PRYOR vs NAACP, et al.

25CV006551: PRYOR vs NAACP, et al. 10/15/2025 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration in Department 53

Tentative Ruling

NOTICE: PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that pursuant to “Public Notice – Civil Division – Wednesday Law and Motion Calendar” any oral arguments regarding this tentative ruling will be heard in Department 25, located at 720 9th Street, Sacramento, CA, the Hon. Julie G. Yap presiding. Should argument be requested by either party, the requesting party must call the Law and Motion Oral Argument Request Line at (916) 874-2615, by 4:00 p.m. the Court day before the hearing, request the hearing, and notify the opposing party of the location and time of hearing pursuant to Local Rule 1.06.

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25CV006551: PRYOR vs NAACP, et al. 10/15/2025 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration in Department 53

or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will be forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided

TENTATIVE RULING

Defendants National Association for The Advancement of Colored People (“NAACP”) and National Association for The Advancement of Colored People California-Hawaii State Area Conference’s (“NAACP CA-HI”) (“Defendants”) Motion to Compel Arbitration of Plaintiff Salena Pryor’s (“Plaintiff”) Complaint is ruled upon as follows.

This matter was previously continued from September 17, 2025 to permit the parties to file supplemental briefing on the issue of arbitration of claims against the NAACP.

Factual Background

This case arises out of Plaintiff’s employment by Defendant National Association for The Advancement of Colored People California-Hawaii State Area Conference (“CA/HI NAACP”). The First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) brings 14 causes of action for discrimination; harassment; retaliation; failure to prevent discrimination, harassment, and retaliation; defamation; adverse employment action; unfair competition; numerous Labor Code violations (Labor Code §§ 1102.5, 510, 1194(a), 226(a), 226.7, 512); negligent interference; and negligent infliction of emotional distress.

Defendants now move to compel arbitration and dismiss the instant action pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act and the California Arbitration Act. Alternatively, Defendants seek to stay the instant action pending arbitration. Plaintiff opposes, arguing that Defendants fail to meet their burden in demonstrating the existence of a valid arbitration agreement, Defendants have waived their right to arbitration, Plaintiff will be prejudiced by arbitration, and that the arbitration provision does not apply to disputes outside of the contract, focusing predominantly on her cause of action for defamation.

As part of her employment, Plaintiff entered into a consultation agreement with CA/HI NAACP. The consulting agreement includes the following provision:

9. ARBITRATION OF DISPUTES 9.1 As a condition of the Consultant's employment with NAACP, NAACP and Consultant agree, to the fullest extent permitted by law, to submit to mandatory binding arbitration any dispute, claim or controversy arising out of or relating to

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV006551: PRYOR vs NAACP, et al. 10/15/2025 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration in Department 53

Consultant's employment with NAACP. 9.2 Administration: The parties agree that the arbitration shall be conducted in Sacramento County California by a neutral arbitrator from the American Arbitration Association, who will administer any such arbitration(s) pursuant to the American Arbitration Association's applicable procedures and rules for arbitration of employment disputes. The arbitrator shall: (a) have the authority to compel adequate discovery for the resolution of the dispute, and to award such relief as would otherwise be permitted by law; and (b) issue a written decision including a statement of the award and the arbitrator's essential findings and conclusions on which the decision is based.

The arbitrator shall have the power to award damages, remedies or relief that would be available in a court otherwise having jurisdiction of the matter, but no other damages, remedies or relief. Each party shall pay its own attorneys' fees and expenses, except that NAACP shall pay the fees and expenses related to the arbitration that Consultant would not generally be required to bear if Consultant brought the same action in a court otherwise having jurisdiction. Nothing in this Agreement is intended to prevent either Consultant or NAACP from obtaining injunctive relief in court to prevent irreparable harm pending the conclusion of any such arbitration. 9.3 American Arbitration Association Rules.

The American Arbitration Association’s Employment Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures (Rules), as amended from time to time, shall apply to any arbitration conducted by this Agreement. The Rules are incorporated by reference as if fully set forth herein. 9.4 Entire Agreement Regarding Arbitration; Modification: This Agreement reflects the parties' full and final agreement regarding the manner in which they will resolve Arbitrable Claims. There are no other agreements between the parties regarding this subject.

This Agreement supersedes any prior agreements, written or oral, regarding this subject. 9.5 Review of Arbitration Award. Court review of any arbitration award shall be limited to errors of law by the arbitrator and the grounds for vacating the award set forth in California Code of Civil Procedure Section 1286.2 (Grounds for Vacating Award). 9.6 Acknowledgment and Agreement. Consultant acknowledges her prior receipt of the Rules and has had sufficient time to review the same prior to execution of this Agreement.

Consultant understands and agrees to the provisions of this Section 9 (ARBITRATION OF DISPUTES).

(Exh. A to Mincey Decl.)

Legal Standard

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV006551: PRYOR vs NAACP, et al. 10/15/2025 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration in Department 53

Under California law, arbitration must be compelled where there is a valid, binding arbitration agreement unless the opposing party proves the agreement is unenforceable on unconscionability or other grounds. (See, e.g., Armendariz v. Foundation Health (2000) 24 Cal.4th 83, 96-100, 114; Gatton v. T-Mobile USA (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 571, 579.) In fact, Code of Civil Procedure §1281.2 specifically provides in pertinent part:

On petition of a party to an arbitration agreement alleging the existence of a written agreement to arbitrate a controversy and that a party thereto refuses to arbitrate such controversy, the court shall order the petitioner and the respondent to arbitrate the controversy if it determines that an agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists, unless it determines that: (a) The right to compel arbitration has been waived by the petitioner; or (b) Grounds exist for the revocation of the agreement. (Underline added for emphasis.)

Section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) is essentially the same:

A written provision in any contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract. (Underline added for emphasis.)

California has a public policy which encourages arbitrations and arbitration clauses have been repeatedly enforced. (See, e.g., Moncharsh v. Heily & Blasé (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1, 9 [the California Supreme Court stated this state has a “strong public policy in favor of arbitration as a speedy and relatively inexpensive means of dispute resolution”]; Madden v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (1976) 17 Cal.3d 699, 707 [California’s statutory scheme “evidence[s] a strong public policy in favor of arbitrations [as a] favored method of resolving disputes”]; Gross v. Recabaren (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 771, 775; Berman v. Dean Witter Co. (1975) 44 Cal.App.3d 999, 1003; Greenfield v. Mosley (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 735, 744.)

“Under both federal and state law, the threshold question presented by a petition to compel arbitration is whether there is an agreement to arbitrate.” (Sparks v. Del Mar Child and Family Svcs. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1511, 1517.) “In a petition to compel arbitration, the party seeking to compel arbitration bears the burden of proving the existence of a valid arbitration agreement by a preponderance of the evidence. [Citation.] The party opposing the petition bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence any fact necessary to its defense, including that an arbitration provision is invalid or otherwise not enforceable.” (Brinkley v. Monterey Financial

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV006551: PRYOR vs NAACP, et al. 10/15/2025 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration in Department 53

Servs., Inc. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 314, 325.)

“The burden of persuasion is always on the moving party to prove the existence of an arbitration agreement with the opposing party by a preponderance of the evidence.” (Gamboa v. Northeast Community Clinic (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 158, 164.) “However, the burden of production may shift in a three-step process.” (Id., at 165.) The moving party meets the initial burden by attaching to the moving papers a copy of the alleged arbitration agreement or setting forth its terms verbatim. (Id.; Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.1330.) “For this step, ‘it is not necessary to follow the normal procedures of document authentication.’” (Id. (quoting Candee v.

Longwood Management Corp. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 215, 218.) Once the moving party meets its initial prima facie burden, the opposing party bears the burden of producing evidence to challenge the authenticity of the agreement. (Id.) If the opposing party meets its burden, the moving party must then offer admissible evidence to demonstrate the arbitration agreement is valid. (Id.)

The Court must grant a petition to compel arbitration if it determines that the parties agreed to arbitrate the controversy, unless it determines that: (a) the petitioner waived the right to compel arbitration; (b) grounds exist to revoke the agreement; or, (c) a party to the arbitration agreement is also a party to a pending court action or special proceeding with a third party, arising out of the same transaction or series of related transactions and there may be conflicting rulings on a common issue of law or fact. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.2; Rosenthal v. Great Western Fin. Securities Corp. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 394, 413.)

Discussion

Existence of Agreement

NAACP CA-HI

Plaintiff asserts that Defendants have not met their burden in demonstrating the existence of a valid arbitration agreement.

The threshold question here is whether there is between the parties an enforceable agreement to arbitrate and to answer this question, the Court follows the above-cited burden-shifting framework established by the decision of Gamboa v. Northeast Community Clinic.

The Court finds that the moving papers are more than sufficient to satisfy Defendant NAACP CA-HI’s initial burden of production. In Gamboa, the Court of Appeal explained that a moving party’s initial burden is met either by including with the moving papers a copy of the alleged agreement or by setting forth its terms, clarifying that the moving party need not at this stage satisfy the “normal” requirements for document authentication. (Gamboa, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV006551: PRYOR vs NAACP, et al. 10/15/2025 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration in Department 53

at 165; Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.1330.) There can be no legitimate dispute that plaintiff’s moving papers meet this clearly minimal burden insofar as the Callender Declaration states that a true and correct copy of the underlying consulting contract is attached thereto as Exhibit A and this same exhibit not only reflects a compulsory arbitration provision in paragraph 9 but also purports to include Plaintiff’s and NAACP CA-HI’s electronic signatures on the last page. This evidence (to which no objections were asserted) goes significantly above and beyond the limited initial burden described in Gamboa and is therefore more than sufficient to successfully shift to Plaintiff the burden to produce evidence challenging the authenticity of the contract on which this motion is premised. (Gamboa, at 165.)

While Plaintiff argues that there is not a valid agreement, Plaintiff has failed to proffer any specific argument or any evidence to support an assertion that the written and signed agreement between Plaintiff and Defendant NAACP CA-HI is invalid.

NAACP

As noted in the Court’s September 17, 2025 tentative ruling, while this motion is brought by both NAACP and NAACP CA-HI, the only parties to the contract which includes the arbitration agreement are Plaintiff and NAACP CA-HI.[1]

In their supplemental briefing, Defendants argue that NAACP may enforce the agreement between Plaintiff and NAACP CA-HI under the theories of equitable estoppel and agency, and that the inclusion of NAACP would prevent undue hardship and maximize judicial efficiency. Plaintiff, in her supplemental briefing argues that Defendants’ arguments fail and that public policy supports denial of NAACP’s motion to compel arbitration.

California has accepted limited exceptions, which allow “nonsignatories to an agreement containing an arbitration clause to compel arbitration of, or be compelled to arbitrate, a dispute arising within the scope of that agreement.” (DMS Services, LLC v. Super. Ct. (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 1346, 1353.) For example, “'[e]nforcement [of an arbitration agreement] is permitted where the nonsignatory is the agent for a party to the arbitration agreement [citation], or the nonsignatory is a third party beneficiary of the agreement [citation].' [Citation.]” (Fuentes v. TMCSF, Inc. (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 541, 547.) “'In addition, a nonsignatory may enforce an arbitration agreement under the doctrine of equitable estoppel.' [Citation.]” (Ibid.)

“Under [the equitable estoppel' exception, 'a nonsignatory defendant may invoke an arbitration clause to compel a signatory plaintiff to arbitrate its claims when the causes of action against the nonsignatory are ‘intimately founded in and intertwined’ with the underlying contract obligations.' [Citation.]” (Garcia v. Pexco, LLC (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 782, 786.) “The doctrine applies where the claims are based on the same facts and are inherently inseparable from the

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV006551: PRYOR vs NAACP, et al. 10/15/2025 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration in Department 53

arbitrable claims against signatory defendants.” (Ibid. [internal quotation marks and citations omitted].)

Defendants argue that Garcia v. Pexco, LLC is the controlling law for the purposes of the instant motion. In Garcia, the Fourth District Court of Appeals found that the plaintiff’s claims for violations of the Labor Code and unfair business practices were “intimately founded in and intertwined with his employment” and that his claims against the nonsignatory were rooted in his employment relationship. (Id., at p. 787-788.) The court in Garcia further explained that the “agency exception is another exception to the general rule that only a party to an arbitration agreement may enforce it” and the exception applies where the plaintiff alleges that a nonsignatory defendant acted as an agent of a party to the arbitration agreement.

The Garcia court found that the complaint alleged workplace violations against both the signatory and nonsignatory defendants as joint employers, failed to distinguish between the two defendants in the allegations, and alleged identical conduct and improper actions. As a result, the granting of the motion to compel arbitration as to the nonsignatory defendant was affirmed.

In this case, Plaintiff’s allegations regarding causes of action arising out of the employment relationship, including her claims for violation of the FEHA and violation of Labor Code provisions, are brought against both Defendants NAACP CA-HI and NAACP. As in Garcia, with respect to her employment claims, Plaintiff alleges in her verified FAC that Defendants were acting as agents of one another and every cause of action alleging an employment relationship alleges that “Defendant(s) is/are an “employer” or “Plaintiff was an employee of Defendant(s)” and alleges identical claims against “All Defendants” without any distinction. (See, e.g., FAC ¶¶ 92-188, 200-237.)

In opposition, Plaintiff argues that Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants are not inextricably intertwined, because Plaintiff’s claims against NAACP are entirely statutory, as opposed to based in contract. Plaintiff argues that Defendants’ reliance on Garcia is misplaced, because the claims in Garcia were based in contract and the arbitration agreement in question explicitly included statutory claims. However, this argument was expressly raised and rejected by the Garcia court. Specifically, the plaintiff argued that a nonsignatory could not “compel arbitration where a complaint is based upon statutory, not contractual rights”; the Garcia court “reject[ed] his argument”, finding that all of the “claims are intimately founded in and intertwined with his employment relationship with [the signatory party], which is governed by the employment agreement compelling arbitration” and holding that the plaintiff “cannot avoid his obligation to arbitrate his causes of action arising out of his employment relationship by framing his claims as merely statutory.” (Garcia, supra, 11 Cal.App.5th at 787.)

Specifically, the Court held that the plaintiff cannot attempt to link the non-signatory defendant to the signatory defendant to hold it liable for alleged wage and hour claims while at the same time arguing that the arbitration provision only applies to the signatory defendant. (Id. at 788.)[2]

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV006551: PRYOR vs NAACP, et al. 10/15/2025 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration in Department 53

Plaintiff cites to Goldman v. KPMG LLP (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 209, 231; and JSM Tuscany, LLC v. Superior Court (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 1222, 1237-1238 for the premise that Garcia is inapplicable in matters where the plaintiff’s claims do not rely on the contract and could have been maintained even if the contract was never formed. The Court notes that in Goldman, the case did not involve an employment matter, but rather representation and advisement in tax matters, in which the party moving for arbitration had several engagement agreements with plaintiff, which did not include an arbitration agreement, a fact specifically noted by the court.[3] (Id., at p. 217.) The facts before the Court in Goldman are thus distinguishable from the allegations at issue before the Court in this matter.

Because Plaintiffs’ allegations arising out of employment assert the same causes of action against both defendants and consist of identical allegations, the Court finds that equitable estoppel applies such that Plaintiff must arbitrate against NAACP the same claims that are subject to arbitration for NAACP CA-HI.

Arbitrability

Defendants argue that, through the arbitration provisions, the Parties agreed to have an arbitrator decide gateway issues of arbitrability. Plaintiff fails to address this issue expressly in its Opposition but urges the Court to determine arbitrability of her defamation claim specifically.

As a preliminary matter, the Court notes that the trial court typically decides the threshold or “gatekeeper” issues of enforceability of the arbitration agreement and the scope of issues to be arbitrated. (Aanderud v. Superior Court (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 880, 891.) The parties may delegate resolution of these issues to the arbitrator as long as there is “clear and unmistakable evidence” they intended to do so. (Pinela v. Neiman Marcus Group, Inc. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 227, 239-40; Tiri v. Lucky Chances, Inc. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 231, 250.)

Defendants argue that citation to the AAA rules in the arbitration provision is sufficient to delegate this gatekeeping decision to the arbitrator, citing to Brinkley v. Monterey Fin. Servs., Inc. (2015) 242 Cal. App. 4th 314, 353-54; Rodriguez v. Am. Techs., Inc. (2006) 136 Cal. App. 4th 1110, 1123; Brennan v. Opus Bank (9th Cir. 2015) 796 F.3d 1125, 1130; Zenelaj v. Handybook (N.D. Cal. 2015) 82 F.Supp.3d 968, 974. The Court in Brinkley found that where an agreement incorporates by reference the AAA rules, “[t]he parties' agreement to arbitrate their disputes under a specifically designated set of rules, which in turn provide that the arbitrator shall decide whether the parties' arbitration agreement permits class arbitration, is ‘clear and unmistakable’ evidence that the parties intended to delegate the resolution of that question to the arbitrator.” Defendants attach the AAA rules referenced in the arbitration provision, which provides, in Rule 7(a): “The arbitrator shall have the power to rule on their own jurisdiction,

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV006551: PRYOR vs NAACP, et al. 10/15/2025 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration in Department 53

including any objections with respect to the existence, scope, or validity of the arbitration agreement or the arbitrability of any claim or counterclaim.”

However, Defendants ignore the more recent appellate court decisions in Beco v. Fast Auto Loans, Inc. (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 292 and Mondragon v. Sunrun Inc. (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 592. In Beco, the appellate court held that “[i]n the employment context” and under facts where AAA rules were incorporated in the arbitration agreement, such incorporation by reference did not meet the clear and unmistakable test. The Beco court agreed with the appellate court’s comments in Ajamian v. CantorCO2E, L.P. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 771, 790, as follows:

In our view, while the incorporation of AAA rules into an agreement might be sufficient indication of the parties’ intent in other contexts, we seriously question how it provides clear and unmistakable evidence that an employer and an employee intended to submit the issue of the unconscionability of the arbitration provision to the arbitrator, as opposed to the court. There are many reasons for stating that the arbitration will proceed by particular rules, and doing so does not indicate that the parties’ motivation was to announce who would decide threshold issues of enforceability. [¶] Moreover, the reference to AAA rules does not give an employee, confronted with an agreement she is asked to sign in order to obtain or keep employment, much of a clue that she is giving up her usual right to have the court decide whether the arbitration provision is enforceable.

Assuming that an employee reads the arbitration provision in the proposed agreement, notes that disputes will be resolved by arbitration according to AAA rules, and even has the wherewithal and diligence to track down those rules, examine them, and focus on the particular rule to which appellants now point, the rule merely states that the arbitrator shall have ‘the power’ to determine issues of its own jurisdiction, including the existence, scope and validity of the arbitration agreement. This tells the reader almost nothing, since a court also has power to decide such issues, and nothing in the AAA rules states that the AAA arbitrator, as opposed to the court, shall determine those threshold issues, or has exclusive authority to do so, particularly if litigation has already been commenced.

Beco, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at 305–306 [quoting Ajamian, supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at 790].)

The Court finds the reasoning of these appellate courts persuasive, specifically in light of the employment context presented in this case as well as the language of the AAA rules themselves. Accordingly, the Court moves to Plaintiff’s arguments regarding arbitrability of the defamation claim.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV006551: PRYOR vs NAACP, et al. 10/15/2025 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration in Department 53

Defamation Claim

Plaintiff argues that she will be prejudiced if forced to arbitrate her defamation claim, as the defamation claim does not fall under the arbitration agreement, arbitration would deprive her of a public forum, ongoing defamation requires judicial remedies unavailable in arbitration, Plaintiff will be procedurally prejudiced by the limitations of arbitration, and public policy favors judicial resolution of public reputation harms.

Claims of defamation may arise out of employment. (See Buckhorn v. St. Jude Heritage Medical Group (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1401, 1406 [citing Vianna v. Doctors' Management Co. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 1186].) The Court in Vianna found that sufficiently broad contractual terms pertaining to arbitration encompassed claims for defamation, as the action “ha[d] its roots in the relationship between the parties which was created by ... their agreement.” (Vianna v. Doctors' Management Co., supra, at p. 1190.)

As noted above, Plaintiff’s agreement with Defendant NAACP CA-HI agrees “to submit to mandatory binding arbitration any dispute, claim or controversy arising out of or relating to Consultant's employment with NAACP.” Plaintiff’s allegations regarding the alleged defamatory statements made by Defendants include:

However, in or around December 2023, CA/HI NAACP President CALLENDER and/or the NAACP published and/or provided false and defamatory information concerning PRYOR to the Sacramento Bee. Thereafter, the Sacramento Bee published four articles, dated January 8, 2024, January 16, 2024, January 18, 2024, and January 29, 2024, which claimed the following: (1) PRYOR was a Sacramento NAACP Branch leader who mismanaged Sacramento County funds and hired herself; (2) “Williams, the California civil rights stalwart and longest-serving president in the Sacramento chapter’s history, and branch education chair Salena Pryor, were among six executive officers suspended in October by the national civil rights organization for alleged financial improprieties, including the use of their positions for financial gain[]”; (3) “Betty Williams and education chair Salena Pryor appear to have used their staffing and consulting firms to operate the Dine In 2 program and paid themselves with county funds.”; (4) “Williams and Pryor appear to have used their staffing and consulting firms to operate the food program, Dine In 2, and paid themselves more than $145,000 in county funds earmarked for contractors’ salaries”; and (5) “[o]ne organization paid through a CBCC contract received over $100,000 in COVID relief.

The same contractor is under investigation by Sacramento County for misuse of funds for another COVID relief contract, in which local restaurants and the NAACP are accused of embezzlement. The NAACP said its name was used without permission[,]” (referencing PRYOR’s business, BSBA).

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV006551: PRYOR vs NAACP, et al. 10/15/2025 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration in Department 53

(FAC, ¶ 54; see FAC, ¶ 191 [emphasis added].) Plaintiff’s complaint further explains that all work done for the NAACP Sacramento branch was performed on a volunteer basis, and was not related to her employment by NAACP CA-HI, and that she was not authorized to manage NAACP funds as part of her volunteer work. (FAC, ¶ 55.) Plaintiff’s complaint also alleges that she acted as a subcontractor on an NAACP project called “Dine In 2 Program.” (FAC, ¶ 50.)

Based on these allegations (as brought to the Court’s attention through the clarification/elaboration provided by Plaintiff at hearing on September 17, 2025) that the allegedly defamatory statements relate entirely to her volunteer work and work as a subcontractor, the Court finds that while the defamation was performed by Plaintiff’s supervisor at NAACP CA-HI, the defamation itself does not have its roots in Plaintiff’s employment by NAACP CA-HI. There are no arguments by Defendants that Plaintiff is subject to an arbitration agreement entered into specifically pertaining to her work as a volunteer for the Sacramento chapter or as a subcontractor for NAACP.

Further, with respect to allegations against NAACP, unlike her claims under the FEHA or Labor Code, Plaintiff alleges a number of specific facts pertaining to her work on the “Dine In 2 Program,” and Defendants’ resulting conduct, including NAACP’s accusations against Plaintiff for financial impropriety. (See FAC, ¶¶ 47-54, 60, 61, 80, 84, 86, 88.)

Accordingly, the motion to compel is DENIED as to Plaintiff’s claims for defamation.[4]

Waiver by Defendants

Plaintiff argues that Defendants have waived their right to compel arbitration by engaging in unreasonable delay in bringing the instant motion. Plaintiff filed her complaint on March 20, 2025, and served Defendants on July 2 and 8, 2025. Defendants brought the instant motion on August 22, 2025. Plaintiff cites to Sobremonte v. Superior Court (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 980, 992-93 for the premises that a delay of ten months after service of the complaint was unreasonable. However, here, while Plaintiff filed her complaint five months before the instant motion was filed, she did not serve Defendants until July.

The Court finds that Defendants did not engage in an unreasonable delay before bringing the instant motion.

Dismissal

Defendants’ request that the instant action be dismissed without prejudice “on the grounds that the forum for resolution of this controversy is in arbitration” is denied. While the Court may have the discretion to dismiss an action as part of a motion to compel arbitration, Defendants have presented no argument as to why dismissal would be appropriate as to the instant action.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV006551: PRYOR vs NAACP, et al. 10/15/2025 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration in Department 53

Disposition

Based on the foregoing, Defendants’ motion to compel arbitration is GRANTED as to those claims against Defendant NAACP CA-HI and NAACP, except for Plaintiff’s claim for defamation, for which the motion to compel arbitration is DENIED.

Claims against NAACP CA-HI and NAACP are ordered to arbitration (except for the claim of defamation), and the action is stayed as to those claims only pending arbitration.

The minute order is effective immediately. No formal order pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312 or further notice is required.

[1] Indeed, the Court notes that the meet and confer correspondence from Counsel for NAACP

references the agreement between Plaintiff and NAACP CA-HI. (Memorandum of Points and Authorities at 4:4-11.) [2] Plaintiff further argues that NAACP and NAACP CA-HI are not in close contractual privity,

which would support an agency relationship, as they are entirely separate legal entities. However, it is unclear how these facts are distinguishable from those before the Garcia court, which involved two separate corporations. [3] The court in Goldman v. KPMG LLP found:

Because equitable estoppel applies only if the plaintiffs' claims against the nonsignatory are dependent upon, or inextricably bound up with, the obligations imposed by the contract plaintiff has signed with the signatory defendant, we examine the facts alleged in the complaints. That review shows that (1) Goldman and Haines do not rely or depend on the terms of the operating agreements in asserting their claims against KPMG and Sidley, and (2) none of the allegations against KPMG and Sidley are in any way founded in or bound up with the terms or obligations in the operating agreements.

(Id., at p. 229-230.)

[4] The Court has the discretion to sever the claims and order the ones subject to arbitration to be

stayed pending the outcome of the arbitration. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1281.4.)