Motion for summary adjudication
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the action. (Code of Civ. Proc. § 428.50, subd. (c).) The cross- claims against the new party arise out of the same transaction, occurrence or series of transactions as set forth in the complaint and are proper. (Code of Civ. Proc. § 428.10, subd. (b).) In fact, the cross-claims against the new party are intertwined with the cross- claims against Plaintiff. Leave to amend will thus promote efficiency in having all the claims adjudicated in one action. For these reasons, the motion to file the cross-complaint is GRANTED.
Defendants shall file forthwith the proposed first amended answer attached as Exhibit B to the Carlsen Declaration and the proposed cross-complaint attached as Exhibit 1 to the Supplemental Carlsen Declaration.
Case Management Conference is CONTINUED to October 30, 2026, at 9:30 a.m.
Defendants shall give notice of this ruling. 6 Itria Ventures The unopposed motion for summary adjudication filed by plaintiff LLC v. Itria Ventures LLC (Plaintiff) is GRANTED. (Code Civ. Proc., § Johnsonvan, 437c.) Inc. Plaintiff moves for summary adjudication in its favor and against defendant Johnsonvan, Inc., dba V-Fast Rental (Johnsonvan) as to Plaintiff’s third cause of action for breach of contract against Johnsonvan. The subject contract is governed by New York law. (See Smalbach Decl., ¶ 6 and Ex. A [Receivables Sale Agreement, § 15].) The elements of a breach of contract claim are: (1) existence of a contract; (2) plaintiff's performance or excuse for nonperformance; (3) defendant’s breach; and (4) resulting damage to plaintiff. (Kapoor v. AWI Wireless LLC, 159 AD3d 1027, 1030 (NY App. 2d 2018); Oasis West Realty, LLC v. Goldman (2011) 51 Cal.4th 811, 821.)
Plaintiff has presented evidence to show that on March 10, 2025, Plaintiff and Johnsonvan entered into a contract titled Receivables Sale Agreement (RSA) under the terms of which Plaintiff would pay Johnsonvan $85,000 for the purchase of $108,800 of Johnsonvan’s accounts receivable. (UMF 1.) The RSA provided that Johnsonvan would remit 11.44% of its accounts receivable every week, which amounted to $2,472.73 each week, until Plaintiff had collected the amount sold. (UMF 2.) Plaintiff performed all of its obligations under the RSA, including paying the purchase price to Johnsonvan in March 2025. (UMF 1, 3.)
Johnsonvan breached the RSA by failing to make the promised remittance on May 20, 2025. (UMF 5.) Plaintiff demanded that Johnsonvan remit the amounts due under the RSA, but Johnsonvan has refused to do so. (Smalbach Decl., ¶ 12.) As a result of Johnsonvan’s breaches of the RSA, Plaintiff has suffered damages in the amount of $91,570.43, which includes $89,070.43 in uncollected accounts receivable under the RSA to date, plus the $2,500 in-house collection fee as set forth in Section 8 of the RSA. (UMF 5.)
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The evidence thus shows the contract, Plaintiff’s performance, Johnsonvan’s breach, and resulting damages. Accordingly, Plaintiff met its initial burden of establishing each element of its breach of contract claim. Johnsonvan failed to oppose the motion and thus failed to show there are any disputed issues of material fact to prevent summary adjudication.
Based on the foregoing, the motion is GRANTED.
Counsel for Plaintiff is to submit a proposed order and is ordered to give notice of this ruling. 7 Vicens vs. Cont. to 6/13. General Motors, LLC 8 Cappuccini v. Before the Court is a demurrer filed by defendant The Regents of The Regents the University of California (Defendant) to the Second Amended of the Complaint (SAC) of plaintiff Fabio Cappuccini (Plaintiff). For the University of reasons set forth below, the demurrer is SUSTAINED with 20 days’ California leave to amend.
A general demurrer lies where the pleading does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. (Code of Civ. Proc. § 430.10, subd. (e).) Defendant demurs to the second cause of action for wrongful termination.
Because a public entity is liable for acts or omissions only as provided by statute, a common law claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy does not lie against a public entity. (Gov. Code § 815, subd. (a); Miklosy v. Regents of the University of California (2008) 44 Cal.4th 876, 900-901; Lloyd v. County of Los Angeles (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 320, 329; McAllister v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 1198, 1219.)
Plaintiff argues the wrongful termination claim is grounded in the statutory policy of FEHA, which expressly applies to public entities. Plaintiff’s argument is misplaced. It is true public entities are covered “employers” subject to FEHA. (Gov. Code § 12926, subd. (d).) But Plaintiff does not allege any statutory claim pursuant to FEHA. The fact that Plaintiff’s wrongful termination is tethered to the public policy under FEHA does not change the common law claim to a statutory claim.
Plaintiff next argues that he alleges a viable claim for breach of contract. Preliminarily, the second cause of action is specifically captioned “wrongful termination” not breach of contract. (SAC, p. 3.) Plaintiff also fails to plead the elements of a breach of contract claim, including the contractual terms allegedly breached and Plaintiff’s performance or excuse for performance. (Oasis West Realty, LLC v. Goldman (2011) 51 Cal.4th 811, 821 [elements]; Construction Protective Services, Inc. v. TIG Specialty Ins. Co. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 189, 198-199 [a written contract may be pleaded verbatim, by its legal intendment and effect].)