DOMINIC HIGBEE-GONSALVES VS. ISHAR INVESTMENTS, INC.ET AL.

July 8, 2026 Law and Motion Calendar Judge Nicole S. Healy Department 28 ________________________________________________________________________ On February 10, 2026, plaintiff’s counsel sent defendant’s counsel a letter summarizing the Commissioner’s recommendation and asking for proposed dates – to be provided by February 13, 2026 – for the deposition to be held on or before March 3, 2026. (Liu Decl., ¶ 4, exh. H.) On February 22, 2026, plaintiff filed the instant motion, having received no response from defendant. (Liu Decl., ¶ 5.)

B. Legal Standards

“Any party may obtain discovery . . . by taking in California the oral deposition of any person, including any party to the action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.010.) The service of a deposition notice “is effective to require any deponent who is a party to the action . . . to attend and to testify, as well as to produce any document . . . for inspection and copying.” (Id., § 2025.280, subd. (a).) A party may move for a court order compelling a deponent’s attendance and testimony if the deponent fails to appear for their deposition. (Id., § 2025.450, subd. (a).) In such cases, the motion must be accompanied “by a declaration stating that the petitioner has contacted the deponent to inquire about the nonappearance.” (Id., subd. (d); Leko v. Cornerstone Building Inspection Service (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 1109, 1124.)

Under Code of Civil Procedure, section 2025.450, a person who fails to appear for their deposition may be subject to monetary sanctions, provided the court does not find that the party subject to sanctions acted with substantial justification. (Id., subd. (g).)

Defendant argues that the motion is moot because defendant has agreed to produce a PMK witness. Defendant misses the point. Defendant failed to appear at a duly noticed deposition and, based on the record before the court, has repeatedly failed to provide dates for which the deposition could be held. The deposition has still not taken place. This motion is not moot.

Defendant’s counsel argues that he was substituted as counsel in “September of 2025” and that he was “getting up to speed in this matter” and had “informed Plaintiff of the need for additional time to review this matter and . . . prepare for the deposition of Defendant’s PMK.” (Sapien Decl., ¶¶ 3, 5, 6.) A substitution of attorney regarding current defense counsel was filed on September 10, 2025 – 51 days prior to the scheduled deposition date. (See Substitution of Counsel, filed September 10, 2025.)

While it is understandable that defendant’s counsel wanted more time to prepare for the deposition, it is unclear whether counsel ever made such a request to plaintiff. Defendant’s counsel states that he informed plaintiff’s counsel of the need for more time but does not provide any details regarding that correspondence or when it occurred – and counsel does not specifically state that he ever requested that the deposition date be moved back. Moreover, on October 21, 2025, plaintiff expressly offered via email to re-notice a later deposition date if necessary:

[W]e are amenable to re-noticing the deposition to a new date provided your client offers availability within 30 days of the originally noticed date. If you wish to pursue this option, please provide your client’s availability within the next three (3) business days.

July 8, 2026 Law and Motion Calendar Judge Nicole S. Healy Department 28 ________________________________________________________________________ (Begakis Decl., ¶ 3, exh. B.)

It appears that defendant’s counsel never responded to that offer. Still, on October 29, 2025, after defendant’s counsel informed plaintiff’s counsel that his client was not available for the PMK deposition, plaintiff’s counsel asked that defense counsel provide dates of availability by the following day. Defense counsel failed to do so, even after plaintiff sent a follow-up e-mail at the close of business the next day. Defense counsel informed plaintiff’s counsel the morning of the deposition, “I will be getting you deposition dates by next week.” (Id., exh. C, at p. 1.) He never did. (Begakis Decl., ¶ 4.)

The record before the court does not show that defendant’s counsel ever requested that the deposition date be continued. Rather, the record shows that defendant’s counsel had numerous opportunities to propose alternative dates — both before and after the originally noticed date — and failed to do so. Defendant has not provided any reason why this motion to compel should be denied.

Plaintiff requests sanctions totaling $7,020.00 against defendant Ishar Investments, Inc. and its counsel of record, O’Hagan Meyer LLP, jointly and severally, comprising:

• $620.00 for the court reporter’s wasted attendance and Certificate of Non-Appearance;

• $3,250.00 for the work of Christina Begakis, Esq., representing 5.0 hours at a billing rate of $650.00 per hour, which includes preparing for and attending the remote deposition on October 31, 2025, drafting the initial meet-and-confer correspondence, and drafting the initial motion to compel; and

• $3,150.00 for the work of Junlin Liu, Esq., representing 7.0 hours at a billing rate of $450.00 per hour, including 1.5 hours preparing the written brief for and attending the February 3, 2026 Informal Discovery Conference; 0.5 hours drafting the post-IDC meet-and-confer correspondence sent on February 10, 2026; 3.0 hours updating, revising, and finalizing this Motion to Compel, the Memorandum of Points and Authorities, and the supporting declarations; and 2.0 hours anticipated to review Defendant’s opposition, draft a reply brief, and attend the Law and Motion hearing.

(See Begakis Decl., ¶ 7; Liu Decl., ¶ 6.)

Defendant argues that request for sanctions is “inflated.” However, defendant has provided no basis for that argument, other than to point out that that the original motion — before the IDC — requested $3,870.00 in sanctions. This argument is not compelling. Obviously, the IDC and subsequent revised motion to compel would not have been necessary had defendant provided dates for the deposition to take place.

Plaintiff’s request for sanctions is reasonable. (Spencer v. Collins (1909) 156 Cal. 298, 307 [“The value of attorney’s services is a matter with which a judge must necessarily be

July 8, 2026 Law and Motion Calendar Judge Nicole S. Healy Department 28 ________________________________________________________________________ familiar. When the court is informed of the extent and nature of such services, its own experience furnishes it with every element necessary to fix their value.”].)

Accordingly, plaintiffs’ motion to compel is GRANTED. Upon serving all parties with notice of the order on this motion, or thereafter, plaintiff may serve a notice for the PMK deposition previously scheduled for October 31, 2026.

Plaintiff’s request for sanctions is GRANTED in the amount of $7,020.00 against defendant Ishar Investments, Inc., and O’Hagen Meyer LLP, jointly and severally, to be paid to Dominic Higbee-Gonsalves within ten (10) days of notice of entry of this order.

If the tentative ruling is uncontested, it shall become the order of the court. Thereafter, plaintiff’s counsel shall prepare a written order consistent with the court’s ruling for the court’s signature, pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1312 and Local Rule 3.403(b)(iv), and provide written notice of the ruling to all parties who have appeared in this action. The order should be e-filed only, do not email or mail a hard copy to the court.