.m. in Department 8C, located at the Tani G. Cantil-Sakauye Courthouse located at 500 G. Street, Sacramento, CA, the Hon. Richard C. Miadich presiding.

Any party who wishes to contest the tentative ruling below must:

(1) request a hearing by calling the Law and Motion Oral Argument Request Line at (916) 874- 2615, by 4:00 p.m. the Court day before the noticed hearing date, and leave a voicemail message (a) identifying themselves as the party requesting oral argument; (b) indicating the specific matter/motion for which they are requesting oral argument; and (c) confirming that they have notified the opposing party of their intention to appear; and

(2) advise the opposing party of the location and time of hearing pursuant to Local Rule 1.06.

If a hearing is not requested by 4:00 p.m. on the Court day before the noticed hearing date, the tentative ruling will become the final order of the Court.

If a hearing is requested, the Court prefers in-person attendance by the parties. However, parties may appear by Zoom unless the Court specifically orders in-person attendance. Parties choosing to appear by Zoom are reminded, however, that a Zoom appearance is still a formal appearance before the Court. Parties appearing via Zoom should do so from a quiet location, free from undue distractions, and wear attire suitable for an in-person court appearance.

The parties may join the Zoom session for hearing on the tentative ruling by audio and/or video through the following link:

https://saccourt-ca-gov.zoomgov.com/j/16039062174

SIP Address:

16039062174@sip.zoomgov.com

(833) 568-8864

ID: 16039062174

23CV003034: SHAREEF vs CITY OF CARMICHAEL, et al. 07/08/2026 Hearing on Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings in Department 8C

Parties requesting services of a court reporter will need to arrange for private court reporter services at their own expense, pursuant to Government code §68086 and California Rules of Court, Rule 2.956. Requirements for requesting a court reporter are listed in the Policy for Official Reporter Pro Tempore available on the Sacramento Superior Court website at https://www.saccourt.ca.gov/court-reporters/docs/crtrp-6a.pdf. Parties may contact Court- Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore by utilizing the list of Court Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore available at https://www.saccourt.ca.gov/court-reporters/docs/crtrp-13.Pdf

A Stipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) is required to be signed by each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the hearing, if not using a reporter from the Court’s Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list.

Once the form is signed it must be filed with the clerk. If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will be forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided.

TENTATIVE RULING

***NOTICE: EFFECTIVE APRIL 13, 2026, THIS DEPARTMENT HAS MOVED TO THE TANI G. CANTIL-SAKAUYE COURTHOUSE LOCATED AT 500 G. ST. SACRAMENTO, CA. ALL MOTIONS NOTICED FOR DEPARTMENT 28 WILL BE HEARD IN DEPARTMENT 8C OF THE NEW COURTHOUSE. ALL PAPERS FOR THIS DEPARTMENT MUST BE FILED AT THIS NEW LOCATION AND WILL NOT BE ACCEPTED AT THE HALL OF JUSTICE. ALL HEARINGS WILL TAKE PLACE AT THIS NEW LOCATION****

TENTATIVE RULING:

Defendants City of Citrus Heights (“City”)[1] and Tiffany Campbell, Nicki Garing, and Alex Turcotte’s (the “Individual Defendants;” and with City, “Defendants”) motion for judgment on the pleadings is ruled upon as follows.

Background

This is an employment action alleging statutory violations under California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”) and Labor Code section 1102.5 and common

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

23CV003034: SHAREEF vs CITY OF CARMICHAEL, et al. 07/08/2026 Hearing on Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings in Department 8C

law privacy claims. Plaintiff Tanya Shareef (“Plaintiff”) filed an initial Complaint on June 9, 2023, and the operative First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) on May 8, 2024. The FAC asserts ten causes of action: (1) FEHA harassment on the basis of gender and/or age; (2) FEHA discrimination on the basis of gender and/or age; (3) FEHA retaliation; (4) FEHA discrimination on the basis of disability; (5) FEHA failure to engage in the interactive process; (6) FEHA failure to provide reasonable accommodation; (7) FEHA failure to prevent discrimination and retaliation; (8) whistleblower retaliation pursuant to Labor Code section 1102.5; (9) violation of the constitutional right to privacy; and (10) the common law tort of false light.[2] The FAC names City as a defendant with respect to all causes of action and the Individual Defendants as to causes of action numbers 1, 4, 6 and perhaps 9 and 10.

Plaintiff was hired by City in or around April 2012 and fired on or about April or May 2021. (FAC, ¶¶ 6, 11(jjjjjj).) The Individual Defendants were Plaintiff’s supervisors. (FAC, ¶ 11.) Plaintiff alleges harassing, discriminatory, and retaliatory conduct beginning in approximately 2019. (Ibid.) In July 2019, Plaintiff began experiencing seizures caused or triggered by sleep deprivation and stress. (FAC, ¶ 11(k).) Plaintiff was later diagnosed with epilepsy and attendant migraine headaches. (FAC, ¶ 11(p).) The City placed Plaintiff on administrative or medical leave until August 19, 2019, when Plaintiff returned to modified “desk” duty. Plaintiff was released to full duty on December 23, 2019. (FAC, ¶ 11(l)–(n).) Defendant Campbell told others Plaintiff was faking her injuries and seizures and tired to block Plaintiff from claims worker’s compensation and disability. (FAC, ¶ 11(n).)

Plaintiff realized that she was being treated differently from her co-worker Hernandez. She was assigned more work, assigned inappropriate work, was not allowed to take as much leave as and did not get the administrative help that Hernandez did. (FAC, ¶ 11(r).) Defendant Campbell and Hernandez began undermining Plaintiff’s work. (FAC, ¶ 11(u)–(aa).) Defendant Turcotte did not investigate Plaintiff’s report of the discriminatory, harassing and retaliatory issues she had with Campbell. (FAC, ¶ 11(bb), (cc).) Plaintiff filed at least one “I.A./FEHA” complaint against Campbell, which was rejected. (FAC, ¶ 11(dd), (ee), (kk), (ll).)

Plaintiff’s relationship with Defendant Campbell deteriorated. (FAC, ¶ 11(mm)–(vvv).) Plaintiff’s migraine headaches returned and she suffered a back injury. (FAC, ¶ 11(www), (zzz).) Plaintiff felt pressure to return to work before she was ready. (FAC, ¶ 11(gggg).)

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

23CV003034: SHAREEF vs CITY OF CARMICHAEL, et al. 07/08/2026 Hearing on Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings in Department 8C

Plaintiff was issued a documented counseling, a written reprimand, and a workplace complaint. (FAC, ¶11(jjj), (kkkk)–(nnnn).) Plaintiff learned that Hernandez was substantially better compensated than Plaintiff was, even though Plaintiff was far more productive and handled more calls. (FAC, ¶ 11(wwww). In October 2020, Plaintiff was put on administrative leave (Ibid.) and was fired on or about May 10, 2021 (FAC, ¶ 11(jjjjjj).) In summary,

As a result of the significant, sustained, and intense gender/sex, disability based harassment, discrimination and retaliation, suffered by [Plaintiff], [Plaintiff] was worn down and could no longer work. [Plaintiff] could not trust the City to fairly evaluate the conduct of Defendants. [Plaintiff] had been attacked by defendants, ostracized and marginalized. She finally conceded that the harassment, discrimination and retaliation were never going to end.

(FAC, ¶ 11(llllll).)

Defendants move for judgment on the pleadings as to each cause of action on the basis that the FAC fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.

Discussion

Legal Standard

A motion for judgment on the pleadings has the same function as a general demurrer, but may be made after the time for demurrer has expired. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 438.) A motion for judgment on the pleadings may be made by a defendant if '[t]he complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against the defendant.' (Code Civ. Proc., § 438(c).) If the allegations state a cause of action on any theory, then the motion must be denied. (Barney v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 966, 973–974.)

Except as provided by statute, a motion for judgment on the pleadings is analyzed like a general demurrer. (Cloud v. Northrop Grumman Corp. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 995, 999.) 'Both a demurrer and a motion for judgment on the pleadings accept as true all material factual allegations of the challenged pleading, unless contrary to law or to facts of which

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23CV003034: SHAREEF vs CITY OF CARMICHAEL, et al. 07/08/2026 Hearing on Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings in Department 8C

a court may take judicial notice.' (Tung v. Chicago Title Co. (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 734, 743–744.) Just as with a demurrer, a court draws all reasonable implications and inferences in favor of upholding the complaint but need not accept alleged conclusions of fact or law. (Poseidon Development, Inc. v. Woodland Lane Estates, LLC, 152 Cal.App.4th 1106, 1111–1112; Mendoza v. Continental Sales Co. (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1395, 1401–1402.)

The grounds for a motion for judgment on the pleadings must appear on the face of the challenged pleading or from any matter of which the court is required to or may take judicial notice. (Code of Civ. Proc., § 438(d).) Consequently, in ruling on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, a trial court may not consider any 'extrinsic evidence' including but not limited to declarations. (Cloud v. Northrop Grumman Corp., supra, 67 Cal.App.4th at p. 999.)

Conceded Issues

1. FEHA and Labor Code Claims against Individual Defendants

Plaintiff concedes that FEHA discrimination and retaliation claims cannot be stated against individuals and, to the extent the FAC alleges its Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, or Eighth Causes of Action against the Individual Defendants, this was a “heading error.” (Opp., at p. 4.) For their part, Defendants agree that the FAC does not actually attempt to allege the Second, Third, Fifth, and Seventh Causes of Action against the Individual Defendants but “erroneously identified” them in its motion. (Reply, at p. 3, fn. 1.)

Accordingly, Defendants’ motion is GRANTED as to the Fourth, Sixth, and Eighth Causes of Actions, as against the Individual Defendants only. The Court DENIES leave to amend because these claims are barred as a matter of law. (Faigin v. Signature Group Holdings, Inc. (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 726, 736.)

2. Privacy Claims

Plaintiff concedes that the Ninth and Tenth Causes of Action related to privacy were the result of a typographical error. (Opp., at p. 5.) Accordingly, Defendants’ motion is GRANTED as to the Ninth and Tenth Causes of Action. The Court DENIES leave to amend because Plaintiff has intentionally abandoned these claims.

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23CV003034: SHAREEF vs CITY OF CARMICHAEL, et al. 07/08/2026 Hearing on Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings in Department 8C

Government Claims Act Presentation

Whistleblower retaliation claims under Labor Code section 1102.5 are subject to the administrative exhaustion requirements of the Government Claims Act. (La Mere v. L.A. Unified School Dist. (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 237, 246.) “Timely claim presentation is not merely a procedural requirement, but is a condition precedent to the claimant’s ability to maintain an action against the public entity.” (Ibid.)

Plaintiff asserts that “Defendants cannot affirmatively prove [the lack of claim presentation] on motion for judgment on the pleadings.” (Opp., at p. 5:9–10.) Plaintiff misunderstands the burden. A plaintiff must affirmatively allege compliance with the Government Claims Act or the pleading is subject to challenge. (Snipes v. City of Bakersfield (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 861, 865.)

The FAC fails to allege compliance with the Government Claims Act. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion as to Plaintiff’s Eighth Cause of Action for whistleblower retaliation under Labor Code section 1102.5 et seq. is GRANTED. As this is the first adjudicated challenge to the pleading, the Court GRANTS leave to amend. (City of Stockton v. Super. Ct. (2007) 42 Cal.4th 730, 747.)

First Cause of Action – Harassment

It is an unlawful employment practice for an employer or any person to harass an employee based on gender or age. (Gov. Code, § 12940, subd. (j).) To establish a prima facie case of harassment under FEHA, the employee must allege that '(1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she was subjected to unwelcome harassment; (3) the harassment was based on her protected status; (4) the harassment unreasonably interfered with her work performance by creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment; and (5) defendants are liable for the harassment.' (Ortiz v. Dameron Hospital Assoc. (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 568, 581.) To satisfy the fourth element, the employee must show that the harassment is 'sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive environment.' (Daniel v. Wayans (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 367, 389.)

Defendants contend that Plaintiff does not allege “conduct by Defendants targeted at Plaintiff based upon or referencing any of her protected characteristics.” (Def’s Supp.

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23CV003034: SHAREEF vs CITY OF CARMICHAEL, et al. 07/08/2026 Hearing on Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings in Department 8C

Brf., at p. 3.) Further, Defendants argue that to the extent Plaintiff does allege such conduct the allegations are purely conclusory. (Ibid.)

Plaintiff alleges her protected characteristics as a woman over 40 years of age (FAC, ¶ 14) and that “she was subjected to unwanted harassing conduct because of her gender and/or age” (FAC, ¶¶ 15, 22) which was “severe and/or pervasive” (FAC, ¶ 19). Plaintiff further alleges that the Individual Defendants “engaged in hostile, embarrassing and emotionally abusive conduct such that Plaintiff’s working conditions were significantly altered and plaintiff was terminated.” (FAC, ¶ 11.) In more detail, Plaintiff alleges a course of conduct lasting over a year, primarily relating to the actions of Defendant Campbell, and many events that “undermined Plaintiff’s ability to perform her job.” (See FAC, ¶ 11.)

Defendants argue Plaintiff does not allege conduct sufficiently connected to Plaintiff’s protected status “to survive the pleading stage.” (Def’s Supp. Brief, at p. 2:23–24.) Most of Defendants’ citations are to opinions following motion for summary judgment or jury trial. (Roby v. McKesson Corp. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 686; Jones v. Dept. of Corrections & Rehabilitation (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1367; Doe v. Dep’t of Corrections and Rehabilitation (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 721; Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028; Reno v. Baird (1998) 18 Cal.4th 640.) On motion for judgment on the pleadings, the Court accepts as true all allegations in the pleading and looks for any reasonable inferences to uphold the complaint. This is dramatically different from summary judgment, when a party must support its position with admissible evidence. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (d).)

Defendant cites Stevenson for the proposition that a court need not accept purely conclusory allegations when considering a motion for judgment on the pleadings. (Def’s Supp. Brief, at p. 3:23–24.) The Court agrees with this general statement of law but disagrees that Plaintiff’s allegations in the FAC are purely conclusory. As stated above, Plaintiff details incidents over the course of a year that could reasonably be understood as severe or pervasive when analyzed on a motion for judgement on the pleadings. Further, the alleged preferential treatment of Plaintiff’s male co-worker, when compared to the harsh or dismissive treatment of Plaintiff, could reasonably be understood to be based on Plaintiff’s protected characteristics.[3]

Finally, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s Supplemental Brief refers to allegations not stated in the FAC. (Def’s Supp. Brief, at pp. 3:25–4:10.) However, the Court found

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

23CV003034: SHAREEF vs CITY OF CARMICHAEL, et al. 07/08/2026 Hearing on Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings in Department 8C

related allegations at Paragraph 11(v) and (uuuu).

When taken in totality and liberally construed, the Court finds that Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged severe or pervasive conduct based on Plaintiff’s protected characteristics. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings to Plaintiff’s First Cause of Action is DENIED.

Second Cause of Action – Gender and/or Age Discrimination

To establish a prima facie claim of discrimination under FEHA, a plaintiff must show “(1) [she] was a member of a protected class, (2) [she] was qualified for the position [she] sought or was performing competently in the position [she] held, (3) [she] suffered an adverse employment action, such as termination, demotion, or denial of an available job, and (4) some other circumstance suggests discriminatory motive.” (Dinslage v. City and County of S.F. (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 368, 378.) A FEHA plaintiff “must plead a prima facie case in order to survive demurrer.” (Caldwell v. Paramount Unified School Dist. (1995) 41 Cal.App.4th 189, 202, fn. 7.)[4]

Defendants contend that none of Plaintiff’s allegations “demonstrate that Plaintiff suffered any adverse employment actions; nor does Plaintiff point to any allegations showing that Defendants’ alleged conduct or comments were motivated by any animus based upon her gender or claimed disability.” (Def’s Supp. Brief, at p. 4:21–26.)

The Supreme Court has “defined an adverse employment action generally as one that ‘materially affect[s] the terms and conditions of employment.’” (Featherstone v. Southern Cal. Permanente Medical Group (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1150, 1161 [quoting Yanowitz v. L'Oreal USA Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028, 1051, fn. 9].) This inquiry is focused “on guarding against employer conduct that materially affects an employee's job performance and/or opportunity for advancement,” and it is appropriate to view the allegations under the totality of the circumstances. (Id. at p. 1162.) “In the case of an institutional or corporate employer, the institution or corporation itself must have taken some official action with respect to the employee, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, adverse job assignment, significant change in compensation or benefits, or official disciplinary action.” (Roby v.

McKesson Corp. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 686, 706.) “Minor or relatively trivial adverse actions or conduct by employers or fellow employees that, from an objective perspective, are reasonably likely to do no more than anger or upset an employee cannot properly be viewed as materially affecting the terms,

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conditions, or privileges of employment and are not actionable.” (Yanowitz, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 1054.) FEHA's prohibition on discrimination based on race 'protects an employee against unlawful discrimination with respect not only to so-called ‘ultimate employment actions’ such as termination or demotion, but also the entire spectrum of employment actions that are reasonably likely to adversely and materially affect an employee's job performance or opportunity for advancement in his or her career.' (Id. at pp. 1053–1054.)

“[A]n employer may be found to have engaged in an adverse employment action ‘by permitting fellow employees to punish [an employee] for invoking [her] rights.'’” (Kelley v. The Conco Companies (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 191, 213, superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Taylor v. Nabors Drilling USA, LP (2014) 222 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1239, fn. 2.) Further, severe or pervasive harassment may constitute an adverse employment action by itself. (Yanowitz, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 1056, fn. 16.) It follows that an adverse employment action may be found where an employer permits employees to harass another employee.

Here, Plaintiff alleges protected characteristics as a woman over 40 years of age. (FAC, ¶ 29.) Plaintiff alleges that her job performance was satisfactory or better at all times. (FAC, ¶¶ 11(yy), 31.) Despite her satisfactory performance, Plaintiff alleges that she was treated significantly different from her coworkers, was denied leave, assigned tasks for which she was not trained, and ultimately terminated. (See, e.g., FAC, ¶¶ 11(uuu), (vvv), (www), (dddd), (wwww), (jjjjj).) Plaintiff alleges that these actions were on account of her gender or age. (FAC, ¶ 32.) In addition, the Court has already found that Plaintiff stated a cause of action for harassment.

When taken in totality and liberally construed, the Court finds the allegations in the FAC state a claim for gender and/or age discrimination. Defendant cites caselaw unrelated to FEHA law. (Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962; Shea Homes Limited Partnership v. County of Alameda (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1246; Ponderosa Homes, Inc. v. City of Sam Ramon (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1761.) Accordingly, Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings to Plaintiff’s Second Cause of Action is DENIED.

The Court agrees with Defendants that Plaintiff’s Supplemental Brief refers to facts not alleged in the FAC, including as to the number of uniforms provided to coworkers and payment for coworkers’ licenses. (Defs’ Supp. Brief, at pp. 4:27–5:7.) Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s counsel are admonished for attempting to improperly enlarge the scope of

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23CV003034: SHAREEF vs CITY OF CARMICHAEL, et al. 07/08/2026 Hearing on Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings in Department 8C

allegations. However, the Court need not rely on the improper arguments in finding that Plaintiff stated a claim.

Third Cause of Action – Retaliation

The elements of a FEHA retaliation claim are “(1) the employee's engagement in a protected activity, i.e., ‘oppos[ing] any practices forbidden under this part’; (2) retaliatory animus on the part of the employer; (3) an adverse action by the employer; (4) a causal link between the retaliatory animus and the adverse action; (5) damages; and (6) causation.” (Mamou v. Trendwest Resorts, Inc. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 686, 713.) A prima facie claim for retaliation under Labor Code section 1102.5 requires the employee to show protected activity, an adverse employment action, and a causal link between the two. (Hawkins v.

City of Los Angele (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 384, 392–393.) Protected activity under Labor Code section 1102.5 includes disclosing reasonably based suspicions of illegal activity or noncompliance with rules or regulations to a government or law enforcement agency or to another employee who has authority of the disclosing employee or who has authority to investigate, discover, or correct the violation. (Lab. Code § 1102.5, subd. (b).) The same standard for adverse employment actions in FEHA cases applies to whistleblower retaliation claims. (Patten v.

Grant Joint Union High School Dist. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 1378, 1387 [disapproved of on other grounds by Lawson v. PPG Architectural Finishes, Inc. (2022) 12 Cal.5th 703, 718, fn. 2].)

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s allegations of complaints are nonspecific. Plaintiff alleges that she reported “discriminatory, harassing and retaliatory issues” to a supervisor but that these claims were rejected. (FAC, ¶ 11(bb), (cc), (ee), (kk), (ll).) Plaintiff alleges retaliation because of these complaints leading, at least partly, to her termination. (FAC, ¶¶ 44, 47, 49.)

When taken in totality and liberally construed, the Court finds the allegations in the FAC state a claim for retaliation. Defendant cites caselaw for standards on a motion for summary judgment (Husman v. Toyota Motor Credit Corp. (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 1168) and related to a retaliation claim under Labor Code section 1102.5, subdivision (c) (Nejadian v. County of L.A. (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 703). The Court does not understand the FAC to attempt to state a Section 1102.5, subdivision (c) retaliation claim.

Accordingly, Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings to Plaintiff’s Third Cause of Action is DENIED.

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23CV003034: SHAREEF vs CITY OF CARMICHAEL, et al. 07/08/2026 Hearing on Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings in Department 8C

Fourth Cause of Action – Disability Discrimination

“A prima facie case of disability discrimination under FEHA requires a showing that (1) the plaintiff suffered from a disability, (2) the plaintiff was otherwise qualified to do his or her job, with or without reasonable accommodation, and (3) the plaintiff was subjected to adverse employment action because of the disability.” (Castro-Ramirez v. Dependable Highway Express, Inc. (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 1028, 1037.)

As with Plaintiff’s gender/age discrimination claim, Defendants argue Plaintiff does not allege an adverse employment action or motivation by animus. The Court has already found that the FAC alleges adverse employment actions.

Plaintiff alleges that “Defendants discriminated against Plaintiff because of an actual or perceived disability (epilepsy)” despite her ability and intention to return to work. (FAC, ¶ 57.) Liberally construing the pleadings, the Court finds the allegations in the FAC state a claim for disability discrimination.

Accordingly, Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings to Plaintiff’s Fourth Cause of Action is DENIED.

Fifth Cause of Action – Failure to Engage in Interactive Process

FEHA makes it unlawful for an employer 'to fail to engage in a timely, good faith, interactive process with the employee or applicant to determine effective reasonable accommodations, if any, in response to a request for reasonable accommodation by an employee or applicant with a known physical or mental disability or known medical condition.' (Gov. Code, § 12940, subd. (n).) Defendants contend that Plaintiff fails to specifically allege she requested an accommodation or identify a reasonable accommodation that was refused. (Memo. of Points & Auth. [“MPA”], at p. 29:5–14.)

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants knew about her epilepsy (FAC, ¶ 11(l)) but ignored Plaintiff’s requests and complaints about hours, schedules, and leave (FAC, ¶ 11(bb), (zz), (www).) Plaintiff alleges that “[n]o real attempt was made to work with the Plaintiff interactively to determine what the Plaintiff’s actual job responsibilities were, and whether they could still be performed given the Plaintiff’s medical restrictions.” (FAC, ¶ 65.) The Court finds that Plaintiff sufficiently alleges a claim for failure to engage in the

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23CV003034: SHAREEF vs CITY OF CARMICHAEL, et al. 07/08/2026 Hearing on Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings in Department 8C

interactive process.

Defendants note that Plaintiff admits she was placed on modified, light desk duty when she initially returned to work. (MPA, at p. 29:15–19.) But Plaintiff alleges that her medical condition is permanent (FAC, ¶ 11(p)), and Plaintiff’s allegations extend beyond the time when she returned to full duty.

Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings to Plaintiff’s Fifth Cause of Action is DENIED.

Sixth Cause of Action – Failure to Accommodate

To state a failure to accommodate claim under FEHA, Plaintiff must allege: 1) she has a disability covered by FEHA, 2) she can perform the essential functions of the position, and 3) Defendant failed to reasonably accommodate plaintiff's disability. (Brown v. L.A. Unified School Dist. (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 1092, 1107.) To maintain a failure to accommodate claim, a plaintiff generally must have requested an accommodation. (Price v. Victor Valley Union High School Dist. (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 231, 246.)

Defendants argue that Plaintiff has not specifically identified an accommodation she requested. Plaintiff alleges that “Defendants failed to reasonably accommodate Plaintiff by simply allowing her to work an easier schedule.” (FAC, ¶ 73.) As stated above, the Court also finds that the initial light duty given to Plaintiff does not negate Plaintiff’s claim. Liberally construing the pleadings, the Court finds that Plaintiff sufficiently alleges a claim for failure to accommodate.

Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings to Plaintiff’s Sixth Cause of Action is DENIED.

Seventh Cause of Action – Failure to Prevent

A “failure to prevent” claim under FEHA cannot stand without an underlying discrimination or harassment claim. (Trujillo v. North County Transit Dist. (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 280, 289.) Since the Court has denied Defendants’ motion to the first, second, third, and fourth causes of action, the motion as to the seventh cause of action does not fail for that reason.

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23CV003034: SHAREEF vs CITY OF CARMICHAEL, et al. 07/08/2026 Hearing on Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings in Department 8C

Plaintiff alleges that that Defendants failed to investigate or dismissed her complaints of FEHA violations (FAC, ¶¶ 11(cc)–(ee), (kk), (ll)). Plaintiff alleges harm from Defendants’ failure. (FAC, ¶ 84.) The Court finds these allegations sufficient to state a claim for failure to prevent discrimination or harassment.

Accordingly, Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings to Plaintiff’s Seventh Cause of Action for failure to prevent discrimination and harassment is DENIED.

Disposition

Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings is GRANTED with respect to Plaintiff’s Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Causes of Action. The motion is DENIED with respect to the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Causes of Action.

The Court GRANTS leave to amend as to the Eighth Cause of Action only. Plaintiff may file and serve a Second Amended Complaint by no later than July 31, 2026.

This minute order is effective immediately. No formal order or other notice is required. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1019.5; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1312.)

[1] Plaintiff’s initial Complaint named the City of Carmichael as a defendant. The

operative complaint dismissed the City of Carmichael and substituted the City of Citrus Heights, but the case caption name remains the same. [2] The FAC and Plaintiff’s papers refer in places to Plaintiff’s Native American race or

ancestry. (See, e.g., FAC, ¶ 11(fff); Plf’s Suppl. Brief, at p. 5:12–18.) The Court does not understand the FAC to attempt to state claims of harassment or discrimination on the basis of race or ancestry. (See, e.g., FAC, ¶¶ 15, 30.) [3] Plaintiff’s supplemental brief links some allegedly harassing conduct to disability. (See

Plf’s Supp. Brief, at pp. 1–7.) The Court does not read the FAC to assert a cause of action for harassment based on disability. [4] As stated above, the standards on a motion for judgment on the pleadings are

identical to those on demurrer, except where provided by statute.