Defendant’s Motion to Stay
Cal.App.5th 426, “nearly all of the quotations in plaintiff’s opening brief, and many of the quotations in plaintiff’s reply brief,” were “fabricated” by generative artificial intelligence. (Id., at p. 435.) The appellate court awarded $10,000 in sanctions. It noted that larger sanctions might be appropriate, but because counsel “expressed remorse for his actions,” $10,000 sufficed.
Based on the appellate court’s opinion in this case, it appears counsel’s misconduct was less pervasive than in Noland, where nearly all quotations were fabricated. This might support a lower sanction than the $10,000 awarded there. On the other hand, ARC and its counsel’s opposition brief is anything but remorseful. It describes the appellate court’s opinion as “simply an embarrassment to those of us who defend the California court system,” accuses the appellate court of being “disingenuous” and “intellectually...insulting,” questions whether the appellate court ever read two cases cited in its opinion, and characterizes the opinion as containing “a gross misstatement of fact and grossly improper assumption.” (See generally Opp.)
Moreover, the opposition asks this Court to ignore the appellate court’s instructions on remand and not order sanctions. This might merit a higher sanction than the amount awarded in Noland. Considering the foregoing, as well as the full record in this matter, the Court concludes in its discretion that $10,000 is a sufficient sanction to deter counsel from violating the Rules of Court in the future. Said sanction is payable to OCTC, through its counsel, by July 26, 2026.
III. Request to Strike Costs In the last sentence of its opposition, ARC asks the Court to “strike the disallowed costs from the Memorandum of Costs.” No motion to strike or tax costs has been filed, so this request is denied.
7 Arteaga vs. Penske Logistics, LLC.
2025-01501859
Defendant’s Motion to Stay
Defendant Penske Logistics, LLC’s motion to stay proceedings is GRANTED. This case is stayed pending resolution of Nelson v. Penske Logistics, LLC, San Joaquin County Super. Ct. No. STK-CV-UOE-2024-0001484. A status conference will take place on March 2, 2027 at 8:30 a.m. The parties shall file a joint status report by February 23, 2027.
GROUNDS FOR RULING
I.
Factual Background
In February 2024, Terry Nelson filed a PAGA-only lawsuit against Defendant in San Joaquin County Superior Court. (Moos Decl. (ROA 49) Ex. B.) Nelson worked in one of Defendant’s warehouses (id., ¶ 17), but alleged that the wage-and-hour violations he suffered “were not unique to him but rather were companywide policies and practices at all distribution facilities in the State of California and were suffered by all non-exempt employees.” (Id., ¶ 57 (emphasis added).) His original complaint identified the following predicate Labor Code violations: (1) sick leave rate miscalculation, (2) overtime rate miscalculation, (3) vacation pay rate miscalculation, (4) meal break premium rate miscalculation, (5) noncompliant meal breaks, (6) noncompliant rest breaks, (7) failure to pay for all hours worked (regular and overtime wages), (8) reimbursement, (9) wage statements, (10) waiting time, and (11) maintenance of an illegal quota at a distribution center.
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Nelson’s PAGA-only suit followed an earlier class action he filed in federal court. (Moos Decl. Exs. C-D.)
Plaintiffs filed the present PAGA-only lawsuit in August 2025. They are drivers based at Defendant’s Ontario facility. (Compl., ¶ 2.) They seek to represent a group of aggrieved employees limited to Defendant’s drivers. (Id., ¶ 1.) Their complaint identifies the following predicate Labor Code violations: (1) failure to pay for all hours worked, (2) overtime, (3) meal breaks, (4) rest breaks, (5) reimbursement, and (6) wage statements.
In April 2026, Nelson filed an amended complaint in his state court action that incorporates the class allegations from his federal court action and adds factual allegations that cover the theories of liability Plaintiffs advance in this case. (Moos Decl. Ex. E.) Defendants represent this complaint was filed as part of a global settlement of Nelson’s two actions, but they submit no admissible evidence of such a settlement, such as a declaration from counsel stating that a settlement has been reached. For present purposes, however, it suffices to state that the FAC in Nelson’s case appears to have been crafted, at least in part, to fully subsume Plaintiffs’ theories of liability here.
II. Standard of Review
Defendant moves to stay this case under the doctrine of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction. “Under this doctrine, when two or more courts have subject matter jurisdiction over a dispute, the court that first asserts jurisdiction assumes it to the exclusion of the others.” (Shaw v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 245, 255.) “Unlike the statutory plea of abatement, the rule of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction
does not require absolute identity of parties, causes of action or remedies sought in the initial and subsequent actions. [Citations.] If the court exercising original jurisdiction has the power to bring before it all the necessary parties, the fact that the parties in the second action are not identical does not preclude application of the rule. Moreover, the remedies sought in the separate actions need not be precisely the same so long as the court exercising original jurisdiction has the power to litigate all the issues and grant all the relief to which any of the parties might be entitled under the pleadings.” (Plant Insulation Co. v. Fibreboard Corp. (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 781, 788.)
III.
Discussion
Nelson’s PAGA action—now a class/PAGA action—was filed before this case. It seeks civil penalties for Labor Code violations affecting all of Defendant’s non-exempt employees. The original complaint includes every section of the Labor Code serving as a predicate violation in this case. Finally, the San Joaquin County Superior Court has the power to litigate all issues and grant all relief to which any party in either case might be entitled. The doctrine of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction therefore applies.
Plaintiffs raise several counterarguments, none of which the Court finds convincing. First, they contend Nelson, a warehouse employee, is an inadequate representative of drivers because he lacks the knowledge and incentive necessary to prosecute driver-related claims. “[C]lass action requirements,” such as adequacy of representation, “developed in large part from California courts’ assertion of their inherent equitable powers . . . . In contrast, a PAGA claim is a pure statutory claim arising under California law.” (Estrada v.
Royalty Carpet Mills, Inc. (2024) 15 Cal.5th 582, 614 (emphasis original).) Adequacy of representation is mentioned nowhere in the PAGA statute, and there is “little reason to presume the Legislature would intend” an “extra-statutory” requirement. (Id., at p. 613 (discussing extra-statutory manageability requirement).) Plaintiff cites Estrada as endorsing an adequacy requirement, but the only mentions of adequacy in Estrada is a discussion of class action requirements in contrast to PAGA requirements. (Id., at p. 612.)
Second, Plaintiffs contend Nelson’s driver-related allegations were added only after this case was on file. Perhaps, but in the Court’s experience, this is a common practice in overlapping PAGA actions. In any event, to the extent a court should view Nelson’s amendments skeptically, it is the San Joaquin County Superior Court, which is the court hearing Nelson’s case.
Third, while Plaintiffs admit the predicate Labor Code sections overlap, they contend the factual underpinnings of their claims differ meaningfully from Nelson’s original complaint. This may be true, but civil penalties are awarded for statutory violations, not factual theories. If an employee suffers a rest break violation in a pay period, a single civil penalty may be assessed, regardless of how many different ways the rest break statute is violated.
Fourth, Plaintiffs argue staying the case would undermine the purpose of PAGA by allowing a warehouse employee to settle driver-related PAGA claims that were only recently added at a substantial discount. Again, Nelson has always purported to represent all non-exempt employees, and he has always identified each of Plaintiff’s predicate Labor Code violations as his own predicate Labor Code violations. Furthermore, in the Court’s experience, employers facing overlapping PAGA suits will often negotiate a settlement with a single plaintiff that has the effect of resolving all outstanding claims.
Fifth, Plaintiffs argue a settlement in Nelson’s action will have no preclusive effect on their individual wage-and-hour claims here. This argument is misplaced insofar as Plaintiffs haven’t brought any individual wage-and-hour claims in this PAGA-only action. To the extent Plaintiffs intend to seek leave to amend their complaint, no such motion is on file at this time. In any event, Nelson’s action as currently pled includes class claims, and the Court will not speculate on the effect the settlement of class claims might have on Plaintiffs’ potential individual claims.
Finally, Plaintiffs offer several alternatives to a stay:
• They ask the Court to coordinate this case with Nelson’s. If Plaintiffs want the cases to be coordinated, they must follow the statutory procedure for doing so. (CCP § 404.)
• A limited stay of certain claims, with discovery allowed on driverspecific issues. Again, all non-exempt employees, including drivers, have always been part of Nelson’s case, as have the Labor Code sections Plaintiffs’ claims are based upon.
• Conditioning a stay on Plaintiffs having the opportunity to object to the settlement of Nelson’s case, both in San Joaquin County Superior Court and in this Court. This Court has no authority to require the
San Joaquin County Superior Court to consider any objections filed by Plaintiffs, nor does this Court have the authority to rule on the propriety of Nelson’s settlement.
For these reasons, the motion for a stay pending resolution of Nelson’s case is granted. 8 Abdelghany vs. Southern California Edison
2021-01195715
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss
Defendants Southern California Edison Company, Edison International, and T-Mobile USA, Inc. move to dismiss the claims of Plaintiffs Alicia Garcia, Brenda Martinez, Mauricio Valencia, Dehzad Derakhshani, Kobra Vaziri, Mona Marashi, Nazanin Marashi, and Peyda Marashi (“Non-Responsive Plaintiffs”). Defendants’ unopposed motion is GRANTED.
GROUNDS FOR RULING
I.
Factual Background
The Non-Responsive Plaintiffs are several of the numerous plaintiffs who filed suit against Defendants for claims arising from the Silverado Fire. All plaintiffs were represented by the Singleton firm. In a minute order dated September 2, 2022 (ROA 150), Judge Sherman granted the Singleton firm’s motion to be relieved as counsel for Dehzad Derakhshani, Kobra Vaziri, Mona Marashi, Nazanin Marashi, and Peyda Marashi. In a second minute order dated February 10, 2023 (ROA 188), Judge Sherman granted the Singleton firm’s motion to be relieved as counsel for Alicia Garcia, Brenda Martinez, and Mauricio Valencia.
The Non-Responsive Plaintiffs haven’t participated in discovery or motion practice since their counsel withdrew. (Greer Decl. (ROA 885) ¶ 7.) Nor did the Non-Responsive Plaintiffs participate in global settlement discussions that resulted in most of the other plaintiffs’ claims being resolved. (Ibid.)
On March 9, 2026, the Court entered a stipulated supplemental case management order requiring the Non-Responsive Plaintiffs to file fact sheets regarding claimed damages within 30 days. (ROA 880.) Counsel for Edison served the order, including the fact sheet, on the Non-Responsive Plaintiffs by overnight delivery. (ROA 883.) As of April 28, 2026—over 30 days later— the Non-Responsive Plaintiffs hadn’t served completed fact sheets. (Greer