PRYOR vs NAACP, et al.

25CV006551: PRYOR vs NAACP, et al. 07/06/2026 Hearing on Special Motion to Strike under CCP Section 425.16 (Anti-SLAPP motion) in Department 8D

Tentative Ruling

NOTICE: PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that pursuant to “Public Notice – Civil Division – Wednesday Law and Motion Calendar” any oral arguments regarding this tentative ruling will be heard in Department 8D, located at 500 G Street, Sacramento, CA, the Hon. Julie G. Yap presiding. Should argument be requested by either party, the requesting party must call the Law and Motion Oral Argument Request Line at (916) 874-2615, by 4:00 p.m. the Court day before the hearing, request the hearing, and notify the opposing party of the location and time of hearing pursuant to Local Rule 1.06.

At the time of requesting oral argument, the requesting party shall leave a voice mail message: a) identifying themselves as the party requesting oral argument; b) indicating the specific matter/motion for which they are requesting oral argument; and c) confirming that it has notified the opposing party of its intention to appear and that opposing party may appear via Zoom using the Zoom link and Meeting ID indicated below. If no request for oral argument is made, the tentative ruling becomes the final order of the Court.

The Court encourages parties to appear remotely for the hearing on the tentative ruling through the Court’s Zoom Application. But, any party wishing to appear in person may do so, provided that party notifies the Court by 4:00 the Court day before the hearing. The parties may join the Zoom session for hearing on the tentative ruling by audio and/or video through the following link: https://saccourt-ca-gov.zoomgov.com/j/16113421868 SIP Address: 16113421868@sip.zoomgov.com (833) 568-8864 ID: 16113421868 Parties requesting services of a court reporter will need to arrange for private court reporter services at their own expense, pursuant to Government code §68086 and California Rules of Court, Rule 2.956.

Requirements for requesting a court reporter are listed in the Policy for Official Reporter Pro Tempore available on the Sacramento Superior Court website at https://www.saccourt.ca.gov/court-reporters/docs/crtrp-6a.pdf. Parties may contact Court- Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore by utilizing the list of Court Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore available at https://www.saccourt.ca.gov/court-reporters/docs/crtrp- 13.Pdf A Stipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) is required to be signed by each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the hearing, if not using a reporter from the Court’s Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list.

Once the form is signed it must be filed with the clerk. If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with

25CV006551: PRYOR vs NAACP, et al. 07/06/2026 Hearing on Special Motion to Strike under CCP Section 425.16 (Anti-SLAPP motion) in Department 8D

a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will be forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided

***NOTICE: EFFECTIVE APRIL 13, 2026, THIS DEPARTMENT HAS MOVED TO THE TANI G. CANTIL-SAKAUYE COURTHOUSE LOCATED AT 500 G. ST. SACRAMENTO, CA. ALL MOTIONS NOTICED FOR DEPARTMENT 25 WILL BE HEARD IN DEPARTMENT 8D OF THE NEW COURTHOUSE. ALL PAPERS FOR THIS DEPARTMENT MUST BE FILED AT THIS NEW LOCATION AND WILL NOT BE ACCEPTED AT THE HALL OF JUSTICE. ALL HEARINGS WILL TAKE PLACE AT THIS NEW LOCATION****

TENTATIVE RULING

Defendant’s Notice of Motion does not provide notice of the Court’s tentative ruling system, as required by Local Rule 1.06(D). Defendant’s counsel is directed to contact opposing counsel forthwith to advise counsel of Local Rule 1.06 and the Court’s tentative ruling procedure. If Defendant’s counsel is unable to contact opposing counsel prior to the hearing, Defendant’s counsel shall be available at the hearing, in person or remotely (telephonically or by video conference via Zoom as stated in the introductory notice to today’s tentative rulings), in the event opposing counsel appears without following the procedures set forth in Local Rule 1.06(B).

Defendant Enrico Lydell Callender’s (“Callender”) Special Motion to Strike Plaintiff Salena Pryor’s (“Plaintiff”) eighth cause of action is ruled upon as follows.

Factual Background

This case arises out of Plaintiff’s employment by Defendant National Association for The Advancement of Colored People California-Hawaii State Area Conference (“CA/HI NAACP”). The First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) asserts causes of action against Defendant Callender, Defendant CA/HI NAACP, and Defendant National Association for The Advancement of Colored People (“NAACP”); the FAC alleges 14 causes of action for discrimination; harassment; retaliation; failure to prevent discrimination, harassment, and retaliation; defamation; adverse employment action; unfair competition; numerous Labor Code violations (Labor Code §§ 1102.5, 510, 1194(a), 226(a), 226.7, 512); negligent interference; and negligent infliction of emotional distress. On October 15,

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV006551: PRYOR vs NAACP, et al. 07/06/2026 Hearing on Special Motion to Strike under CCP Section 425.16 (Anti-SLAPP motion) in Department 8D

2025, the Court granted Defendants CA/HI NAACP and NAACP’s motion to compel arbitration for all claims, except the defamation cause of action. (Minute Order, dated 10/15/25.) On December 9, 2025, the Court signed an Order on the stipulation of Plaintiff and Defendant Callender, compelling all causes of action to arbitration, except for the defamation cause of action. (Stipulation and Order, dated 12/9/25.)

This motion to strike relates to Plaintiff’s eighth cause of action for defamation. In relevant part, Plaintiff’s FAC alleges:

Defendant(s) made one or more of the following statements to persons other than Plaintiff: In or around December 2023, CA/HI NAACP President CALLENDER and/or the NAACP published and/or provided false and defamatory information concerning PRYOR to the Sacramento Bee. Thereafter, the Sacramento Bee published four articles, dated January 8, 2024, January 16, 2024, January 18, 2024, and January 29, 2025, which claimed the following: (1) PRYOR was a Sacramento NAACP Branch leader who mismanaged Sacramento County funds and hired herself; (2) “Williams, the California civil rights stalwart and longest-serving president in the Sacramento chapter’s history, and branch education chair Salena Pryor, were among six executive officers suspended in October by the national civil rights organization for alleged financial improprieties, including the use of their positions for financial gain[]”; (3) “Betty Williams and education chair Salena Pryor appear to have used their staffing and consulting firms to operate the Dine In 2 program and paid themselves with county funds.”; (4) “Williams and Pryor appear to have used their staffing and consulting firms to operate the food program, Dine In 2, and paid themselves more than $145,000 in county funds earmarked for contractors’ salaries”; and (5) “[o]ne organization paid through a CBCC contract received over $100,000 in COVID relief.

The same contractor is under investigation by Sacramento County for misuse of funds for another COVID relief contract, in which local restaurants and the NAACP are accused of embezzlement. The NAACP said its name was used without permission[,]” (referencing PRYOR’s business, BSBA).

These people, including but not limited to, the general public, potential business partners, potential clients, and potential grant funders, reasonably understood that the statements were about Plaintiff.

These people, including but not limited to, the general public, potential business partners, potential clients, and potential grant funders, reasonably understood the statements to mean that: (1) Plaintiff mismanaged County grant funds and used

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV006551: PRYOR vs NAACP, et al. 07/06/2026 Hearing on Special Motion to Strike under CCP Section 425.16 (Anti-SLAPP motion) in Department 8D

her alleged NAACP Sacramento Officer position hire herself and embezzle the same grant funds; (2) Defendant(s) suspended Plaintiff because Plaintiff allegedly engaged in financial improprieties, including the use of their positions for financial gain, and used County grant funds and her alleged NAACP Sacramento Officer position hire herself and embezzle the same grant funds; (3) Plaintiff unlawfully used her consulting firm to operate the Dine In 2 Program and pay herself large amounts of money that were earmarked for contractors’ salaries and not her or her business; and (4) Plaintiff unlawfully received over $100,000 in COVID relief through a CBCC contract, and Plaintiff is accused of embezzlement and under investigation by Sacramento County for misuse of funds for another COVID relied contract and used the NAACP name without permission.

(FAC, ¶¶ 191-193.)

Callender now brings a special motion to strike Plaintiff’s eighth cause of action pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section 425.16 on the grounds that Plaintiff’s cause of action for defamation arises out of protected activity. Plaintiff opposes.

Callender’s unopposed request for judicial notice is granted for the purposes appropriate for judicial notice. (See Evid. Code § 452, subd. (d); see also Johnson & Johnson v. Superior Court (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 757, 768 [court may take judicial notice of the existence of court documents but not to the truth of the statements contained therein].)

Legal Standard

Code of Civil Procedure § 425.16(a) states in its entirety:

The Legislature finds and declares that there has been a disturbing increase in lawsuits brought primarily to chill the valid exercise of the constitutional rights of freedom of speech and petition for the redress of grievances. The Legislature finds and declares that it is in the public interest to encourage continued participation in matters of public significance, and that this participation should not be chilled through abuse of the judicial process. To this end, this section shall be construed broadly.

(Underline added for emphasis.)

Subdivision (b)(1) then provides that “[a] cause of action arising from any act of that

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV006551: PRYOR vs NAACP, et al. 07/06/2026 Hearing on Special Motion to Strike under CCP Section 425.16 (Anti-SLAPP motion) in Department 8D

person in furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free speech in connection with a public issue shall be subject to a special motion to strike, unless the court determines that the plaintiff has established that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.” Importantly, subdivision (e) clarifies the preceding provision with the following definitions:

As used in this section, ‘act in furtherance of a person’s right of petition or free speech under the United States or California Constitution in connection with a public issue’ includes:

(1) any written or oral statement or writing made before a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by law, (2) any written or oral statement or writing made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law, (3) any written or oral statement or writing made in a place open to the public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest, or (4) any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest.

Anti-SLAPP motions are analyzed in two steps. First, the moving party bears the burden of establishing that the challenged allegations or claims ‘arise from’ protected activity in which the defendant has engaged. (Park v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1061.) The court must determine whether the moving party has made a threshold showing that the challenged cause of action is one arising from protected activity: An act or acts taken ‘in furtherance of the [party’s] right of petition or free speech under the United States or California Constitution in connection with a public issue,’ as defined in the statute. [Citation omitted.]” (Falcon Brands, Inc. v. Mousavi & Lee, LLP (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 506, 517-518.)

The moving party’s burden at the first step of the anti-SLAPP analysis of showing that a claim arises from protected activity is “not always easily met.” (Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 66.) To satisfy this burden, a moving party must identify allegations of an activity that is in furtherance of the right of petition or free speech as expansively defined by the anti-SLAPP statute and thus, a “‘protected activity’” under the statute. (Laker v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 745, 760 & fn. 11.) The moving party also must show that the claim at issue ‘arises from’ such protected activity but a claim does not arise from

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV006551: PRYOR vs NAACP, et al. 07/06/2026 Hearing on Special Motion to Strike under CCP Section 425.16 (Anti-SLAPP motion) in Department 8D

protected activity “simply because it was filed after, or because of, protected activity, much less because protected activity provides evidentiary support or context for the claim. (Rand Resources, LLC v. City of Carson (2019) 6 Cal.5th 610, 621.) Instead, the protected activity “must ‘supply elements of the challenged claim[s].’” (Id.; see also, Wilson v. Cable News Network, Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 871, 884 [“To determine whether a claim arises from protected activity, courts must ‘consider the elements of the challenged claim and what actions by the defendant supply those elements and consequently form the basis for liability.’”].) If a plaintiff combines multiple claims into a count, each claim is analyzed separately. (Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 393, 396.)

In Bonni v. St. Joseph Health System (2021) 11 Cal.5th 995, 1010, the California Supreme Court provided additional guidance, noting that “courts should analyze each claim for relief — each act or set of acts supplying a basis for relief, of which there may be several in a single pleaded cause of action — to determine whether the acts are protected and, if so, whether the claim they give rise to has the requisite degree of merit to survive the motion.” Courts may look to the gravamen of the basis of the cause of action “to determine whether particular acts alleged within the cause of action supply the elements of a claim . . . or instead are incidental background . . . . (Id. at p. 1012.)

Where the moving party makes the initial showing required by the anti-SLAPP statute, the burden then shifts to the opposing party to demonstrate “there is a probability that [s/he] will prevail on the claim. [Citations omitted.]” (Falcon Brands, supra, 74 Cal.App.5th at 518.) This requirement has been interpreted to demand only a showing of “minimal merit.” (Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at 1061.) In determining whether a claim has “minimal merit,” a court “does not weigh the evidence or resolve conflicting factual claims.” (Monster Energy Co. v.

Schechter (2019) 7 Cal.5th 781, 788.) Instead, a court merely determines whether the claim is both “legally sufficient” (i.e., “adequately pled”) but also “factually substantiated” with evidence sufficient to establish the prima facie elements of the claim at issue. (See, e.g., Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at 379-380, 396.) In other words, a plaintiff responding to an anti-SLAPP motion must show not only that it has pleaded a valid claim, but also that this claim is supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment for the opposing party. (Navellier, supra, 29 Cal.4th at 88-89.)

In ruling on the special motion to strike, the trial court considers the pleadings and the evidence submitted but it must not weigh credibility or compare the weight of the evidence. Rather, the court’s responsibility is merely to accept as true the evidence presented by the opposing party favorable to him/her (see, e.g., Nagel v. Twin

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV006551: PRYOR vs NAACP, et al. 07/06/2026 Hearing on Special Motion to Strike under CCP Section 425.16 (Anti-SLAPP motion) in Department 8D

Laboratories, Inc. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 39, 45-46) and to evaluate the moving party’s evidence only to determine if it defeats as matter of law the evidence offered by the opposing party (see, e.g., Kashian v. Harriman (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 892, 906).

With these standards in mind, the Court now turns to the specific arguments advanced in support of and opposition to the present special motion to strike.

Objections to Evidence

Objections to the declaration of Plaintiff are ruled upon as follows:

- Objection nos. 1 and 13 are sustained; - Objection nos. 2-12, 14 are overruled.

Objections to the declaration of Donald Williams are ruled upon as follows:

- Objection nos. 1, 8 are sustained; - Objection nos. 2-7, 10-12 are overruled. Exhibits 2, 4, and 6 (including exhibits to Exhibit 6) are not considered for the truth of the matter asserted.

The Court notes that many of the objections relate to evidence that is not necessary to the Court’s conclusions.

Discussion

Callender’s Initial Burden

Callender argues that Plaintiff’s eighth cause of action arises out of protected activity because “Defendant’s conduct challenged by Plaintiff—allegedly furnishing information to a media outlet about use and oversight of Sacramento County public funds in the NAACP’s COVID meals program—constitutes “conduct in furtherance of the right of petition or free speech” on an issue of public interest.” In opposition, Plaintiff argues that the gravamen of her claim for defamation is not an issue of public interest, but rather “Defendants’ publication and republication of specific accusations falsely portraying Plaintiff as dishonest, corrupt, financially unethical, and engaged in misconduct.” (Opp., p. 5:10-12.)

Plaintiff does not appear to dispute that the statements were made in a “public forum” for the purposes of section 425.16(e)(3). (See Nygard, Inc. v. Uusi-Kerttula (2008) 159

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV006551: PRYOR vs NAACP, et al. 07/06/2026 Hearing on Special Motion to Strike under CCP Section 425.16 (Anti-SLAPP motion) in Department 8D

Cal.App.4th 1027, 1039.) As presented by the parties, the issue at bar is whether the complained about conduct concerns an issue of public interest.

Defendant argues that the allegations of the complaint are those which pertain to a public interest, as Plaintiff alleges Defendants made defamatory statements that Plaintiff misallocated public funds, a matter which is clearly of public concern. Plaintiff argues that her claims arise out of the defamation of Plaintiff’s character, which is not an issue of public concern.

The court in FilmOn.com Inc. v. DoubleVerify Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 133, 145 set forth a two-part test for determining whether particular speech is made in connection with an issue of public interest. The FilmOn court explained that first, the court must decide what “issue of public interest the speech in question implicates—a question we answer by looking to the content of the speech.” Second, the court examines the “functional relationship between the speech and the public conversation about some matter of public interest.” (Id., at pp. 149-150.) The second part of this test includes determining if the speaker “participated in, or furthered, the discourse that makes an issue one of public interest.” (Id., at p. 153.)

Relevant to the matter before the Court, the Third District Court of Appeal in Maranatha Corrections, LLC v. Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1075 contemplated whether allegations of defamation with respect to purported misappropriation of public funds constituted an issue of public interest:

Director Woodford's assertions of misappropriation were connected to an issue of public interest. Maranatha received a lucrative contract with the State to operate a correctional facility. The Woodford letter terminated that contract based, in substantial part, on the improper withholding of monies rightfully belonging to the State. The Legislature has made clear that the government's business is the people's business and that California's citizens have a right to full disclosure of all information which affects the public fisc. (See Gov.Code, § 6250 [“access to information concerning the conduct of the people's business is a fundamental and necessary right of every person in this state”].) Thus, it cannot be doubted that the assertion by a state agency that a private contractor wrongfully withheld $1.6 million in taxpayer funds is a matter of concern and interest to the public.

(Id., at p. 1086.)

In this case, Plaintiff alleges, inter alia:

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV006551: PRYOR vs NAACP, et al. 07/06/2026 Hearing on Special Motion to Strike under CCP Section 425.16 (Anti-SLAPP motion) in Department 8D

However, in or around December 2023, CA/HI NAACP President CALLENDER and/or the NAACP published and/or provided false and defamatory information concerning PRYOR to the Sacramento Bee. Thereafter, the Sacramento Bee published four articles, dated January 8, 2024, January 16, 2024, January 18, 2024, and January 29, 2024, which claimed the following: (1) PRYOR was a Sacramento NAACP Branch leader who mismanaged Sacramento County funds and hired herself; (2) “Williams, the California civil rights stalwart and longest- serving president in the Sacramento chapter’s history, and branch education chair Salena Pryor, were among six executive officers suspended in October by the national civil rights organization for alleged financial improprieties, including the use of their positions for financial gain[]”; (3) “Betty Williams and education chair Salena Pryor appear to have used their staffing and consulting firms to operate the Dine In 2 program and paid themselves with county funds.”; (4) “Williams and Pryor appear to have used their staffing and consulting firms to operate the food program, Dine In 2, and paid themselves more than $145,000 in county funds earmarked for contractors’ salaries”; and (5) “[o]ne organization paid through a CBCC contract received over $100,000 in COVID relief.

The same contractor is under investigation by Sacramento County for misuse of funds for another COVID relief contract, in which local restaurants and the NAACP are accused of embezzlement. The NAACP said its name was used without permission[,]” (referencing PRYOR’s business, BSBA).

(FAC, ¶ 54.)

The Court finds that the allegations of Plaintiff’s eighth cause of action constitute conduct “protected” pursuant the anti-SLAPP statute which must be broadly construed. Specifically, the Court finds that the statements at issue implicate the public fisc and the “people’s business.” The Court also finds that the alleged speaker of the statements participated and furthered discourse relating to this issue through statements that provide detail regarding the purported mismanagement, improprieties, or self-dealing relating to public funds. As such, Defendant Callender has met his initial burden in demonstrating that the claim arises out of protected activity.

Plaintiff's Burden of Showing “Probability of Prevailing”

For the reasons explained above, this Court has concluded Callender had satisfied his initial burden with respect to the eighth cause of action for defamation. Therefore, this cause of action is subject to being stricken under the anti-SLAPP statute unless Plaintiff

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV006551: PRYOR vs NAACP, et al. 07/06/2026 Hearing on Special Motion to Strike under CCP Section 425.16 (Anti-SLAPP motion) in Department 8D

is able to establish a “probability of prevailing” on this claim.

Under California law, to defeat a special motion to strike a plaintiff must establish a “probability of prevailing” on their causes of action and to do this, a plaintiff must show not only that the cause of action is adequately pled (“legally sufficient”) but also produce admissible evidence sufficient to establish each of the prima facie elements of each claim. (See, e.g., Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 384-385; Burrill v. Nair (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 357, 379-380; Navarro v. IHOP Properties (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 834, 843-844.)

“Defamation is an invasion of the interest in reputation. The tort involves the intentional publication of a statement of fact that is false, unprivileged, and has a natural tendency to injure or which causes special damage.” (Smith v. Maldonado (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 637, 645.) The elements of a claim for defamation include: (1) a publication that is (2) false, (3) defamatory, (4) unprivileged, and (5) has a natural tendency to injure or causes special damage. (J-M Manufacturing Co., Inc. v. Phillips & Cohen LLP (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 87, 97.) “Truth is a complete defense to defamation.” (Terry v. Davis Community Church (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1534, 1553.)

A statement is defamatory “on its face” only if its content defames a person without the need of introducing any evidence other than the statement itself in order to prove that the tort of defamation has been completed. If it is necessary to introduce extrinsic evidence in order to show that the defamatory statement refers to the plaintiff, or that the statement itself is defamatory, then the statement is not defamatory on its face. (See e.g., MacLeod v. Tribune Publ'g Co. (1959) 52 Cal. 2d 536, 549; Code Civ.

Proc. § 45a (“A libel which is defamatory of the plaintiff without the necessity of explanatory matter, such as an inducement, innuendo or other extrinsic fact, is said to be a libel on its face. Defamatory language not libelous on its face is not actionable unless the plaintiff alleges and proves that he has suffered special damage as a proximate result thereof. Special damage is defined in Section 48a of this code.”).) A statement is not libelous per se if its defamatory content is not apparent to the reasonable reader but only to persons with specialized knowledge. (See Barnes-Hind, Inc. v.

Superior Court (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 377, 386-387 (“[I]f the reader would be able to recognize a defamatory meaning only by virtue of his or her knowledge of specific facts and circumstances, extrinsic to the publication, which are not matters of common knowledge rationally attributable to all reasonable persons, then (under the same authorities) the libel cannot be libel per se but will be libel per quod.”).)

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV006551: PRYOR vs NAACP, et al. 07/06/2026 Hearing on Special Motion to Strike under CCP Section 425.16 (Anti-SLAPP motion) in Department 8D

Plaintiff argues that she can establish an “overwhelming” probability of prevailing on her claims. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that the alleged statements are defamatory, unprivileged, and have a natural tendency to injure. (See Washer v. Bank of America (1943) 21 Cal.2d 822, 827-828 [Accusations implying dishonesty, corruption, misuse of funds, self-dealing, unethical conduct, or financial impropriety constitute defamation per se because such statements directly injure a person in her profession and reputation].) Plaintiff argues that Callender’s statements were made before any competent investigation was performed, and thus such statements were made negligently and with reckless disregard for the truth. (Pryor Decl., ¶¶ 8; Williams Decl., ¶ 4; Callender Decl., ¶ 12.)

Callender argues that while the FAC alleges that Callender made false statements to the Sacramento Bee, none of these statements were attributable to Callender directly. Callender further argues that none of the allegedly defamatory statements are “provably false,” as the statements “are at least in part, true.” (Mtn., p. 8:21-22.) Callender argues that when considering the totality of the circumstances, the statements in the Sacramento Bee are not provably false. (Citing Nygard, Inc. v. Uusi-Kerttula (2008) 159 Cal. App. 4th 1027, 1049.)

In support of the motion, Callender attests in his declaration that:

By the end of 2023, I was aware that the NAACP had questions about Plaintiff’s invoices for services related to the Dine In 2 Program, that the NAACP had questions regarding the contractor’s relationships with Williams and Plaintiff, and that the County of Sacramento, the distributor of funds, had suspicions regarding Sac NAACP’s expenditure of funds.

By December 2023, I, along with others, based upon our review of Sac NAACP’s Branch Financial Transactions and other documents, had a good faith belief that Plaintiff engaged in financial impropriety regarding her contractual relationship with Sac NAACP for the Dine In 2 Program, and opined as such.

The NAACP advised Sac DHA that it did not have many responsive documents to support the costs for the Dine Inn 2 Program, and that they were in custody and control of the former Sac NAACP members who ran the program. This was reflected in the subsequent audit report.

(Callender Decl., ¶¶ 10-12.)

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV006551: PRYOR vs NAACP, et al. 07/06/2026 Hearing on Special Motion to Strike under CCP Section 425.16 (Anti-SLAPP motion) in Department 8D

Callender further presents the audit results from an audit which was performed by Sacramento County’s Department of Human Assistance. (Callender Decl., ¶ 14, Ex. A; Audit Report dated May 21, 2025.) In the audit findings, the Department of Human Assistance states that most of the documents requested as part of the audit were not in Sacramento NAACP’s possession, despite several requests to Sacramento NAACP personnel. (Ex. A, p. 2.) The audit report states that there are $1,728,769 in questioned costs and $948,037 in disallowed costs, and recommended appropriate remedial action. (Id., p. 3.)

In support of her opposition, Plaintiff presents evidence which tends to establish that a publication occurred. (Pryor Decl., ¶¶ 6, 10, 11, Ex. 4.) In support of falsity, Plaintiff presents evidence which shows that she was hired by the Sacramento NAACP and thus allegations that she improperly used funds to “hire herself” are false. (Pryor Decl., ¶¶ 4, Ex. 1 and 2.) Plaintiff further presents evidence that she lacked authority to control NAACP funds and therefore could not have mismanaged funds or exercised unauthorized financial control. (Pryor Decl., ¶ 5.) Plaintiff also presents evidence that the statements made to the Sacramento Bee were at a time when a competent investigation had not been completed, including a lack of substantial documentation and interviews with relevant individuals. (Pryor Decl., ¶ 8.)

As an initial matter, the Court finds that Plaintiff has presented sufficient, admissible evidence that tends to show that Callender made defamatory statements to the Sacramento Bee, which went on to publish said statements. Each publication of defamatory material gives rise to a cause of action for defamation against the originator, as long as the republication is reasonably foreseeable. (See Schneider v. United Airlines, Inc. (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 71, 77; see also Dickinson v. Cosby (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 1138, 1156 [“One who takes a responsible part in a publication of defamatory material may be held liable for the publication.”].)

In light of Callender’s representations of what he knew, his role in the investigation/audit, his position as CA/HI President, and his declaration that he “opined” that Plaintiff had engaged in financial impropriety provides evidence (even if circumstantial) to support a prima facie showing that Defendant Callender published the defamatory statements. (See Callender Decl. ¶¶ 1-2, 9-11.)

While Callender has proffered his own evidence that directly rebuts Plaintiff's evidence with respect to the “truth” of the alleged statements, the Court cannot weigh evidence on this motion (except where Callender’s evidence shows as a matter of law that Plaintiff cannot prevail, which is not the case here). (See Greene v. Bank of America (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 454, 457-458 [quoting Overstock.com, Inc. v. Gradient

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV006551: PRYOR vs NAACP, et al. 07/06/2026 Hearing on Special Motion to Strike under CCP Section 425.16 (Anti-SLAPP motion) in Department 8D

Analytics, Inc. (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 688, 699-700].) Likewise, the Court cannot weigh credibility on this motion. (See Ibid.) Although it recognizes the conflicting evidence as to “truth” of the statements in question here, the Court must take the evidence in Plaintiff's declaration as true at this procedural posture. (See e.g., id., at p. 707 [in affirming trial court's order denying special motions to strike, the appellate court explained that “[t]aking the evidence in [financial officer's] declaration as true, it was sufficient to establish a probability that Overstock would prevail in demonstrating the falsity of Gradient's assertions that the company engaged in accounting irregularities with respect to revenue recognition accounting and operating cash flow. . .”).)

Finally, to the extent Callender contends that the statements at issue, as framed by the pleadings, are matters of opinion, not facts, the Court disagrees. Considering the totality of the circumstances before it at this time, the alleged statements at issue, at minimum, imply the existence of unstated defamatory facts. (Franklin v. Dynamic Details, Inc. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 375, 386-387.) Further, the statements at issue appear to go beyond any general opinion and appear to assert that Plaintiff engaged in particular acts constituting misconduct or improprieties.

Given the “not high” burden (ibid) upon Plaintiff to make a “prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment” (see Premier Med. Mgmt Systems, Inc. v. California Ins. Guar. Ass 'n (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 464, 476), Plaintiff has proffered evidence that is sufficient to meet her burden here.[1]

Disposition

As shown above, although Callender has carried his initial burden of demonstrating this action arises from conduct falling within the scope of the broad protections afforded by the anti-SLAPP statute, Plaintiff in opposition has identified evidence that, if credited by a jury, would support a prima facie showing to support a favorable judgment.

Accordingly, Callender’s special motion to strike must be and hereby is DENIED.

The minute order is effective immediately. No formal order pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312 or further notice is required.

[1] In the moving papers, Defendant Callender contends that there is no evidence of

malice, citing New York Times v. Sullivan (1964) 376 U.S. 254 and Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. (1974) 418 U.S. 323 (without reference to any pinpoint cites). The Supreme

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV006551: PRYOR vs NAACP, et al. 07/06/2026 Hearing on Special Motion to Strike under CCP Section 425.16 (Anti-SLAPP motion) in Department 8D

Court in New York Times v. Sullivan held that a libel action brought by a public official against critics of official conduct requires proof of actual malice. (supra, 376 U.S. at p. 283.) In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., the Supreme Court declined to extend the New York Times privilege to defamation of private individuals and held that “the States may define for themselves the appropriate standard of liability so long as it is not imposed without fault. (supra, 418 U.S. at pp. 347, 351.) Defendant does not appear to contend that Plaintiff is a public figure and provides no basis for the assertion that the constitution requirements relevant to a public figure apply in this case.

Indeed, there is no discussion regarding this threshold issue at all. While not clear, it appears that perhaps Defendant contends that constitution considerations relating to a private individual involved in a public controversy may apply. Nevertheless, Defendant appears to abandon the contention regarding a need to show malice in reply and instead asserts statements were made with a “good faith basis” without articulating any argument, rule, or supporting authority which it seeks the Court to apply.

As Defendant’s argument regarding the requisite intent or state of mind is neither clearly articulated nor supported by any legal authority, the Court does not address it here.