Defendants Ernesto Martinez Garcia and Miguel Martinez Cruz’s Motion to Strike Punitive Damages
Angeles County (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890, 897; accord, Peterson v. Superior Court (1982) 31 Cal.3d 147, 155-156; see Peterson v. Superior Court (1982) 31 Cal.3d 147, 155 [the imposition of punitive damages is a legitimate means for furthering the goal of deterring drunk driving].)
In his Motion to Strike, Garcia cites to Taylor, as well as Dawes v. Superior Court (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 82, for the proposition that Plaintiffs must state facts that demonstrate a conscious disregard of the probable dangerous consequence of the defendant’s conduct, rather than merely the allegation that the defendant was intoxicated. Garcia also argues that the allegation that he has been, or will be, convicted of a felony violation of the Vehicle Code is speculative, such that it does not constitute an ultimate fact that supplies the factual basis required to plead punitive damages.
However, as the Supreme Court held in Taylor, Peterson and Watson, Garcia’s operation of a motor vehicle while allegedly intoxicated, in and of itself, constitutes malice, particularly since his actions resulted in significant property damage. (Peterson v. Superior Court (1982) 31 Cal.3d 147, 155-156, 158; People v. Watson (1981) 30 Cal.3d 290, 300-301; Taylor v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890, 892, 896-897.)
Further, Plaintiffs allege in their Complaint that Garcia drove the subject vehicle “while not holding a valid driver’s license,” yet he was “so intoxicated that [he] reportedly caused collisions to occur with three (3) parked vehicles and reportedly told the investigating officer that [he was] unsure how many vehicles [he] hit.” (Complaint, ¶ 10.)
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Taken together, these allegations state facts that demonstrate Garcia’s conduct was in conscious disregard of the probable dangerous consequences of driving while intoxicated.
In any event, and as discussed, the simple fact a defendant becomes intoxicated, and then chooses to drive in that state, is sufficient to support an award of punitive damages. (Peterson v. Superior Court (1982) 31 Cal.3d 147, 163; see Ramona Manor Convalescent Hosp. v. Care Enters. (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 1120, 1141-1142 [recognizing courts approve punitive recoveries against drunk drivers, even though a drunk driver does not know the specific identity of his victim].)
Given the foregoing, the Court can treat Garcia’s act of driving while under the influence as being malicious or oppressive, as he consciously disregarded the safety of others by driving while under the influence. (See Taylor v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890, 896-897 [one who willfully consumes alcoholic beverages to the point of intoxication, and then operates a motor vehicle, “reasonably may be held to exhibit a conscious disregard of the safety of others,” and “the effect may be lethal whether or not the driver had a prior history of drunk driving incidents”].)
The Court also disagrees with Garcia’s contention that Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to support his punitive damage allegations. (See Monge v. Superior Court (1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 503, 510 [necessary facts can be stated as ultimate facts or conclusions of law, as long as they are read in context with the other facts alleged as to defendant’s conduct in order to “adequately plead the evil motive requisite to recover[] ... punitive damages”].)
Plaintiffs allege Garcia consumed alcohol to the point of intoxication. Garcia knew (1) he was intoxicated, (2) he had to operate a motor vehicle, which he allegedly did not have a valid license to operate, and (3) he was unfit to operate the motor vehicle, yet he did so anyway, resulting in him colliding with three parked vehicles. (Complaint, ¶¶ 9- 11, 13.)
The foregoing allegations of fact are sufficient to support Plaintiff’s claim that Garcia’s conduct was willful and wanton. (Complaint, ¶ 11.)
Thus, the Court shall deny Defendants’ Motion to Strike.
Plaintiff to give notice.
Case Management Conference
The Case Management Conference is continued to August 27, 2026, at 9:00 a.m. in this department.
Plaintiff to give notice.
9 Adjemian v. Gallo Plaintiff Kevork Adjemian’s motion for protective order is GRANTED.
The court awards Plaintiff sanctions in the amount of $875. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2033.080, subd. (d)).
Untimely Opposition
As a preliminary matter, Defendant Gallo’s Opposition was due 6/11/26 pursuant to Code Civ. Proc. § 1005, subd. (b), but was not submitted until 6/16/26. The court disagrees with Defendant Gallo’s assertion that this delay was “minimal”, and, therefore, disregards the Opposition.
Authority
A protective order may be obtained if the relief is sought “promptly”. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2033.080(a) [protective order for requests for admissions]).
The burden is on the moving party to establish “good cause” for whatever order is sought. (Fairmont Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (2000) 22 Cal.4th 245, 255 (interrogatories); Stadish v. Super. Ct. (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 1130, 1145 (document requests).) “Good cause” requires specific facts demonstrating unwarranted annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden and expense. (Goodman v. Citizens Life & Cas. Ins. Co. (1967) 253 Cal.App.2d 807, 819).
Merits
Plaintiff moves for an order excusing him from responding to Defendant’s Gallo' s third set of requests for admissions containing requests for admissions nos. 418-666.
Plaintiff sets forth the following in support of his contention that good cause requires this order:
This case is based on the sale of certain real property by Defendant Gallo to Plaintiff Adjemian. As is alleged in the complaint, Adjemian purchased the property and, after doing so and taking possession discovered water intrusion below the exterior decks of the home and into the interior living space. Adjemian learned that Gallo had replaced the decks without permits and without the necessary waterproofing. Adjemian contends that these facts should have been disclosed to him but were not. (Decl. of Quinn, ¶ 1).
On December 30, 2025, Gallo propounded his third set of requests for admissions by email on Plaintiff. These requests took the total number of requests propounded to 666. (Decl. of Quinn, ¶ 2). Plaintiff has responded to over 400 requests for admissions to date. (Decl. of Quinn, ¶ 4). Counsel then declares that he discovered the requests were duplicative, as follows: “my review of the latest set led me to conclude that they were largely duplicative of what had previously been responded to. However, due to the volume of interrogatories, trying to analyze all 666 over three sets for duplication was nearly impossible and certainly would have been very time consuming.
As such, I uploaded all three sets to ChatGPT and had it analyze for duplication. I then spot checked for accuracy. The results are reflected in my letter. I thus pointed out that the requests were duplicative of the 417 previously propounded and responded to. On this basis, 1 requested withdrawal of requests.” (Decl. of Quinn, ¶ 4).
The court agrees that 666 requests for admissions in this particular matter is grossly excessive. Defendant Gallo failed to timely oppose, and, therefore, failed to contend why this additional set was necessary. But even if the court were to consider his Opposition, Defendant Gallo did not set forth justification as to why these many requests are necessary. Rather, Defendant Gallo discussed the prior discovery disputes relating to earlier sets of discovery and Plaintiff’s failure to completely respond. But if this were the case, the proper remedy would be to move to compel further responses to those prior requests (and Defendant has, in fact, done so on multiple occasions).
Accordingly, the court GRANTS the motion.
Plaintiff shall give notice.
10 Streling v. Miller Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant Sheena Streling moves for summary adjudication on the Complaint. Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant Sheen Streling moves for summary judgment on the Cross-Complaint filed by Defendant/Cross-Complainant Daniel Paul Miller or in the alternative, summary adjudication on each crossclaim therein. For the following reasons, the motions are DENIED.
Improperly Combined Motions
Plaintiff moves for summary judgment or adjudication in two separate actions. “A complaint and a cross-complaint are, for most purposes, treated as independent actions. [Citation.] ‘Procedurally, a cross- 15