Kailie Armstrong vs. Lotus Investment Partners LLC

A Stipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) is required to be signed by each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the hearing, if not using a reporter from the Court’s Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list.

Once the form is signed it must be filed with the clerk. If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will be forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided.

TENTATIVE RULING:

Defendant Tirath Sahota’s (“Sahota”) motion for summary judgment against Plaintiff Kailie Armstrong (“Plaintiff”) is ruled upon as follows.

Sahota is admonished for failing to comply with California Rules of Court rule 3.1110(f)(4), which requires electronic exhibits to include electronic bookmarks linking to the first page of each exhibit. Failure to comply with this rule in the future may result in the motion being dropped without consideration or the matter being continued with direction to refile the papers with properly linked exhibits.

Sahota is also admonished for failing to comply with California Rules of Court rule 3.1116(c), which requires the relevant portions of a deposition to be “marked in a manner that calls attention to the testimony.”

Background

This action arises out of an alleged homicide that occurred on July 1, 2020 at a 7- Eleven convenience store located in the Evergreen Shopping Center in Sacramento.

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34-2021-00300268-CU-PO-GDS: Kailie Armstrong vs. Lotus Investment Partners LLC 12/15/2025 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment in Department 28

Plaintiff alleges that her son, Decedent Amari Brown (“Decedent”), was fatally shot as he exited the 7-Eleven by Defendants Artis Hunter (“Hunter”) and Damarea Chaney (“Chaney”).

This motion was originally set to be heard on September 17, 2025. The Court continued the motion to November 19, 2025 at the request of Plaintiff and further granted Plaintiff leave to file (and serve) a late opposition to this motion no later than October 30, 2025. The Court also granted Sahota leave to file a reply to the opposition by no later than November 7, 2025.

The Court observes that on November 12, 2025, Plaintiff made an ex-parte application for an “order staying entire action and resetting all hearings and deadlines” in which Plaintiff sought to vacate or reschedule a number of hearings, including the November 19, 2025 Motion for Summary Judgment.

On November 13, 2025 the Court denied Plaintiff’s application in its entirety for lack of good cause.

On November 19, 2025, the Court continued this motion so that it could be heard along with Defendant’s Motion to File Evidence Under Seal in Support his Motion for Summary Judgment.

Plaintiff did not, at any time, file a late opposition to this motion. In that regard, Sahota has not filed a reply.

The Court now rules on the merits of the motion.

Sahota’s Separate Statement

Sahota is the owner of the subject 7-Eleven franchise operating at the Evergreen Shopping Center. The Evergreen Shopping Center is owned by Defendant Lotus Investment Partners (“Lotus”) and managed by Defendant RentMultiplier Corporation (“RM”) pursuant to an agreement with Lotus. The subject 7-Eleven was leased by Lotus to 7-Eleven, Inc., as Sahota’s franchise agreement prohibited him from entering into a lease for the premises. The lease between 7-Eleven, Inc. and Lotus provided that Lotus was responsible for maintaining the landscaping, roof, and other common areas of the shopping center, with 7-Eleven, Inc. agreeing to pay a portion of the maintenance costs of the common areas. The space that 7-Eleven, Inc. leased is limited to the interior of the store; the areas outside of the store within the shopping center are considered common areas, including the parking lot and sidewalks.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

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Sahota submits a surveillance video of the shooting that provides the following timeline. At around 10:21 p.m. on July 1, 2020, Decedent entered the Evergreen Shopping Center from Center Parkway on a bicycle. Decedent placed his bicycle against the western exterior wall of the 7-Eleven store and walked towards the entrance of the store. Decedent looked into the store through the entrance door for a few seconds but did not enter the premises beyond a brief step through the doorway. Approximately 10 seconds later, Decedent walked away from the door and back towards his bicycle. Hunter and Chaney were standing near Decedent’s bicycle at this time. Hunter and Chaney briefly interacted with Decedent before shooting him multiple times. Decedent ultimately succumbed to his wounds and died. The shooting occurred in a common area of Evergreen Shopping Center.

Officers from the Sacramento Police Department were nearby at the time of the shooting and arrived at the scene within seconds. Detective Amanda Worm of the Sacramento Police Department investigated the shooting and determined that the shooting was likely part of a larger ongoing gang war. Although Detective Worm did not know of any evidence linking Decedent to any gang, she noted that Hunter was at least loosely affiliated with the Oak Park Bloods, and the Evergreen Shopping Center was a hangout for members of rival gangs.

Plaintiff’s complaint alleges three causes of action against Sahota: (1) negligence; (2) premises liability; and (3) negligent infliction of emotional distress. Each cause of action is labeled as a survival action and as a wrongful death action. Sahota moves for summary judgment on the basis that Plaintiff cannot establish he owed a legal duty of care to Decedent.

Discussion

Legal Standard on Summary Judgment

Summary judgment must be granted if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(c); Mann v. Cracchiolo (1985) 38 Cal.3d 18, 35.) Summary judgment is properly granted only if the moving party's evidence establishes that there is no issue of material fact to be tried. (Upson v. Superior Court (1982) 31 Cal.3d 362, 374.) A judge may not grant summary judgment when any material factual issue is disputed. (O’Riordan v. Federal Kemper Life Assur. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 281, 289.)

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In evaluating a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication the Court engages in a three-step process. First, the Court identifies the issues framed by the pleadings. The pleadings define the scope of the issues on a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication. (FPI Dev. Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 381-382.) The Court cannot consider an unpled issue in ruling on a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication. (Roth v. Rhodes (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 530, 541.)

Next, the Court must determine whether the moving party has met its burden. A defendant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication bears the burden of persuasion that one or more elements of the plaintiff's cause of action cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal. 4th 826, 850, quoting Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(p)(2).) A defendant is not required to conclusively negate one or more elements of the plaintiff's cause of action. (Saelzer v Advance, Group 400 (2001) 25 Cal.4th 763, 780-781). Rather, to meet its burden, the defendant is only required to show that the plaintiff cannot prove an element of its cause of action, i.e., that the plaintiff does not possess and cannot reasonably obtain evidence necessary to show this element. (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal. 4th at pp. 853-55.)

At the same time, a defendant cannot shift the burden to the plaintiff simply by suggesting the possibility that the plaintiff cannot prove its case; a moving defendant must still make 'an affirmative showing' in support of its motion. (Id. at pp. 854-855, fn. 23.)

Once the moving party has met its burden, the burden shifts to the opposing party to show that a material factual issue exists as to the cause of action alleged or a defense to it. (Code. Civ. Proc. § 437c(p); see generally Bush v. Parents Without Partners (1993) 17 Cal. App. 4th 322, 326-27.) In ruling on the motion, the Court must consider the evidence and inferences reasonably drawn from the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal. 4th 826 at p. 843.)

There is a triable issue of material fact only if the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion. (Id. at 850.) The trial court's function in ruling on the motion is to determine whether such issues of fact exist, not to decide the merits of the issues themselves. (Furla v. Jon Douglas Co. (1998) 65 Cal. App. 4th 1069, 1076-77.) Whether or not a disputed fact is “material” is determined by the law applicable to the legal theories put in issue by the complaint. (Anderson v. Heart Federal Sav. & Loan Assn. (1989) 208 Cal. App. 3d 202, 210.

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Merits of Sahota’s Motion

As noted above, Plaintiff brings three causes of action against Sahota: (1) negligence; (2) premises liability; and (3) negligent infliction of emotional distress. These are essentially a single cause of action for negligence. “Premises liability is comprised of the same elements as negligence.” (Coyle v. Historic Mission Inn Corp. (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 627, 634.) “A premises liability claim is founded on a theory of negligence.” (Joshi v. Fitness Internat., LLC (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 814, 832, fn. 13.) “A claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress is not an independent tort but the tort of negligence to which the traditional elements of duty, breach of duty, causation, and damages apply.” (Wong v. Jing (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1354, 1377.) Thus, Plaintiff’s causes of action are properly construed as a single claim for negligence against Sahota.

The duty of a property owner to protect from dangerous conditions on its property applies where the property owner has actual or constructive notice of the condition. (Jones v. Awad (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 1200, 1208-1209.) For a property owner to have constructive notice, “he must have ‘actual notice of facts or circumstances which are sufficient to put a prudent person on inquiry as to the existence of the fact with respect to which he is charged with constructive notice.’” (Id. at p. 1209, quoting Nicholson v. Los Angeles (1936) 5 Cal.3d 361, 364.) “Therefore, a landowner cannot be charged with constructive notice without a showing of some overt feature surrounding the dangerous condition, which would notify the landowner of its existence.” (Ibid.)

Generally, “there is no duty to protect others from the conduct of third parties.” (Williams v. Fremont Corners, Inc. (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 654, 663.) The Williams court further stated:

In the case of a landlord, however, the general duty of maintenance that is owed to tenants and patrons “has been held to include the duty to take reasonable steps to secure common areas against foreseeable criminal acts of third parties that are likely to occur in the absence of such precautionary measures.” This exception to the “general no-duty-to-protect rule” comes under the “‘special relationship’ doctrine,” which courts have found “in cases involving the relationship between business proprietors such as shopping centers, restaurants, and bars, and their tenants, patrons, or invitees.”

(Id. at pp. 663-664, citations omitted.)

“[T]he question of the scope of a land[holder]’s duty to provide protection from

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foreseeable third party crime is determined in part by balancing the foreseeability of the harm against the burden of the duty to be imposed.” (Ann M. v. Pacific Plaza Shopping Center (1993) 6 Cal.4th 666, 678, disapproved on other grounds in Reid v. Google, Inc. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 512, 527, fn. 5.) Where the burden in preventing future harm caused by third party criminal conduct is high, then “heightened foreseeability— shown by prior similar criminal incidents or other indications of a reasonably foreseeable risk of violent criminal assaults in that location—will be required.” (Delgado v. Trax Bar & Grill (2005) 36 Cal.4th 224, 243-244, fn. 24.)

“[T]he relationship between a business and its customers is a special one requiring the business ‘to take affirmative action to control the wrongful acts of third persons which threaten invitees where [it] has reasonable cause to anticipate such acts and the probability of injury resulting therefrom.’” (Marois v. Royal Investigation & Patrol (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 193, 199.) Even where a special relationship exists, application of the Rowland factors may warrant limiting any duty to protect. (Brown v. USA Taekwondo (2021) 11 Cal.5th 204, 209.) Application of the Rowland factors requires consideration of the following:

the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant’s conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant and consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach, and the availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved.

(Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108, 112-113.)

“A bar’s duty arising out of its special relationship with its patrons extends to protecting patrons from ‘imminent or “ongoing” criminal conduct,” but not further. [Citation.] When patrons safely and peaceably leave the bar, the bar’s special relationship with them terminates, and the duty it owes to them ends.” (Glynn v. Orange Circle Lounge Inc. (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1289, 1295.)

Here, it is undisputed that Decedent was shot outside of the 7-Eleven, in the common area of the Evergreen Shopping Center. Decedent had only briefly entered the 7-Eleven before turning around and walking back towards his bicycle where the shooting ultimately occurred. While the shooting happened within seconds of Decedent leaving the store, there was no indication during the brief moment that he was around the front door that he was in imminent danger of third-party criminal conduct. Thus, there was no

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2021-00300268-CU-PO-GDS: Kailie Armstrong vs. Lotus Investment Partners LLC 12/15/2025 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment in Department 28

special relationship between Decedent and Sahota.

Moreover, the policy considerations weigh against finding a duty here. Decedent was present at the Evergreen Shopping Center for less than one minute. He was present around the front door of the 7-Eleven for only a few seconds. Imposing a duty upon an operator of a convenience store to protect persons who pass by the store but do not establish themselves as customers would impose a significant burden on store operators like Sahota. Further, the connection between the shooting and Sahota’s conduct is tenuous.

Additionally, Sahota’s lease agreement expressly provided that the owner of the Evergreen Shopping Center was responsible for maintaining the common areas of the shopping center, with Sahota obligated to pay a proportionate share of the costs. The owner was also obligated for maintaining liability insurance covering the common areas, again with Sahota obligated to pay a proportionate share of the cost. This further supports the conclusion that Sahota was not responsible for events that occurred in the common area outside of his store, particularly involving persons who were not customers of the store.

Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiff cannot establish that Sahota owed Decedent a legal duty, and Plaintiff’s three negligence-based causes of action against Sahota must fail.

Disposition

For the reasons stated above, Sahota’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.