In the Matter of The Keith V. Anderson Family Trust

24PR001989: The Keith V. Anderson Family Trust 06/17/2026 Hearing on Motion - Other Demurrer in Department 129

13.pdf.

A Stipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) is required to be signed by each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the hearing, if not using a reporter from the Court’s Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list.

Once the form is signed it must be filed with the clerk. If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided.

TENTATIVE RULING Respondent Ronald Melchin’s demurrer to Petitioner George Bauslaugh’s (“Petitioner”) first amended complaint is ruled on as follows.

Respondent is the former counsel of Decedent Elizabeth Anderson (“Decedent”). Decedent maintained a trust, The Elizabeth E. Anderson Family Trust, and with her deceased spouse Keith Anderson, created the Five A Family Trust on February 26, 1976 and the Anderson Family Trust on August 29, 1994.

Keith Anderson died on February 28, 2003. (Petition, ¶ 47.) Upon her spouse’s passing, Decedent allegedly executed various documents changing the ownership and interests in her spouse’s limited partnership and real property. (Petition, ¶¶ 51, 53, 54, 55.)

Petitioner is an heir to the Estate of Keith Anderson and a beneficiary of the Keith V. Anderson Family Trust. (Petition, ¶ 1.) The petition alleges Decedent’s failure to report various assets and sales to the Internal Revenue Service. (See, e.g., Petition, ¶¶ 57, 59, 60.) Respondent is listed in the complaint for his alleged role in drafting certain documents executed by Decedent. (See, e.g., Petition, ¶¶ 65.c., 68.) Petitioner asserts all causes of action against Respondent, except the fourth (negligence).

Respondent demurs to the petition in its entirety on the grounds that it is barred by Civil Code, section 1714.10 and thus fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure, section 430.10(e). Respondent also demurs to each cause of action individually on grounds that each fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure, section 430.10(e).

A demurrer may be sustained if “the pleading does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10(e).) The function of a demurrer is to test the sufficiency of the pleading it challenges by raising questions of law. (Salimi v. State Comp. Ins. Fund (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 216, 219; Nordlinger v. Lynch (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 1259, 1271.) A demurrer

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24PR001989: The Keith V. Anderson Family Trust 06/17/2026 Hearing on Motion - Other Demurrer in Department 129

“tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters.” (SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 902, 905.) The purpose of a demurrer is to test the legal sufficiency of a claim. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) For the purpose of determining the effect of a complaint, its allegations are liberally construed, with a view toward substantial justice. (Code Civ. Proc. §452; Amarel v. Connell (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 137, 140-141; Quelimane Co. v.

Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 43, fn. 7.) In this respect, the Court treats the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law, and considers matters which may be judicially noticed. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318; Poseidon Development, Inc. v. Woodland Lane Estates, LLC (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1106, 1111-1112.)

A demurrer may be sustained only if the complaint lacks any sufficient allegations to entitle the plaintiff to relief. (Financial Corp. of America v. Wilburn (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 764, 778.) “Plaintiff need only plead facts showing that he may be entitled to some relief . . . we are not concerned with plaintiff’s possible inability or difficulty in proving the allegations of the complaint.” (Highlanders, Inc. v. Olsan (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 690, 696-697.) “[Courts] are required to construe the complaint liberally to determine whether a cause of action has been stated, given the assumed truth of the facts pleaded.” (Picton v.

Anderson Union High School Dist. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 726, 732-733.) A demurrer admits the truth of all material facts properly pled and the sole issue raised by a general demurrer is whether the facts pled state a valid cause of action – not whether they are true. (Serrano v. Priest (1971) 5 Cal.3d 584, 591.)

Petitioner argues in opposition that the demurrer was untimely filed pursuant to Probate Code section 1043. Probate Code section 1043 requires that an “interested person may appear and make a response or objection in writing at or before the hearing.” Goebner v. Superior Court, (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 1105, interprets the term “objection” in Probate Code section 1043 to include demurrers. (Goebner v. Superior Court (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 1105, 1111.) While Petitioner correctly points out the demurrer must be filed at or before the hearing, Respondent denies service of both the initial and amended petitions.

Respondent first demurs to the petition in its entirety on the grounds that Civil Code section 1714.10 bars the petition absent the required prefiling court order. “Civil Code section 1714.10, subdivision (a), establishes a prefiling requirement for a ‘cause of action against an attorney for a civil conspiracy with his or her client arising from any attempt to contest or compromise a claim or dispute, and which is based upon the attorney’s representation of the client.’” (Wong v. Dong (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 109, 117, citing Cortese v. Sherwood, (2018) 26 Cal. App. 5th 445, 453 [emphasis added].) Petitioner opposes on the grounds that the purported civil conspiracy actions were conducted as transactional activities, which is distinct from contesting or compromising a claim or dispute. (Opposition, 6:19-20.)

While the claim or cause of action for civil conspiracy need not be explicitly labeled “conspiracy,” the plain wording of Civil Code, section 1714.10(a) “requires court permission to

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24PR001989: The Keith V. Anderson Family Trust 06/17/2026 Hearing on Motion - Other Demurrer in Department 129

file an attorney-client conspiracy claim ‘arising from any attempt to contest or compromise a claim or dispute.’” (Cortese v. Sherwood (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 445, 450; Stueve v. Berger Kahn (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 327, 331.) The alleged conspiratorial conduct in Stueve v. Berger Kahn, “the siphoning off of assets through fraudulent estate planning, including the misappropriation of the Stueves’ assets through the diversion of those assets to entities created and controlled by the defendants,” is analogous to the allegations in this present matter. (Id.)

In 2018, Cortese explained that the statute applies to “situations in which the alleged conspiracy arose from the attorney’s representation of his or her client in a previous or current legal dispute or litigation with the plaintiff.” (Cortese, supra, 26 Cal.App.5th at p. 457.) The petition alleges Respondent’s role in drafting and preparing various tax filings and real property deeds, which were not related to any attempt to contest or compromise a claim or dispute. Further, under Cortese, there was no “previous or current legal dispute or litigation with the plaintiff.” Accepting the allegations in the petition as true, the petition states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. (Serrano v.

Priest, supra, 5 Cal.3d 584, 591.) The demurrer to the entire petition on this basis is overruled.

The demurrer to the first cause of action is OVERRULED. “The elements of fraud, which give rise to the tort action for deceit, are (a) misrepresentation (false representation, concealment, or nondisclosure); (b) knowledge of falsity (or ‘scienter’); (c) intent to defraud, i.e., to induce reliance; (d) justifiable reliance; and (e) resulting damage.” (Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 638.) Here, the amended petition states facts sufficient to demonstrate a claim for fraud. Petitioner alleges Respondent played a role in drafting documents for legitimate purposes when the documents were allegedly drafted for the purpose of tax avoidance. (Petition, ¶¶ 69.af.)

Next, Petitioner sufficiently alleges Respondent’s knowledge of the falsity of the representations. (Petition, ¶ 70.) Petitioner also alleges Respondent’s intent to defraud by stating “all [respondents] had duties to disclose the true value of [Keith’s] estate to the IRS and [Petitioner] based on federal and state law,” and that Respondent drafted the Anderson Family Trust and related deeds, and “intentionally failed to advise [Decedent] that she was required by law to provide notice to Petitioner upon Keith’s death, and upon the transfer and sale of significant estate assets after Keith’s death.” (Petition, ¶¶ 71, 71.b.)

Petitioner alleges justifiable reliance by alleging that he had no knowledge of the administration of Keith’s trust, and “failed to act solely on the basis of the concealment of the material facts.” (Petition, ¶ 72.) Finally, Petitioner alleges damages exceeding $5 million, as well as double damages and fees and costs. (Petition, ¶¶ 73-74.) This is sufficient to state the claim of fraud. The demurrer to the first cause of action is OVERRULED.

The demurrer to the second cause of action is SUSTAINED with leave to amend. An action for relief against a transfer or obligation under the Uniform Voidable Transactions Act is “subject to the limitations in [Civil Code] Section 3439.08,” which states a judgment may be entered against “[t]he first transferee of the asset or the person for whose benefit the transfer was made,” or “[a]n immediate or mediate transferee of the first transferee ” (Civil Code, §§ 3439.07-3439.08.) The petition does not state whether Respondent was a transferee of any property. Thus, the petition lacks sufficient facts to state a cause of action under the Uniform Voidable Transactions Act

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24PR001989: The Keith V. Anderson Family Trust 06/17/2026 Hearing on Motion - Other Demurrer in Department 129

against Respondent. The demurrer to the second cause of action is sustained with leave to amend.

The third cause of action, intentional interference with expected inheritance (“IIEI”), is SUSTAINED with leave to amend. In Beckwith v. Dahl (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 1039, the Fourth District Court of Appeals explains:

“To state a claim for [intentional interference with expected inheritance], a plaintiff must allege five distinct elements. First, the plaintiff must plead he had an expectancy of an inheritance. It is not necessary to allege that ‘one is in fact named as a beneficiary in the will or that one has been devised the particular property at issue. [Citation.] That requirement would defeat the purpose of an expectancy claim It is only the expectation that one will receive some interest that gives rise to a cause of action. [Citations.]” Second, as in other interference torts, the complaint must allege causation. ‘This means that, as in other cases involving recovery for loss of expectancies there must be proof amounting to a reasonable degree of certainty that the bequest or devise would have been in effect at the time of the death of the testator if there had been no such interference.’ Third, the plaintiff must plead intent, i.e., that the defendant had knowledge of the plaintiff's expectancy of inheritance and took deliberate action to interfere with it.

Fourth, the complaint must allege that the interference was conducted by independently tortious means, i.e., the underlying conduct must be wrong for some reason other than the fact of the interference. Finally, the plaintiff must plead he was damaged by the defendant’s interference.” (Beckwith v. Dahl (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 1039, 1057 [Citations omitted.].)

Petitioner alleges he had an expectancy of inheritance due to his status as a contingent beneficiary. (Petition, ¶ 81.) Second, Respondent, along with the other Respondents, are the “direct and sole causes of Petitioner’s failure to receive his bequest of Keith’s estate and refused to properly fund” the various Anderson trusts of which Petitioner was a contingent beneficiary. (Petition, ¶¶ 82-83.) Petitioner expressly alleges Respondent’s intent. (Petition, ¶ 83.) Fourth, Petitioner alleges the independent tortious means include fraud. (Petition, ¶ 84.) Finally, Petitioner again alleges damages exceeding $5 million, as well as double damages and fees and costs. (Petition, ¶¶ 84-85.)

Next, Respondent Melchin demurs to the third cause of action on the basis that this cause of action is only available where there is no adequate remedy in probate. “[T]he tort of IIEI developed to provide a remedy when the plaintiff had no independent tort action because the

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24PR001989: The Keith V. Anderson Family Trust 06/17/2026 Hearing on Motion - Other Demurrer in Department 129

underlying tort was directed at the testator and when the plaintiff had no adequate remedy in probate.” (Beckwith v. Dahl, supra, 205 Cal.App.4th at p. 1058; see also Halperin v. Halperin (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 193, 200 [“[A] plaintiff cannot recover for IIEI if “an adequate probate remedy exists.”].) Petitioner is currently seeking several remedies in probate, and is silent on whether there is no adequate remedy to pursue in probate. Thus, Petitioner has not plead sufficient facts to support this cause of action. The demurrer to the third cause of action is sustained with leave to amend.

The demurrer to the fifth cause of action, malpractice, is OVERRULED. “Legal malpractice consists of the failure of an attorney ‘to use such skill, prudence, and diligence as lawyers of ordinary skill and capacity commonly possess and exercise in the performance of the tasks which they undertake.’ [Citation omitted.] When such failure proximately causes damage, it gives rise to an action in tort.” (Neel v. Magana, Olney, Levy, Cathcart & Gelfand (1971) 6 Cal.3d 176, 180-181.) Here, Petitioner alleges duty as Respondent was a hired professional to assist with handling estate and trust matters of which Petitioner was a known beneficiary, breach of that duty in drafting the alleged fraudulent documents and deeds, proximate cause of damages, and damages exceeding $5 million. (Petition, ¶¶ 94-97.)

This is sufficient to state a cause of action for malpractice. The demurrer to the fifth cause of action is overruled.

The demurrer to the sixth cause of action, breach of fiduciary duty, is OVERRULED. Petitioner “has the burden of proving (1) the existence of a fiduciary relationship, (2) breach of that relationship, and (3) damage proximately caused by the breach.” (Starr v. Ashbrook (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 999, 1019, fn. 7.) Petitioner alleges Decedent breached various trustee duties pursuant to Probate Code, section 16000 et seq. (Petition, ¶¶ 101.a.-l.) Petitioner further alleges that Decedent delegated various trustee duties to Respondent, who also breached these duties. (Petition, ¶ 103.) Petitioner further alleges Decedent’s breaches of duty occurred “on the advice of” Respondent. (Petition, ¶ 105.) Again, Petitioner alleges damages exceeding $5 million. (Petition, ¶ 104.) This is sufficient to state a cause of action for malpractice. The demurrer to the sixth cause of action is overruled.

The demurrer to the seventh cause of action, an action to quiet title pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure §§ 760.010, et. seq., is SUSTAINED with leave to amend. An action for quiet title must contain “(1) A description of the property that is the subject of the action, (2) The title of the plaintiff as to which a determination of quiet title is sought (3) The adverse claims to the title of the plaintiff (4) The date as of which the determination is sought [and] (5) A prayer for determination of the title of the plaintiff against adverse claims.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 761.020.) The cause of action, found at Petition, ¶¶ 107-111, does not state the date any facts supporting the fourth or fifth statutory requirements. The demurrer to the seventh cause of action is sustained with leave to amend.

The demurrer to the eighth cause of action, cancellation of instruments pursuant to Civil Code § 3412, is OVERRULED. “A written instrument, in respect to which there is a reasonable

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24PR001989: The Keith V. Anderson Family Trust 06/17/2026 Hearing on Motion - Other Demurrer in Department 129

apprehension that if left outstanding it may cause serious injury to a person against whom it is void or voidable, may, upon his application, be so adjudged, and ordered to be delivered up or canceled.” (Civ. Code, § 3412.) Here, Petitioner identifies several written instruments at issue for this cause of action, the affidavit of death of trustee and the various grant deeds. (Petition, ¶ 112.) Petitioner further indicates reasonable apprehension of serious injury to Petitioner if left outstanding. (Petition, ¶ 113.) Finally, Petitioner identifies himself as someone as to whom the instruments are void or voidable. (Petition, ¶¶ 113-114.) The demurrer to the eighth cause of action is overruled.

Finally, the demurrer to the ninth cause of action, a request for the imposition of a constructive trust pursuant to Civil Code, section 2224, is SUSTAINED. “Three conditions must be shown to impose a constructive trust: (1) a specific, identifiable property interest, (2) the plaintiff’s right to the property interest, and (3) the defendant’s acquisition or detention of the property interest by some wrongful act.” (Higgins v. Higgins (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 648, 659.) Petitioner has identified a specific property interest in the relevant trust property and his right to the property interest as a contingent beneficiary. (Petition, ¶¶ 81, 116.) However, Petitioner has not clearly identified Respondent’s “acquisition or detention of the property interest.” (Id.) Thus, the demurrer to the ninth cause of action is sustained with leave to amend.

The demurrer is SUSTAINED with leave to amend as to the second, third, seventh, and ninth causes of action. All other bases to demur to the petition in its entirety and the remaining causes of action are OVERRULED.

Petitioner’s second amended complaint shall be filed no later than July 8, 2026.

This minute order is effective immediately. No formal order or other notice is required. (Code Civ. Proc. §1019.5; CRC, Rule 3.1312.)