Cemex Construction Materials Pacific, LLC vs. Gunner Concrete, Inc.

denied, on the basis Defendants failed to “[f]urnishes the court with sufficient information to enable it to take judicial notice of the matter.” (Evid. Code, § 453, subd. (b).)

Should Plaintiff desire to file an amended complaint that addresses the issues in this ruling, Plaintiff shall file and serve the amended complaint within 30 days of service of the notice of ruling.

Defendants to give notice.

5 Cemex TENTATIVE RULING: Construction Materials Motion for Leave to File Cross-Complaint Pacific, LLC vs. Gunner Concrete, Inc. Defendants Douglas Scott Milne, II, and Geneva Milne move for leave to file a Cross-Complaint against Plaintiff Cemex Construction Materials Pacific, LLC. For the following reasons, the motion is GRANTED. The Milnes shall file the proposed Cross-Complaint within 7 days of this ruling.

Code Civ. Proc. § 428.10 provides that a party may file a cross- complaint setting forth: “[a]ny cause of action he has against a person alleged to be liable thereon, whether or not such person is already a party to the action, if the cause of action asserted in his cross- complaint (1) arises out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences as the cause brought against him or (2) asserts a claim, right, or interest in the property or controversy which is the subject of the cause brought against him.”

There are two types of cross-complaints: compulsory cross- complaints and permissive cross-complaints. A compulsory cross- complaint is a cross-complaint that is asserted against the plaintiff and related to the subject matter of the complaint. (Code Civ. Proc. § 426.30.) A cross-complaint is “related” to the complaint if it arises out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences as the complaint. (Code Civ. Proc. § 426.10(c).) All other cross-complaints are permissive cross-complaints.

A liberal construction is given to the application of the compulsory cross-complaint statute. (Align Technology, Inc. v. Bao Tran (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 949, 967.) “The test requires not an absolute identity of factual backgrounds for the two claims, but only a logical relationship between them”. The key question is “are any factual or legal issues relevant to both claims?” The goal is to avoid duplication of time and effort that comes from separate suits on the

same events. (Currie Medical Specialties, Inc. v. Bowen (1982) 136 Cal.App.3d 774, 777.)

Here, the proposed Cross-Complaint asserts causes of action for 1) public disclosure of private facts, 2) violation of the California Consumer Privacy Act, and 3) improper public disclosure of social security numbers. The Complaint alleged that Gunner Concrete, Inc. breached a Credit Application and Agreement and the Milnes breached the related personal guaranty. The Court granted Cemex’s summary judgment motion on May 13, 2026. (ROA 434.) The Proposed Cross-Complaint alleges Cemex wrongfully attached to its Complaint an unredacted copy of the Credit Application that contained the Milnes’ personal information, including their social security number.

If the proposed cross-complaint is permissive, leave of court may be granted “in the interests of justice” at any time during the course of the action. (Code Civ. Proc. § 428.50(c).) On the other hand, if the proposed cross-complaint is compulsory, leave must be granted so long as defendant is acting in good faith. (Code Civ. Proc. § 426.50.)

Here, the cross-complaint appears to be permissive. The claims in the Cross-Complaint relate to the conduct of Cemex and its counsel in this matter in filing an unredacted document containing the Milnes’ personal information. These claims are not “related” to the Complaint and they do not arise out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences as the Complaint – i.e., the Credit Application and Agreement and the personal guarantee.

Further, there is some evidence that the Milnes have delayed in bringing their proposed Cross-Complaint. Cemex’s Complaint containing the allegedly offending material was filed on January 17, 2024, over two years before the Milnes filed this motion on March 3, 2026. However, Geneva Milne states in her declaration that she became aware of identity theft and fraudulent activity from her credit card company in August 2025.

Rather than have the Milnes file a separate lawsuit to assert the claims in the Cross-Complaint, the Court exercises its discretion to have this Court adjudicate those claims because the Court is already familiar with the facts and procedural history of this matter.

Finally, while Cemex contends that the Proposed Cross-Complaint is futile, “the preferable practice would be to permit the amendment and allow the parties to test its legal sufficiency by demurrer, motion for judgment on the pleadings or other appropriate proceedings.”

(California Casualty Gen. Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 274, 280.) At this stage, the Court will not address the merits of a potential Anti-SLAPP motion to strike the Proposed Cross-Complaint.

The Milnes shall give notice of this ruling.

6 Colligan vs. TENTATIVE RULING: So-Cal Boys Restaurant Motion for Stay Group Inc. Defendant Viking Security Services, Inc. moves to stay this action pending the interpleader and declaratory relief action filed by Defendant’s insurer. For the following reasons, the motion is DENIED.

The Court notes that Defendant caused the motion to be served by email. However, the proof of service is defective because it does not state the sender’s email address. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1013b(b)(1).) Further, on August 16, 2025, Plaintiff’s counsel filed a Notice of Change of Firm Address, indicating that Plaintiff’s counsel’s email address is chris@gansen.law. (ROA 166.) Defendant did not serve Plaintiff’s counsel at that email address. Instead, moving counsel served Plaintiff’s counsel at chris@gansenlawgroup.com.

The motion is also denied on the merits.

“[A] court ordinarily has inherent power, in its discretion, to stay proceedings when such a stay will accommodate the ends of justice.” (People v. Bell (1984) 159 Cal.App.3d 323, 329; Landis v. North American Co. (1936) 299 U.S. 248, 254 (“[T]he power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every court to control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants.”).)

The Court “may, with propriety, find it is efficient for its own docket and the fairest course for the parties to enter a stay of an action before it, pending resolution of independent proceedings which bear upon the case.” (Leyva v. Certified Grocers of Cal. Ltd. (9th Cir. 1979) 593 F.2d 857, 863, citing Kerotest Manufacturing Co. v. C–O–Two Fire Equipment Co. (1952) 342 U.S. 180 (“the court may order a stay of the action pursuant to its power to control its docket and calendar and to provide for a just determination of the cases pending before it”).) Where such a stay is considered, the court need not find that the two cases present identical issues; instead, a finding that the cases present