Rottman v. Svedise

Specific statutory procedures are established for enforcement of money judgments. This includes the appointment of a receiver after judgment to carry the judgment into effect. (CCP section 564(b)(3).

The judgment debtor's interest in an alcoholic beverage license may be applied to the satisfaction of a money judgment. (CCP § 708.630(a).)

A trial court must consider the availability and efficacy of other remedies in determining whether to employ the extraordinary remedy of a receivership. (City & Cty. of San Francisco v. Daley (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 734, 745.)

In making this decision, the court must depend upon competent and admissible evidence submitted by the parties, and not conclusions and hearsay. (McCaslin v. Kenney (1950) 100 Cal.App.2d 87, 94.)

“California rigidly adheres to the principle that the power to appoint a receiver is a delicate one which is to be exercised sparingly and with caution.” (Morand v. Superior Ct. (1974) 38 Cal.App.3d 347, 351.)

“It is said by the state's courts that the appointment of a receiver is ‘an extraordinary and harsh,’ and ‘delicate,’ and ‘drastic,’ remedy to be used ‘cautiously and only where less onerous remedies would be inadequate or unavailable...’” (Ibid.)

Mere difficulty in trying to collect a debt is not sufficient basis for the court to appoint a receiver. (Medipro Medical Staffing LLC v. Certified Nursing Registry, Inc. (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 622, 628-629.)

The Medipro Court explained, “Medipro's evidentiary showing demonstrated that it had, at most, encountered some difficulty in its initial efforts to collect on its money judgment. If this was sufficient to constitute the ‘necessity’ required to justify the ‘extraordinary’ remedy of the appointment of a receiver to take over a judgment debtor's business, it is difficult to see how the appointment of receivers would not become a routine part of the collection of judgments—a result at odds with the solid wall of precedent holding to the contrary.”

On September 22, 2025, judgment was entered in this action for the above stated amount.

Plaintiff states he has attempted to collect on the judgment by attempting to locate a bank or deposit account, mailing a letter requesting payment, serving post-judgment interrogatories and requests for production of documents, and mailing a letter requesting responses to the post-judgment discovery. (Looney decl., ¶¶6-10.)

Judgment Debtor’s business is open. (Id., ¶4.)

According to Plaintiff, the sheriff’s office will not sell liquor inventory; the installation of a sheriff’s keeper is unavailable or ineffective; the size of the judgment makes it impractical to levy upon equipment, fixtures, or inventory; plus, the value of equipment and fixtures is depressed.

Thus, Plaintiff concludes there is no other option but to appoint a receiver to seize and sell the liquor license to satisfy the judgment.

Plaintiff has not made a sufficient factual showing that appointing a receiver to seize and sell the liquor license is necessary. Plaintiff has failed to show the inadequacy of alternate remedies. Rather, as in Medipro, supra, Plaintiff has only shown that he has encountered some difficulties in his initial efforts to collect the judgment.

While Plaintiff states in his declaration that he investigated Defendant’s finances, there is no explanation regarding the depth of this investigation. This court is not convinced that no bank accounts exist linked to a business that is purportedly still open. Plaintiff’s representations regarding the inadequacy of alternative remedies are not supported by foundation. Finally, Plaintiff has not filed a motion to compel further responses to his postjudgment discovery requests.

Mere difficulties in collecting the judgment are insufficient grounds for appointing a receiver. Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden of proving that a receiver is necessary in this matter. The motion is DENIED. Due to the lack of opposition, the court’s minutes shall constitute the order of the court.

5. 25CV05120, Rottman v. Svedise 6

1. Demurrer

This matter is on calendar for the demurrer of defendant United Financial Casualty Company (“United”) to the first amended complaint filed by Plaintiff Kathryn Rottmann (“Plaintiff”).

On February 27, 2026, Plaintiff dismissed United from this action. Accordingly, the demurrer is taken off calendar as MOOT.

2. Motion to Strike

Defendant Joseph Svedise (“Defendant”) moves to strike all references to Punitive Damages in the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) filed by Plaintiff Kathryn Rottmann (“Plaintiff”).

The FAC arises out of an automobile accident between Plaintiff and Defendant. Plaintiff alleges Defendant executed an illegal turn when the traffic signal and roadway conditions did not permit for them. After the illegal turn, Defendant made a U-turn in active traffic causing Plaintiff’s vehicle to collide with Defendant’s vehicle. The FAC further alleges Defendant made “conflicting statements” to law enforcement and his insurer about how the collision occurred.

“In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant.” (Civ. Code, § 3294(a).)

“Malice” means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others. (Civ. Code §3294(c)(1).)

“Oppression” means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person's rights. (Civ. Code §3294(c)(2).)

“Fraud” means an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury. (Civ. Code §3294(c)(3).)

Defendant argues that the FAC does not allege any relevant facts that support Plaintiff’s request for punitive damages. He argues that the allegations only support a negligence cause of action.

While Defendant cites numerous cases for general statements about punitive damages, he cites no cases which show, as a matter of law, that the allegations in the FAC are insufficient to support punitive damages.

The FAC describes Defendant’s driving in a manner that could be said to constitute a willful and conscious disregard for the rights or safety of others. Plaintiff alleges Defendant willfully made an unauthorized right-hand turn followed by a U-turn in active traffic disregarding the potential serious consequences of those actions. He further allegedly attempted to mitigate his responsibility for the collision by misrepresenting the cause of the action to law enforcement and his automobile insurer.

Defendant has not shown these allegations are insufficient to support an award of punitive damages. The motion is DENIED. Plaintiff is directed to submit a written order to the court consistent with this ruling and in compliance with Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.1312.

6. 26CV00208, Petition for Starfinder Stanley, Audrey Stanley

This matter is on calendar for the motion of Petitioners Starfinder Stanley and Audrey Rose Stanley (“Petitioners”) to vacate the order dismissing their petition for a name change of their daughter Juniper Eve Stanley to Juniper Eveningstar Stanley (“the Petition”). 7