Jason Tumulak v. Amanda Dobberpuhl

Jason Tumulak v. Amanda Dobberpuhl, 25CVP-0375

Hearing: Demurrer to First Amended Complaint

Date: June 23, 2026

Jason Tumulak filed this action against Amanda Dobberpuhl on September 22, 2025. Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint (FAC) on October 22, 2025.

Plaintiff alleges that he and Defendant were planning to marry. Plaintiff alleges that he and Defendant entered into an oral contract wherein Plaintiff agreed to transfer $78,000 to Defendant with which Defendant could buy out her ex-spouse’s equity interest in real property located at 8840 Old Santa Rosa pursuant to a divorce, in exchange for a proportionate interest in the property. Plaintiff transferred the money for the property and also gave Defendant an engagement ring. The marriage did not take place, and Defendant did not return the engagement ring, give Plaintiff an interest in the property or reimburse Defendant for the $78,000. (FAC, ¶¶ 9-18.)

Defendant now demurs to each of the seven causes of action in the FAC pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10, subdivisions (e) and (f), on grounds that they fail to state a cause of action and are uncertain. Defendant’s counsel met and conferred with Plaintiff’s counsel prior to filing the demurrer via email and telephone but the parties could not come to an agreement (See Declaration of Gregory Gillett.) Plaintiff opposes the demurrer.

I.

Legal Standard

A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack, or from matters outside the pleading that are subject to judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.30, subd. (a).)

A demurrer tests only the legal sufficiency of the pleading, and “[t]he facts alleged in the pleading are deemed to be true, however improbable they may be. [citation].” (Berg & Berg Enterprises, LLC v. Boyle (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 1020, 1034.) While the Court must accept as true all material facts properly pled, it may disregard logical inferences, contentions, or conclusions of fact or law. (Schep v. Capital One, N.A. (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 1331, 1335-1336; Winn v. Pioneer Medical Group, Inc. (2016) 63 Cal.4th 148, 152.) A demurrer must be overruled if the plaintiff has stated a cause of action under any possible legal theory. (Hale v. Sharp Healthcare (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1373, 1379.)

When reviewing a demurrer, the court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff, not the defendant. (Perez v. Golden Empire Transit Dist. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1239.) “To survive a demurrer, the complaint need only allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action; each evidentiary fact that might eventually form part of the plaintiff’s proof need not be alleged.” (C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 872.)

Demurrers for uncertainty are sustained “ ‘ “only if the pleading is so incomprehensible that a defendant cannot reasonably respond.’ ” [Citations.]” (A.J. Fistes Corp. v. GDL Best Contractors, Inc. (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 677, 695.)

II. Discussion

a. First Cause of Action – Breach of Contract

The FAC that Defendant breached the parties’ oral agreement on April 14, 2024, by refusing to repay the amount of money delivered to Plaintiff or refusing to convey an interest in 8840 Old Santa Rosa to Plaintiff. (FAC, ¶ 22.)

Defendant contends that internal inconsistencies in the FAC create uncertainty as to whether the agreement that the money was for purchase of an interest in the property or whether it was a loan. Defendant contends that the contradictions make the allegations of the terms of the contract insufficiently certain and that the conflicting facts show that the agreement lacked mutual consent. Defendant contends that without clarity on the terms, it is impossible to determine if a breach occurred.

¶ 11 alleges that “The terms of the Contract were initially that Plaintiff would transfer $78,000 to Defendant and be entitled to a proportionate equitable interest in 8840 Old Santa Rosa that Defendant was buying from her ex-spouse pursuant to a divorce.” [emphasis added].

¶17 alleges that “Plaintiff’s transfer to Defendant was initially intended to serve as Plaintiff’s purchase of a proportionate interest in 8840 Old Santa Rosa, which Defendant was buying from her ex-husband pursuant to a divorce.” [emphasis added].

¶32 alleges that the money given to Defendant was “Plaintiff’s $78,000 loan.” [emphasis added].

Defendant also contends that the use of the word “initially” makes it unclear whether the terms of the contract changed.

Defendant also contends that to the extent that the oral agreement was for the sale of an interest in real property, it is not enforceable due to the statute of frauds. (Civ. Code, § 1624, subd. (a)(3).)

Plaintiff responds that his FAC explicitly alleges that (1) an oral agreement was formed on or about March 4, 2022 (¶¶ 11-12), (2) Plaintiff performed all obligations under the agreement (¶¶ 12, 21), (3) Defendant breached the agreement by failing to perform or pay (¶¶ 22-25), and (4) Plaintiff suffered damages (¶ 26). Plaintiff contends that these allegations satisfy the baseline requirements to survive a demurrer.

The Court agrees that the specific terms of the oral agreement as alleged by Plaintiff are inconsistent to the extent that they allege that the funds transferred by Plaintiff were purchase money and that they were a loan. Plaintiff also does not address the statute of frauds.

A plaintiff may plead inconsistent causes of action or alternative facts and legal theories. (Batta v. Hunt (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 295, 304.) However, the Court is uncertain whether Plaintiff attempts to allege alternative theories in the FAC, or whether the allegations are merely inconsistent.

Defendant’s demurrer to the first cause of action is sustained with leave to amend.

b. Second Cause of Action – Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing

“A cause of action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is premised on the breach of a specific contractual obligation. (Racine & Laramie, Ltd. v. Department of Parks & Recreation (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 1026, 1031, 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 335 [the purpose of the implied covenant is to “ ‘prevent a contracting party from engaging in conduct which ... frustrates the other party's rights to the benefits of the contract’ ”].)” (Innovative Business Partnerships, Inc. v. Inland Counties Regional Center, Inc. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 623, 631.)

Defendant contends that this cause of action fails because the FAC fails to sufficiently allege a valid contract between the parties. For the reasons set forth above, the Court agrees.

The Court sustains Defendant’s demurrer to the second cause of action with leave to amend.

c. Third Cause of Action – Quasi-Contract/Unjust Enrichment/Constructive Trust

Defendant contends again that the allegations are inconsistent and that the FAC has not alleged facts showing that Defendant was unjustly enriched.

The Court finds that Plaintiff’s FAC sufficiently alleges facts to state a claim for quasi contract and unjust enrichment.

Defendant contends again that the allegations are inconsistent and that the FAC has not alleged facts showing that Defendant was unjustly enriched.

The Court finds that Plaintiff’s FAC sufficiently alleges facts to state a claim for quasi contract and unjust enrichment.

“A person is enriched if the person receives a benefit at another's expense.” (First Nationwide Savings v. Perry (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 1657, 1662.) Moreover, the deficiencies with Plaintiff’s contract cause of action are not determinative here. A quasi-contract is an obligation created by the law “without regard to the intention of the parties and is designed to restore the aggrieved party to his or her former position by return of the thing or its equivalent in money.” (See 1 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (11th ed. 2026) Contracts, § 1050.) Additionally, the statute of frauds applies to true contracts only. (Id. ̧at § 1051.)

However, a plaintiff may not recover for quasi-contract or unjust enrichment if the parties have an enforceable agreement on the subject matter. While the rules of pleading permit plaintiffs to set forth alternative theories in varied and inconsistent counts, the allegations of the unjust enrichment claim must explicitly deny the existence or enforceability of an agreement. (Klein v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 1342, 1389.) In Klein, the court of appeal found that the trial court did not err in sustaining the defendant’s demurrer to the plaintiff’s unjust enrichment claim. “Although a plaintiff may plead inconsistent claims that allege both the existence of an enforceable agreement and the absence of an enforceable agreement, that is not what occurred here.

Instead, plaintiffs' breach of contract claim pleaded the existence of an enforceable agreement and their unjust enrichment claim did not deny the existence or enforceability of that agreement. Plaintiffs are therefore precluded from asserting a quasicontract claim under the theory of unjust enrichment. [Citation.]” (Id., at pp. 1389-1390.)

Defendant’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s third cause of action in the FAC is sustained with leave to amend.

d. Fourth Cause of Action – Money Had and Received

Defendant contends that the fourth cause of action fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action for money had and received as Plaintiff has not pleaded that the money was for the benefit of Plaintiff.

Defendant contends that the elements of a common count for money had and received are that 1) the defendant received money that was intended to be used for the benefit of plaintiff, 2) that the money was not used for the benefit of plaintiff, and 3) that defendant has not given the money to plaintiff. (CACI 370; Avidor v. Sutter's Place, Inc. (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 1439, 1454 [the claim is viable wherever one person has received money which belongs to another, and which in equity and good conscience should be paid over to the latter].)

Plaintiff responds that “[t]he essential elements of an action for money and/or goods had and received are (1) a statement of indebtedness of a certain sum, (2) the consideration made by the plaintiff, and (3) nonpayment of the debt.” (First Interstate Bank v. State of California (1987) 197 Cal.App.3d 627, 635.)

The directions for the CACI 370 jury instructions specify that “[t]he instructions in this series are not intended to cover all available common counts. Users may need to draft their own instructions or modify the CACI instructions to fit the circumstances of their case.”

The Court finds that Plaintiff sufficiently alleges a claim for a common count.

Defendant’s demurrer to the fourth cause of action is overruled.

e. Fifth Cause of Action – Fraud

Defendant contends that Plaintiff has failed to allege his fraud cause of action with the required specificity.

Fraud must be plead with specificity rather than with “general and conclusory allegations.” The specificity requirement means a plaintiff must allege facts showing how, when, where, to whom, and by what means the representations were made. (Small v. Fritz Companies, Inc. (2003) 30 Cal.4th 167, 184, quoting Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 645.)

Plaintiff alleges that “Defendant promised to provide Plaintiff a proportionate equitable interest in 8840 Old Santa Rosa if Plaintiff would transfer $78,000 to Defendant so Defendant could buy out her ex-spouse’s, Troy Dobberpuhl’s, equity interest in 8840 Old Santa Rosa” but that “Defendant had no intention of providing Plaintiff with any interest in 8840 Old Santa Rosa at the time Plaintiff transferred $78,000 to Defendant” and that “Defendant did not communicate to Plaintiff that Defendant had no intention of providing Plaintiff with any interest in 8840 Old Santa Rosa at the time Plaintiff transferred $78,000 to Defendant. (FAC, ¶¶ 40, 41.) Plaintiff alleges the promise was made to induce Plaintiff to transfer the money to her, and that Plaintiff justifiably relied on her promise because at the time the parties were intending to marry. (FAC, ¶¶ 42, 43.)

The elements of promissory fraud are (1) a promise made regarding a material fact without any intention of performing it; (2) the existence of the intent not to perform at the time the promise was made; (3) intent to deceive or induce the promisee to enter into a transaction; (4) reasonable reliance by the promisee; (5) nonperformance by the party making the promise; and (6) resulting damage to the promise. (Missakian v. Amusement Industry, Inc. (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 630, 654, quoting Gruber v. Gruber (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 529, 540.)

Defendant contends that Plaintiff fails to allege any representation or that she intended to deceive Plaintiff. Plaintiff has alleged a representation—the promise to provide an interest in the property if Plaintiff transferred her $78,000. However, while Plaintiff alleges that Defendant had no intention of providing an interest in the property “at the time Plaintiff transferred $78,000 to Defendant”, it does not allege that Plaintiff lacked the intention to perform at the time she made the promise. At a minimum the timing is unclear.

Plaintiff’s demurrer to the fifth cause of action for fraud is sustained with leave to amend.

f. Sixth Cause of Action – Recovery of Personal Property

Plaintiff’s sixth cause of action in the FAC seeks the return of the engagement ring.

Defendant contends that while it is not explicitly alleged, presumably this cause of action is brought pursuant to Civil Code section 1590, which provides that:

Where either party to a contemplated marriage in this State makes a gift of money or property to the other on the basis or assumption that the marriage will take place, in the event that the donee refuses to enter into the marriage as contemplated or that it is given up by mutual consent, the donor may recover such gift or such part of its value as may, under all of the circumstances of the case, be found by a court or jury to be just.

Plaintiff alleges that “The marriage did not take place, after circumstances arose between Plaintiff and Defendant on or about March 20, 2024, in effect ending their engagement.” (FAC, ¶ 48.) Plaintiff contends that this sufficiently alleges that the marriage was given up based on mutual consent. However, the complaint leaves the reason the marriage plan was abandoned wholly ambiguous, and Plaintiff does not actually allege that it was by refusal of Defendant to enter the marriage or by mutual consent.

Defendant’s demurrer to the sixth cause of action for recovery of personal property is sustained with leave to amend.

g. Seventh Cause of Action – Declaratory Relief

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant’s promise to transfer an interest in the property at 8840 Old Santa Rosa to Plaintiff in exchange for a transfer of $78,000 was an enforceable contract and seeks a declaration to settle the matter in controversy. (FAC, ¶¶ 51-56.)

Defendant contends that Plaintiff’s claim fails for the same reasons the breach of contract claim fails.

The Court has sustained the demurrer to Plaintiff’s contract claim with leave to amend. Therefore, the Court also sustains Defendant’s demurer to Plaintiff’s seventh cause of action for declaratory relief with leave to amend.

ORDER (PROPOSED)

Defendant’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s fourth cause of action is overruled.

Defendant’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s first, second, third, fifth, sixth and seventh causes of action is sustained with leave to amend.

Plaintiff shall have ten days from service of notice of this order to file and serve his amended complaint. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1320(g).) Defendant shall serve notice.

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