Defendant General Motors, LLC’s motion to strike portions of the complaint
brief summary of the repair history and problems with the motor vehicle. 2) Demand that the manufacturer repurchase or replace the motor vehicle.”
(Code Civ. Proc., § 871.24, subd. (a)). “At the time that the notice submitted pursuant to subdivision (a) is sent, the consumer shall have possession of the motor vehicle.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 871.24, subd. (c)).
“The notice required by subdivision (a) shall be in writing and shall be sent either by email to the email address prominently displayed on the manufacturer's website for this purpose or by certified or registered mail, return receipt requested, to the address provided by the manufacturer in the owner's manual or warranty booklet. The notice information on the manufacturer's website, owner's manual, and warranty booklet shall be provided in both English and Spanish.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 871.24, subd. (d).)
“An action seeking restitution or replacement under Section 871.20 may be commenced without compliance with subdivision (a). In that event, the consumer shall have possession of the motor vehicle at the time of the filing of the complaint, and shall not seek civil penalties, whether by amendment of the complaint or otherwise. If, however, notice is provided pursuant to subdivision (a) and the manufacturer fails to comply with their obligations under subdivision (e), the consumer may commence an action for restitution or replacement, including, but not limited to, civil penalties under subdivision (c) of Section 1794 of the Civil Code.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 871.24, subd. (h).)
Here, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs failed to allege that they provided timely written notice that complied with section 871.24(a) and were in possession of the vehicle on the date the notice was sent.
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The court agrees with Defendant that Plaintiffs’ allegations are insufficient to allege a claim for civil penalties. Plaintiffs failed to allege that Plaintiffs complied with section 871.24 before seeking civil penalties and/or that any purported notice was a “minor deviation.” Without compliance with section 871.24(a) or 871.24(b), section 871.24 precludes Plaintiffs from obtaining civil penalties.
For this reason, the motion is GRANTED with 20 days leave to amend.
Defendant to give notice.
Case Management Conference
The Case Management Conference is continued to August 27, 2026, at 9:00 a.m. in this department.
Plaintiff to give notice.
8 24/7 Family Defendants Ernesto Martinez Garcia and Miguel Martinez Cruz’s Motion Homecare, Inc. v. to Strike Punitive Damages from Plaintiffs’ Complaint is DENIED. Martinezgarcia The Court notes that Plaintiff does not seek punitive or exemplary damages from Defendant Cruz. Thus, Cruz’s Motion is denied.
Garcia contends that allegations of intoxication, statutory violations, or conclusory labels, without supporting factual details, are insufficient to support Plaintiffs 24/7 Family Homecare, Inc., and Shear Perfection Pet Salon, Inc.’s punitive damage allegations.
The Court rejects Garcia’s contentions.
“[T]he act of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated may constitute an act of ‘malice’ under section 3294 if performed under circumstances which disclose a conscious disregard of the probable dangerous consequences.” (Taylor v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890, 892; see Peterson v. Superior Court (1982) 31 Cal.3d 147, 158 [recognizing driving while intoxicated amounts to a conscious disregard of the safety of others, which is sufficient to support punitive damages]; see Peterson v. Superior Court (1982) 31 Cal.3d 147, 160 [“by the time Taylor was decided, the majority rule in other jurisdictions considering the issue was to allow punitive damages in drunk driving case”].)
While the defendant in Taylor was an alcoholic who had habitually driven while under the influence of alcohol, the Supreme Court held, “while a history of prior arrests, convictions and mishaps may heighten the probability and foreseeability of an accident, we do not deem these aggravating factors essential prerequisites to the assessment of punitive damages in drunk driving cases.” (Taylor v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890, 896, italics added.) The Supreme Court had “no difficulty concluding that [the pleadings] contain sufficient allegations upon which it may reasonably be concluded that defendant consciously disregarded the safety of others.
There is a very commonly understood risk which attends every motor vehicle driver who is intoxicated. [Citation.] One who wilfully consumes alcoholic beverages to the point of intoxication, knowing that he thereafter must operate a motor vehicle, thereby combining sharply impaired physical and mental faculties with a vehicle capable of great force and speed, reasonably may be held to exhibit a conscious disregard of the safety of others. The effect may be lethal whether or not the driver had a prior history of drunk driving incidents.” (Id. at pp. 896-897, italics added; accord, People v.
Watson (1981) 30 Cal.3d 290, 300-301.)
This is precisely what Plaintiffs allege in paragraph 11 of their Complaint.
“The allowance of punitive damages in such cases may well be appropriate because of another reason, namely, to deter similar future conduct, the ‘incalculable cost’ of which is well documented. [Citation.] Section 3294 expressly provides that punitive damages may be recovered ‘for the sake of example.’” (Taylor v. Superior Court of Los
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