RINGGOLD vs BURGETT INC., et al.

23CV006400: RINGGOLD vs BURGETT INC., et al. 11/06/2025 Hearing on Motion for Order Requiring Security from the Plaintiff Edward Ringgold Pursuant to CCP § 391.1 in Department 54

Tentative Ruling

Defendant Burgett Inc. dba Pianodisc’s (“Defendant”) motion for an order requiring security from Plaintiff in pro per Edward Ringgold (“Plaintiff”) pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 391.1 is ruled upon as follows.

On August 14, 2025, after hearing oral arguments, the Court allowed Defendant to file supplemental briefing and Plaintiff to file a response addressing four issues raised during arguments with respect to the ninth cause of action. The Court supplements its previous tentative ruling to address the arguments raised by the parties in their briefs.

Defendant’s request for judicial notice made in support of its moving papers is GRANTED. Defendant requests the Court take judicial notice of Plaintiff’s complaint filed in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California and several other filings from that action. Plaintiff opposes the request. “Judicial notice may be taken of [r]ecords of (1) any court of this state or (2) any court of record of the United States or of any state of the United States.” (Evid. Code § 452(d).) Thus, the documents are properly subject to judicial notice. However, the Court only takes judicial notice of “the existence of the documents, not the truth of the matters asserted therein.” (Fierro v. Landry’s Restaurant Inc. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 276, 282, fn. 6, emphasis in original.)

Defendant’s request for judicial notice made in support of its reply is UNOPPOSED and GRANTED, subject to the same limitation described above. (Fierro, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 282, fn.6.)

Defendant’s request for judicial notice made in support of its supplemental briefing is GRANTED, subject to the same limitation described above. (Fierro, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 282, fn.6.)

Background

This action arises out of an employment dispute in which Plaintiff alleges he was wrongfully terminated by Defendant after he complained that his salary was being reduced due to his request to work remotely at the beginning of the Covid-19 pandemic due to a medical condition. Plaintiff filed this action on August 9, 2023. After the parties met and conferred about Plaintiff’s allegations, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) on October 9, 2023. On April 18, 2024, the Court sustained with leave to amend Defendant’s demurrer to certain causes of action in the FAC. That same day, the Court also granted Defendant’s motion to strike portions of the FAC. On May 8, 2024, Plaintiff filed the operative Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”).

The operative factual allegations of the SAC are as follows:

23CV006400: RINGGOLD vs BURGETT INC., et al. 11/06/2025 Hearing on Motion for Order Requiring Security from the Plaintiff Edward Ringgold Pursuant to CCP § 391.1 in Department 54

12. Plaintiff began his employment with Defendants on or about March 26, 2010 as a Chief Financial Officer/Controller/Human Resource. Throughout his employment, Plaintiff was a loyal and hard-working employee.

13. On or around June 15, 2020, Plaintiff provided Defendants a letter from his medical provider (See EXHIBIT-1) in which provided [sic] restrictions for Plaintiff not work [sic] in an in-office setting and work from home due to the COVID California State mandate order and his medical conditions of Multiple Sclerosis (hereinafter “MS”). In direct retaliation to his request for accommodation to his disability, Defendants reduced Plaintiff’s salary by fifty percent (50%) and they began to ostracize him due to his need for an accommodation.

14. In or around July 2020, Plaintiff informed Defendants of illegal activities (see EXHIBIT-2) that he believed were taking place within Defendants’ business operations, such as tax fraud, Small Business Administration fraud, Secretary of State fraud, among others. Immediately after the complaint, Plaintiff began to experience a hostile work environment and discrimination from Defendants. Plaintiff filed an EEOC complaint and requested for an internal investigation regarding the harassment and discrimination he was suffering from Defendants. The EEOC charge was submitted to Defendants on or about November 5, 2020, and in direct retaliation Defendants wrongfully terminated Plaintiff’s employment on November 20, 2020.

(SAC, ¶¶ 12-14, emphasis in original.)

The SAC includes 11 causes of action: (1) wrongful termination in violation of public policy; (2) disability discrimination under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”); (3) disability harassment under FEHA; (4) failure to accommodate under FEHA; (5) failure to engage in the interactive process under FEHA; (6) retaliation under FEHA; (7) failure to prevent, investigate, and/or remedy unlawful harassment, discrimination, and retaliation under FEHA; (8) retaliation under Labor Code section 1102.5; (9) failure to maintain and furnish accurate wage statements; (10) intentional infliction of emotional distress; and (11) unfair business practices.

On September 5, 2024, the Court granted Defendant’s motion to declare Plaintiff a vexatious litigant. However, the Court denied Defendant’s request for an order requiring Plaintiff to post a security, because Defendant had not proposed an amount for the security or submitted any evidence of its reasonable expenses incurred in connection with the litigation. The Court’s ruling noted that it “denied the motion for security without addressing the question of whether Mr. Ringgold has a reasonable possibility of prevailing.” (09/05/2024 Minute Order, p. 6.) The Court further emphasized, “This denial is without prejudice to its renewal by Defendant upon a proper showing.” (Ibid.)

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

23CV006400: RINGGOLD vs BURGETT INC., et al. 11/06/2025 Hearing on Motion for Order Requiring Security from the Plaintiff Edward Ringgold Pursuant to CCP § 391.1 in Department 54

On September 16, 2024, Defendant filed the instant motion for an order requiring security from Plaintiff pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 391.1. The matter was heard on August 14, 2025. After oral arguments, the Court directed Defendant to provide supplemental briefing that addressed the four arguments raised during the hearing. Specifically, (1) whether Plaintiff’s ninth cause of action seeks penalties for wage statement violations which is subject to a one-year statute of limitations; (2) whether Labor Code section 226 is a cause of action for statutory penalties only; (3) whether the “ability to recover unpaid wages . . . would still be subject to a one-year statute of limitations”; and (4) whether “if this Court interprets Plaintiff’s Ninth Cause of Action to include both a claim for inaccurate wage statements and a separate claim for unpaid wages, Plaintiff’s claim for unpaid wages is barred by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel as Plaintiff adjudicated such in small claims court and judgment was entered against him.” (Defendant’s Supplemental Brief (“Def.

Supp.”), at p. 3:14-26.) Plaintiff filed a response to the supplemental briefing (“Plf. Resp.”).

Legal Standard

Once a plaintiff is declared a vexatious litigant, the moving party may request that a plaintiff be required to post security before the case proceeds by showing that the vexatious litigant has no reasonable probability of prevailing in the litigation against the moving defendant. (Code Civ. Proc. § 391.1(a).)

[S]ection 391.1 provides that on motion of a defendant, the court may require the posting of security by the plaintiff if it determines, on an evidentiary showing, both that the plaintiff is a vexatious litigant and that there is no reasonable probability that the plaintiff will prevail in the action against the moving defendant. (See also § 391.3.) The burden on the motion is on the moving party and the court is required to weigh the evidence in exercising its discretion to determine whether the plaintiff has no reasonable likelihood of prevailing in the action.

(Golin v. Allenby (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 616, 640.)

In determining whether a plaintiff has a reasonable probability of prevailing, the trial court is permitted to weigh evidence and need not accept the allegations in the complaint as true. (Moran v. Murtaugh Miller Meyer & Nelson, LLP (2007) 40 Cal.4th 780, 786.)

The moving party’s showing “is ordinarily made by the weight of the evidence but a lack of merit may also be shown by demonstrating that the plaintiff cannot prevail in the action as a matter of law.” (Golin, supra, 190 Cal.App.4th at p. 642.)

Defendant’s Motion

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

23CV006400: RINGGOLD vs BURGETT INC., et al. 11/06/2025 Hearing on Motion for Order Requiring Security from the Plaintiff Edward Ringgold Pursuant to CCP § 391.1 in Department 54

Defendant contends, “Plaintiff’s claims have been thoroughly investigated by both a neutral third party and by the EEOC over a year and a half period. Both the neutral third party and the EEOC found no merit to [Plaintiff’s] claims.” (Mot. MPA, p. 7:5-7.) Defendant submits the following facts to support this assertion.

Plaintiff was employed as a Controller for Defendant. On or around March 19, 2020, Plaintiff began working remotely. At the recommendation of Defendant’s CPA, Defendant’s executives began opening mail delivered to the office that would have ordinarily been forwarded to Plaintiff. During this process, Defendant discovered numerous accounting issues. On November 20, 2020, Defendant’s owner, Defendant Lisa Burgett (“Mrs. Burgett”), emailed Plaintiff to inform him of what the executives had discovered and to notify him that he would be placed on an immediate, indefinite, and unpaid suspension.

Mrs. Burgett’s email listed 21 items that had been discovered, which she described as “numerous errors and intentional misreporting,” “alarming notices, unpaid bills, gross accounting oversight[,] and negligence.” (Burgett Decl., Exh. A, p. 1.) On November 23, 2020, Mrs. Burgett emailed Plaintiff to notify him that his employment was terminated.

As Defendant began discovering these issues, Plaintiff asserted that he felt discriminated against and harassed. Thus, Defendant hired a third-party investigator, Terry A. Willis, Esq. of Cook Brown LLP, to investigate Plaintiff’s claims. Ms. Willis investigated, among other matters, Plaintiff’s claims that (1) his hours and salary were reduced in retaliation after Plaintiff submitted a doctor’s note on June 8, 2020 that permitted him to work from home until January of 2021; and (2) he experienced a hostile work environment because he was asked to fill out a reasonable accommodation form after he submitted his doctor’s note, had confrontational interactions with management about accounting functions, and was asked to complete projects that he could not complete due to the reduction in hours.

Ms. Willis’s investigation involved witness interviews and a review of documents submitted by Plaintiff, Defendant, and an independent accounting firm that reviewed Plaintiff’s work. On September 10, 2020, while the investigation was still pending, Plaintiff emailed Ms. Willis asking her to contact him before finalizing the report so he could add to and amend the reports he had submitted to her. On October 15, 2020, Ms. Willis issued her Investigation Summary, which concluded that there was no evidence to support Plaintiff’s retaliation claim, and that the other adverse actions Plaintiff claimed he suffered were made for legitimate business reasons.

On November 5, 2020, Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC related to his claim that his hours and salary were reduced after he submitted his doctor’s note in June of 2020, among other allegations. On December 3, 2020, Plaintiff submitted an amended charge to the EEOC to include an allegation that his suspension and termination constituted retaliation for filing the original charge. On February 24, 2022, the EEOC issued a Notice of Proposed Dismissal, which found that it was “unlikely that a violation of the statute allegedly violated can

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

23CV006400: RINGGOLD vs BURGETT INC., et al. 11/06/2025 Hearing on Motion for Order Requiring Security from the Plaintiff Edward Ringgold Pursuant to CCP § 391.1 in Department 54

be established,” and thus recommended that the charge be dismissed. (Rediger Decl., Exh. E, p. 3.)

On May 18, 2022, Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging 15 causes of action against Defendant in the Eastern District of California. On February 14, 2023, the court granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss the second through fourth causes of action with leave to amend. After obtaining two extensions to amend his complaint, Plaintiff informed the court that he would not be amending his complaint. Since the dismissed causes of action were the only basis for federal jurisdiction, the court dismissed the entire complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on August 10, 2023.

Defendant contends that Plaintiff has no reasonable probability of prevailing on any of his claims. Specifically, Defendant contends that Plaintiff’s first seven causes of action are disability-related claims based solely on the allegation that Plaintiff provided Defendant a doctor’s note on June 15, 2020 permitting him to work from home, but Plaintiff admits that he had been working from home since March 19, 2020. Thus, Defendant contends, “Because working from home is the only reasonable accommodation Plaintiff alleges to have requested, (SAC, ¶13), there is no reasonable probability that Plaintiff will be able to prevail on his claims that Defendant failed to engage in the interactive process and failed to reasonably accommodate him as he admits he was permitted to work from home.” (Mot. MPA, p. 7:23-27.)

Defendant next argues, “As to Plaintiff’s claim that he had his pay and his hours reduced as a form of discrimination, harassment, and/or retaliation, both the neutral third party and the EEOC specifically found that Plaintiff was not the only one to experience such reductions and that Defendant’s reduction of employee hours and pay was due to legitimate business concerns.” (Mot. MPA, p. 8:1-4.) Defendant also argues that the investigator concluded that Plaintiff was not treated differently because of his claimed disability. Additionally, Defendant contends that Plaintiff fails to allege any specific instances of harassment in the SAC, and the only instance identified in Plaintiff’s EEOC charge is not related to Plaintiff’s disability.

Regarding Plaintiff’s cause of action for whistleblower retaliation under Labor Code section 1102.5, Defendant contends that this claim should be limited to retaliation related to Plaintiff’s request for accommodation, which fails for the reasons discussed above. Defendant further argues that even if Plaintiff’s claim is construed to include his reporting of Defendant’s alleged financial fraud, the cause of action still fails because its disclosures do not involve illegal conduct, and there is no causal connection between the disclosures and Plaintiff’s termination.

Regarding Plaintiff’s ninth cause of action for failure to maintain and furnish accurate wage statements, Defendant contends that the claim is time-barred, as it is subject to a one-year statute of limitations.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

23CV006400: RINGGOLD vs BURGETT INC., et al. 11/06/2025 Hearing on Motion for Order Requiring Security from the Plaintiff Edward Ringgold Pursuant to CCP § 391.1 in Department 54

Finally, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s seventh, tenth, and eleventh causes of action are derivative of his other claims and thus fail because his other claims fail.

Plaintiff’s Filings

Plaintiff has submitted a slew of filings in relation to this motion. On June 27, 2025, while the hearing on this matter was set for July 14, 2025, Plaintiff filed two documents titled as “Plaintiff’s Opposition.” One document totals 17 pages and includes a five-page memorandum, a declaration, and an exhibit. The other totals 97 pages and consists of a 10-page memorandum, a declaration, and additional exhibits. The two documents contain some overlap in their content. Also on June 27, Plaintiff filed an opposition to Defendant’s request for judicial notice. On July 2, 2025, Plaintiff filed an amended opposition that appears largely similar to the 17-page filing but with additional exhibits. On July 9, 2025, Plaintiff filed an objection to Defendant’s reply brief. On July 16, 2025, Plaintiff filed a supplemental opposition and a request for judicial notice.

The Court has not considered Plaintiff’s July 9 or July 16 filings. These filings were not authorized by the Code of Civil Procedure or California Rules of Court, and Plaintiff did not request or obtain leave to submit the filings. Although the July 2 filing was also not authorized and was untimely in relation to the July 14 hearing date, the Court has considered the filing since it is only minimally different than the 17-page June 27 filing. The Court treats the July 2 filing and the three June 27 filings as Plaintiff’s combined opposition.

Plaintiff’s 17-page opposition and 24-page amended opposition attempts to reargue the Court’s vexatious litigant determination. This argument amounts to an improper motion for reconsideration of the Court’s ruling. Motions for reconsideration are governed by Code of Civil Procedure section 1008(a), with which Plaintiff has not complied. Accordingly, the arguments advanced in these two filings are rejected.

Plaintiff’s 97-page filing addresses the issue at hand, namely, whether Plaintiff has a reasonable probability of prevailing such that he should not be required to post a security under Code of Civil Procedure section 391.1. Plaintiff first argues that Defendant has not met its burden, contending, “ALL of Defendants [sic] evidence in her exhibits was/is to be used by the Plaintiff in trial or mediation. The Defendant HAS NO personal evidence i.e. job performance reviews etc. to defend their actions ONLY PRETEXT DOCUMENTS AFTER JUNE OF 2020 in which the Plaintiff turned whistleblower.” (Opp. p. 6:2-5.)

Plaintiff further contends that he “has presented substantial factual and legal support” for his claims, included internal whistleblower reports, unspecified protected activity, unspecified retaliatory acts by Defendant, and correspondence between Defendant and its attorney regarding the risks of Plaintiff’s disclosures. On this issue, Plaintiff essentially argues that the exhibits attached to his SAC support his claims.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

23CV006400: RINGGOLD vs BURGETT INC., et al. 11/06/2025 Hearing on Motion for Order Requiring Security from the Plaintiff Edward Ringgold Pursuant to CCP § 391.1 in Department 54

Supplemental Briefing

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s ninth cause of action seeks only statutory penalties, not recovery of unpaid wages as discussed in the Court’s original tentative ruling. In particular, Defendant contends that even if Labor Code section 226, subdivision (e)’s reference to “‘the greater of all actual damages’ is a reference to the amount of alleged unpaid wages, the recovery of such remains the penalty for an inaccurate wage statement and therefore is still subject to the one-year statute of limitations applicable to penalties.” (Def. Suppl. at 6:20-24.) Defendant also argues that Plaintiff is collaterally estopped from seeking unpaid wages due to a judgment entered in a small claims action, Case No. 23SC02892, filed by Plaintiff regarding wages earned between November 23, 2020 and November 30, 2023. (See RFJN 1; Declaration of Arielle M. Rediger, ¶ 3, Ex. A.)

In response, Plaintiff argues that Defendant exceeded the Court’s 10-page limit on the supplemental briefing and requests that the Court strike Defendant’s declaration and request for judicial notice. Plaintiff further argues that his cause of action under Labor Code section 226 “targets Defendants’ [sic] failure to maintain accurate records and furnish compliant wage statements, which caused injury by concealing unpaid wages and depriving Plaintiff of accurate accounting.” (Plf. Resp. at 4:6-12.) Plaintiff also argues that the small claims case does not bar the ninth cause of action because the claim addresses conduct through November 20, 2020, while the small claims action addressed one day of unpaid wages for November 23, 2020.

Discussion

Initially, the Court denies Plaintiff’s request to strike Defendant’s declaration and request for judicial notice. Defendant’s arguments are limited to 10-pages as ordered. While the Court did not expressly allow for Defendant to file a supporting request for judicial notice and declaration, such supporting documents are generally not counted for purposes of determining whether a party has complied with applicable page limitations. (See California Rules of Court, rule 3.1110(d) [“The page limit does not include the caption page, the notice of motion and motion, exhibits, declarations, attachments, the table of contents, the table of authorities, or the proof of service”].)

As noted above, Defendant may meet its burden to show that the vexatious litigant has no reasonable probability of prevailing in the litigation against the moving defendant with evidence or by showing that Plaintiff’s claims fail as a matter of law. (Golin, supra, 190 Cal.App.4th at p. 642.) Defendant opts to meet its burden by showing Plaintiff’s claim fails as a matter of law because it is barred by the one-year statute of limitations and collateral estoppel.

Statute of Limitations

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

23CV006400: RINGGOLD vs BURGETT INC., et al. 11/06/2025 Hearing on Motion for Order Requiring Security from the Plaintiff Edward Ringgold Pursuant to CCP § 391.1 in Department 54

Labor Code section 226, subdivision (e)(1) states:

An employee suffering injury as a result of a knowing and intentional failure by an employer to comply with subdivision (a) is entitled to recover the greater of all actual damages or fifty dollars ($50) for the initial pay period in which a violation occurs and one hundred dollars ($100) per employee for each violation in a subsequent pay period, not to exceed an aggregate penalty of four thousand dollars ($4,000), and is entitled to an award of costs and reasonable attorney’s fees.

At issue here is whether subdivision (e)(1) provides for both damages—which would be subject to the three-year statute of limitations in Code of Civil Procedure section 338—and penalties— the one-year statute of limitations in Section 340—or whether any recovery under this provision is a penalty. None of the cases cited by the parties analyze Labor Code section 226, subdivision (e)(1)’s statutory language. Nevertheless, the Court concludes that Labor Code section 226, subdivision (e)(1) is subject to a two-tier statute of limitations.

Code of Civil Procedure section 338, subdivision (a) provides a three-year statute of limitations for “[a]n action upon a liability created by statute, other than a penalty or forfeiture.” Code of Civil Procedure section 340, subdivision (a) provides a one-year statute of limitations for “[a]n action upon a statute for a penalty or forfeiture, if the action is given to an individual, or to an individual and the state, except if the statute imposing it prescribes a different limitation.”

“Under well-established California law, statutes that provide for mandatory damages either in addition to actual injury or regardless of actual injury or fault are considered to be in the nature of a penalty or forfeiture subject to the one-year limitations period [under section 340, subdivision (a)].” (County of El Dorado v. Superior Court (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 620, 625 [emphasis in original].) However,

[N]ondiscretionary penalties not based on actual losses incurred are generally covered by the one-year statute of limitations for actions upon a statute for a penalty contain in Code of Civil Procedure section 340. (See Hypertouch, Inc. v. ValueClick, Inc. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 805, 842 123 Cal.Rptr.3d 8.) In such situations, general causes of action may be subject to a two-tier limitations period, with claims for actual damages subject to one limitation and other claims limited by Code of Civil Procedure section 340, as was the case in Hypertouch, Inc. (Hypertouch, Inc., at pp. 841–845, 123 Cal.Rptr.3d 8.)

(Malaga County Water Dist. v. State Water Resources Control Bd. (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 447, 470.)

In Hypertouch, Inc., the plaintiff brought a cause of action for violation of Business and Professions Code section 17529.5, subdivision (a), “which prohibits entities from advertising in a

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

23CV006400: RINGGOLD vs BURGETT INC., et al. 11/06/2025 Hearing on Motion for Order Requiring Security from the Plaintiff Edward Ringgold Pursuant to CCP § 391.1 in Department 54

commercial electronic message (e-mail) that contains various types of deceptive content.” (Hypertouch, Inc. v. ValueClick, Inc. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 805, 813.) Subdivision (b)(1)(B)(i) of that statute permits a plaintiff to recover actual damages, while subdivision (b)(1)(B)(ii) permits a plaintiff to recover liquidated damages. The Hypertouch, Inc. court “independently assess[ed] the appropriate statute of limitations applicable” to a claim for actual damages and a claim for liquidated damages. (Id. at p. 842.)

In conducting this assessment, the court concluded that the plaintiff’s claim for actual damages was governed by the three-year statute of limitations found in Code of Civil Procedure section 338, subdivision (a), while the claim for liquidated damages was governed by the one-year statute of limitations of Code of Civil Procedure section 340, subdivision (a). (Id. at pp. 842-845.)

Similarly, in Murphy v. Kenneth Cole Productions, Inc. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1094, 1099, the California Supreme Court addressed whether the “one additional hour of pay” provided for in Labor Code section 226.7 constituted a wage or premium pay subject to a three-year statute of limitations or a penalty subject to a one-year statute of limitations. The Supreme Court stated:

The Labor Code defines “wages” as “all amounts for labor performed by employees of every description, whether the amount is fixed or ascertained by the standard of time, task, piece, commission basis, or other methods of calculation.” (§ 200, subd. (a).) Courts have recognized that “wages” also include those benefits to which an employee is entitled as a part of his or her compensation, including money, room, board, clothing, vacation pay, and sick pay. [Citations.] A “penalty,” on the other hand, is that “which an individual is allowed to recover against a wrong-doer, as a satisfaction for the wrong or injury suffered, and without reference to the actual damage sustained....” [Citations.] Penalties provide for “ ‘recovery of damages additional to actual losses incurred, such as double or treble damages....’ ” [Citation.]

After examining the statute’s plain language, the administrative and legislative history, and the compensatory purpose of the remedy, the Supreme Court concluded that although the statutory language is reasonably susceptible of an interpretation that the hour of pay is a penalty intended to punish the employer for denying employees their meal and rest periods, the primary purpose of the “additional of pay” was intended as a premium wage to compensate employees, not a penalty.

As discussed above, Labor Code section 226, subdivision (e) provides for “the greater of all actual damages or fifty dollars ($50) for the initial pay period in which a violation occurs and one hundred dollars ($100) per employee for each violation in a subsequent pay period.” Thus, it includes a remedy that allows an employee to recover unpaid wages that were withheld as a result of an employer’s failure to comply with Labor Code section 226, subdivision (a) or to recover penalties for the employer’s failure to comply with Labor Code section 226, subdivision (a) regardless of whether the employee suffered any injury. The first remedy is compensatory,

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

23CV006400: RINGGOLD vs BURGETT INC., et al. 11/06/2025 Hearing on Motion for Order Requiring Security from the Plaintiff Edward Ringgold Pursuant to CCP § 391.1 in Department 54

based on actual damages caused by withheld wages. Thus, the Court concludes it is subject to a three-year statute of limitations since it is “[a]n action upon a liability created by statute, other than a penalty or forfeiture.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 338, subd. (a).) Meanwhile, the fifty dollars ($50) and one hundred dollars ($100) provided for by the statute are penalties that are “without reference to the actual damage sustained.” (Murphy, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 1104.) Therefore, these penalties are subject to the one-year statute of limitations set forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 340, subdivision (a).

Finally, although not cited by the parties, the Court notes that at least one federal court has determined that “Section 226 provides for both damages and penalties. Therefore, depending on the relief sought, a claim pursuant to Section 226(e)(1) could be subject to a one-year or a threeyear limitations period” after examining how other district courts have interrupted Labor Code section 226, subdivision (e). (Novoa v. Charter Communications, LLC (E.D. Cal. 2015) 100 F.Supp.3d 1013, 1025 [collecting cases].) While not binding on this Court, federal decisions are persuasive authority. (Mikhaeilpoor v. BMW of North America, LLC (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 240, 250.)

Thus, the Court concludes that Labor Code section 226, subdivision (e)(1) is subject to a two-tier statute of limitations because it provides for actual damages or nondiscretionary penalties. In his ninth cause of action, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant violated Labor Code section 226(a). Plaintiff alleges that he “was injured by Defendant’s failure to maintain accurate payroll records because he was not compensated for the time he worked. He was not paid wages for his labor and is thus entitled to recover an amount to be proved at trial, of not less than his actual damages or the penalties provided by the Labor Code and IWC Order 5-2001.” (SAC, ¶ 103.)

Plaintiff specifies that he “seeks attorneys’ fees, costs of suit, and all other penalties and remedies authorized by law, including, §§ 226(e), 226.3, and 558.) In his response, Plaintiff argues that the ninth cause of action “targets Defendants’ [sic] failure to maintain accurate records and furnish compliant wage statements, which caused injury by concealing unpaid wages and depriving Plaintiff of accurate accounting.” (Plf. Resp. at 4:6-12 [emphasis added].) Since Plaintiff seeks both lost wages and penalties, his ninth cause of action is not completely barred by the statute of limitations, as he filed his action within three years of his termination.

Collateral Estoppel

“Res judicata precludes piecemeal litigation by splitting a single cause of action or relitigation of the same cause of action on a different legal theory or for different relief.” (Federal Home Loan Bank, supra, 214 Cal.App.4th at p. 1527 [quotation marks and citations omitted].) Res judicata bars a cause of action that was or could have been litigated in a prior proceeding if: “(1) the present action is on the same cause of action as the prior proceeding; (2) the prior proceeding resulted in a final judgment on the merits; and (3) the parties in the present action or parties in privity with them were parties to the prior proceeding. [Citations.]” (Federal Home Loan Bank of

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

23CV006400: RINGGOLD vs BURGETT INC., et al. 11/06/2025 Hearing on Motion for Order Requiring Security from the Plaintiff Edward Ringgold Pursuant to CCP § 391.1 in Department 54

San Francisco v. Countrywide Financial Corp. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 1520, 1527.) “It is well established that the claim preclusion aspect of the doctrine of res judicata applies to small claims judgements.” (Pitzen v. Superior Court (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 1374, 1381.) “The burden of establishing preclusion by prior adjudication (res judicata) rests squarely on the party asserting it.” (Ferraro v. Camarlinghi (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 509, 529.)

Here, Defendant fails to meet its burden to establish that res judicata applies. First, Defendant is required to establish that “the present action is on the same cause of action as the prior proceeding.” In the small claims action, Plaintiff sought one day of unpaid wages, liquidated damages, and waiting time penalties for conduct occurring after November 23, 2020. (Declaration of Arielle M. Rediger (“Rediger Decl.”), Ex. A, p. 2-3, § 3.) There is no indication from either the small claims form or from the court’s subsequent ruling on the claim (see Id., Ex.

B) that Plaintiff asserted any claims under Labor Code section 226. Additionally, the instant action concerns alleged conduct that occurred prior to November 20, 2020 (see SAC, ¶14) while the small claims action concerned conduct beginning on November 23, 2020 (See Rediger Decl., Ex. A, p. 3, § 3.b). Thus, Defendant has failed to show that Plaintiff’s small claims action is the same cause of action asserted as the ninth cause of action in his SAC. Further, Defendant’s argument that Plaintiff claim for wage statement penalties incurred prior to his suspension is derivative of his claim for unpaid wages for one day after his suspension is rejected as Defendant provides no legal authority in support of this contention.

Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes that Defendant has failed to establish that collateral estoppel applies. Thus, Plaintiff’s ninth cause of action does not fail as a matter of law for this reason.

Disposition

Since Defendant has not met its burden to show Plaintiff has no probability of prevailing on at least one of Plaintiff’s causes of action, the motion for security must be DENIED.

The stay of litigation that went into effect when this motion was filed is terminated. Defendants shall respond to the SAC within 10 days of this order. (Code Civ. Proc. § 391.6.)

This minute order is effective immediately. No formal order or other notice is required. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1019.5; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1312.)

NOTICE:

Consistent with Local Rule 1.06(B), any party requesting oral argument on any matter on this calendar must comply with the following procedure:

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

23CV006400: RINGGOLD vs BURGETT INC., et al. 11/06/2025 Hearing on Motion for Order Requiring Security from the Plaintiff Edward Ringgold Pursuant to CCP § 391.1 in Department 54

To request limited oral argument, on any matter on this calendar, you must call the Law and Motion Oral Argument Request Line at (916) 874-2615 by 4:00 p.m. the Court day before the hearing and advise opposing counsel. At the time of requesting oral argument, the requesting party shall leave a voice mail message: a) identifying themselves as the party requesting oral argument; b) indicating the specific matter/motion for which they are requesting oral argument; and c) confirming that it has notified the opposing party of its intention to appear and that opposing party may appear via Zoom using the Zoom link and Meeting ID indicated below. If no request for oral argument is made, the tentative ruling becomes the final order of the Court.

Unless ordered to appear in person by the Court, parties may appear remotely either telephonically or by video conference via the Zoom video/audio conference platform with notice to the Court and all other parties in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure §367.75. Although remote participation is not required, the Court will presume all parties are appearing remotely for non-evidentiary civil hearings.

The Department 54 Zoom Link is https://saccourt-ca-gov.zoomgov.com/my/sscdept53.54 and the Zoom Meeting ID is 161 4650 6749. To appear on Zoom telephonically, call (833) 568-8864 and enter the Zoom Meeting ID referenced above. NO COURTCALL APPEARANCES WILL BE ACCEPTED.

Parties requesting services of a court reporter will need to arrange for private court reporter services at their own expense, pursuant to Government code §68086 and California Rules of Court, Rule 2.956. Requirements for requesting a court reporter are listed in the Policy for Official Reporter Pro Tempore available on the Sacramento Superior Court website at https://www.saccourt.ca.gov/court-reporters/docs/crtrp-6a.pdf. Parties may contact Court- Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore by utilizing the list of Court Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore available at https://www.saccourt.ca.gov/court-reporters/docs/crtrp- 13.pdf.

A Stipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) is required to be signed by each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the hearing, if not using a reporter from the Court’s Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list.

Once the form is signed it must be filed with the clerk. If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided.