Zahn, et al. vs Harper

25CV125394: ZAHN, et al. vs HARPER 07/02/2026 Hearing on Special Motion to Strike under CCP Section 425.16 (Anti-SLAPP motion) filed by Amie Harper (Defendant) CRS# A-125394-001 in Department 24

Tentative Ruling - 06/29/2026 Rebekah Evenson

The Motion to Strike (not initial pleading) Plaintiff's Complaint and Cuases of Action as being improper attempt to limit free speach filed by Amie Harper on 03/25/2026 is Granted in Part.

Defendant’s Special Motion to Strike Plaintiffs’ Complaint, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 425.16, is GRANTED, IN PART, as follows.

In ruling on a Special Motion to Strike, the Court engages in a two-step process. (See Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 67.) First, the Court decides whether the moving party has made a threshold showing that the challenged cause of action is one arising from a protected activity, i.e., an act in furtherance of a person’s right of free speech in connection with a public issue. (See Code of Civil Procedure § 425.16(b)(1).) Second, if such a showing is made, the Court determines whether the opposing party has demonstrated a probability of prevailing on the claim.

The opposing party demonstrates this by showing that the challenged pleading is legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the opposing party is credited. (Vogel v. Felice (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1006, 1017.)

Where a party’s causes of action rest on allegations of multiple acts, some of which constitute protected activity and some of which do not, the Court does not strike the causes of action in their entirety. (See, e.g., Bonni v. St. Joseph Health System (2021) 11 Cal.5th 995, 1010.) Instead, the Court determines which alleged conduct is protected, and if there is sufficient evidence to demonstrate a probability of prevailing on a claim based on that conduct.

As to Plaintiffs’ First Cause of Action for Elder Abuse, Defendant’s motion is GRANTED, IN PART. The only portion of the First Cause of Action that is based on protected activity is paragraph 57(e), alleging Plaintiff Elke Zahn suffers from “ongoing fear and intimidation caused by Defendant’s continued threats through legal harassment”. Plaintiff cannot prevail on such a claim because it is barred by the litigation privilege of Civil Code § 47(b). Complaint paragraph 57(e) is STRICKEN. Defendant’s motion as to the remainder of the First Cause of Action is DENIED.

None of the other allegations providing the basis for the First Cause of Action constitute protected activity under Code of Civil Procedure § 425.16(e). Because those portions of the First Cause of Action are not based on protected activity, the Court does not reach the issue of whether Plaintiff's evidence demonstrates a probability of prevailing on such claims.

As to Plaintiffs’ Second Cause of Action for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, Defendant’s motion is GRANTED, IN PART. The only portion of the Second Cause of Action that is based on protected activity is the phrase “and filing of false legal claims” in Complaint paragraph 64. Plaintiffs cannot prevail on such a claim because it is barred by the litigation privilege of Civil Code § 47(b). The above-quoted words in Complaint paragraph 64 are 25CV125394: ZAHN, et al. vs HARPER 07/02/2026 Hearing on Special Motion to Strike under CCP Section 425.16 (Anti-SLAPP motion) filed by Amie Harper (Defendant) CRS# A-125394-001 in Department 24 STRICKEN.

Defendant’s motion as to the remainder of the Second Cause of Action is DENIED. None of the other allegations providing the basis for the Second Cause of Action constitute protected activity under Code of Civil Procedure § 425.16(e), and therefore the Court does not reach the issue of whether Plaintiffs have any evidence demonstrating a probability of prevailing on such claims.

As to Plaintiffs’ Third Cause of Action for Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress, Defendant’s motion is DENIED in its entirety. None of the allegations in the Third Cause of Action are based on protected activity, and therefore the Court does not reach the issue of whether Plaintiffs have any evidence demonstrating a probability of prevailing on such claims.

As to Plaintiff’s Fourth Cause of Action for Defamation, Defendant’s motion is GRANTED, IN PART. The only portion of the Fourth Cause of Action that is based on protected activity is Complaint paragraph 74(a), alleging “False or exaggerated allegations of domestic violence in court filings”. Plaintiff cannot prevail on such a claim because it is barred by the litigation privilege of Civil Code § 47(b). Complaint paragraph 74(a) is STRICKEN. Defendant’s motion as to the remainder of the Fourth Cause of Action is DENIED.

None of the other allegations providing the basis for the Fourth Cause of Action constitute protected activity under Code of Civil Procedure § 425.16(e). In particular, to the extent that Defendant’s Facebook posting that she decided to leave her “nearly 20-year marriage due to a history of unsafety” can be interpreted as a provably false statement of fact about Plaintiff Oliver Zahn, Defendant cannot transform this otherwise private information into a matter of public interest pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 425.1(e)(4) by posting it her Facebook page. (See, e.g., Weinberg v.

Feisel (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1122, 1132-1133.) Because the Court does not find the allegations in Complaint paragraph 74(b)-(c) to be protected activity, it does not reach the issue of whether Plaintiff has any evidence demonstrating a probability of prevailing on such claims.

As to Plaintiff’s Fifth Cause of Action for Negligent Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage, Defendant’s motion is GRANTED, IN PART. The only portion of the Fifth Cause of Action that is based on protected activity is that portion of Complaint paragraph 82 alleging “filing false legal claims, and creating ongoing legal harassment”. Plaintiff cannot prevail on those claims because they are barred by the litigation privilege of Civil Code § 47(b). The abovequoted words in Complaint paragraph 82 are STRICKEN. Defendant’s motion as to the remainder of the Fifth Cause of Action is DENIED. None of the other allegations providing the basis for the Fifth Cause of Action constitute protected activity under Code of Civil Procedure § 425.16(e), and the Court therefore does not reach the issue of whether Plaintiff has any evidence demonstrating a probability of prevailing on such claims.

As to Plaintiff’s Sixth Cause of Action for Malicious Prosecution, Defendant’s motion is GRANTED in its entirety. The Sixth Cause of Action is based on Defendant’s initiation of a legal proceeding seeking issuance of a domestic violence restraining order. This is protected activity under Code of Civil Procedure § 425.16(e)(1)-(2). Plaintiff has no possibility of prevailing on this cause of action because malicious prosecution claims cannot be based on

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

25CV125394: ZAHN, et al. vs HARPER 07/02/2026 Hearing on Special Motion to Strike under CCP Section 425.16 (Anti-SLAPP motion) filed by Amie Harper (Defendant) CRS# A-125394-001 in Department 24 domestic violence restraining order proceedings. (S.A. v. Maiden (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 27.)

As to Plaintiff’s Seventh Cause of Action for Abuse of Process, Defendant’s motion is GRANTED, in its entirety. Like the Sixth Cause of Action, the Seventh Cause of Action is based on Defendant’s initiation of a legal proceeding seeking issuance of a domestic violence restraining order. This is protected activity under Code of Civil Procedure § 425.16(e)(1)-(2). Plaintiff has not submitted evidence demonstrating that Defendant initiated the domestic violence restraining order proceeding to obtain a result that the procedure was not designed to achieve. (See CACI No. 1520.)

Instead, Plaintiff has simply alleged that Defendant initiated the proceeding for an improper purpose. (See Complaint, paragraph 95.) The mere initiation or maintenance of a legal proceeding – even for an improper purpose – is not a proper basis for an abuse of process action. (See S.A. v. Madden, supra, 229 Cal.App.4th at 42.)

As to the Eighth Cause of Action for Civil Conspiracy, Defendant’s motion is GRANTED, IN PART. Substantial portions of the Eighth Cause of Action are based on protected activity, specifically Complaint paragraph 101(g), (i), and (j) and paragraph 102(h), (j), and (l). Plaintiffs cannot prevail on those claims because they are barred by the litigation privilege of Civil Code § 47(b). Complaint paragraph 101(g), (i), and (j) and paragraph 102(h), (j), and (l) are STRICKEN. Defendant’s motion as to the remainder of the Eighth Cause of Action is DENIED. None of the other allegations providing the basis for the Eighth Cause of Action constitute protected activity under Code of Civil Procedure § 425.16(e), and therefore the Court does not reach the issue of whether Plaintiffs’ evidence demonstrates a probability of prevailing on such claims.

As to the Ninth Cause of Action for Stalking, Defendant’s motion is GRANTED, IN PART. Substantial portions of the Ninth Cause of Action are based on protected activity, specifically Complaint paragraph 110(a) and (d); paragraph 111 (a), (b), and (d); and paragraph 112(a) and (c). Plaintiffs cannot prevail on those claims because they are barred by the litigation privilege of Civil Code § 47(b). Complaint paragraph 110(a) and (d); paragraph 111 (a), (b), and (d); and paragraph 112(a) and (c) are STRICKEN. Defendant’s motion as to the remainder of the Ninth Cause of Action is DENIED. None of the other allegations providing the basis for the Ninth Cause of Action constitute protected activity under Code of Civil Procedure § 425.16(e), and therefore the Court does not reach the issue of whether Plaintiff has any evidence demonstrating a probability of prevailing on such claims.

Defendant’s Requests for Judicial Notice are GRANTED, to the extent that the Court takes judicial notice that the documents attached to the Requests appear in the Court’s records. The Court does not take judicial notice of the truth of the information contained in those court records.