SHETH vs FCA US, LLC, et al.

Although Plaintiff argues that the statute of repose does not apply, the plain language of the statute indicates otherwise. He states that the new amendments to the Song-Beverly Act under which Plaintiff brings his claims were made effective only on July 1, 2025, after Plaintiff had already filed this case. But by the plain language of the relevant statute, CCP 871.21 went into effect January 1, 2025 and the Court therefore rejects this argument. The Legislative Counsel’s Digest cited by Plaintiff does not compel a different result. (RJN, Ex. 2.)

Nor does Plaintiff sufficiently allege facts to show that this time period could be tolled and 25CV114493: SHETH vs FCA US, LLC, et al. 06/17/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to Second Amended Complaint in Department 17 appears to imply that it may not apply, in claiming that Section 871.21 " ‘does not "confin[e] tolling to the specific listed bases.’" (Oppo., p. 9:10.) Plaintiff argues separately that the statute of repose also does not apply to his Third (inadequate literature/parts) and Fourth (implied breach of warranty) causes of action by the plain language of the statute, CCP section 871.20(a): "Notwithstanding any other law, this chapter applies to an action seeking restitution or replacement of a motor vehicle pursuant to subdivision (b) or (d) of Section 1793.2, Section 1793.22, or Section 1794 of the Civil Code, or for civil penalties pursuant to subdivision (c) of Section 1794 of the Civil Code, where the request for restitution or replacement is based on noncompliance with the applicable express warranty."

This may be the case, but Plaintiff has also not shown how these claims are also not barred by the four year statute of limitations. (Comm. Code § 2725.) Thus, as Plaintiff has not demonstrated that his claims are within the statute of repose nor has he successfully pled around the statute of repose, Defendant’s Demurrer as to the first through fourth causes of action is SUSTAINED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e).) Sixth Cause of Action: Fraudulent Inducement – Concealment To establish facts sufficient to state a cause of action for fraudulent concealment, Plaintiff needs to sufficiently allege that: (1) FCA concealed or suppressed a material fact; (2) FCA had a duty to disclose the fact; (3) FCA intentionally concealed or suppressed the fact with intent to defraud Plaintiff; (4) Plaintiff justifiably relied on said fact; and (5) Plaintiff was damaged by the concealment. (Jones v.

ConocoPhillips Co. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1187, 1198.) FCA argues that Plaintiff failed to allege facts to meet the requirements for all elements, including that FCA had no duty to disclose. As stated in the Court's prior September 29, 2025 ruling on Defendant’s first Demurrer, the Court rejects FCA’s argument that Defendant had no duty to disclose information to Plaintiff because it did not sell the vehicle directly to Plaintiff and they had no “direct” relationship.

Here, the SAC alleges that FCA knew of certain defects with the car such as with the engine and intentionally failed to inform Plaintiff of these dangers. (SAC ¶¶ 31, 33, 36.)

The duty to disclose arises in four ways: “(1) when the defendant is in a fiduciary relationship with the plaintiff, (2) when the defendant had exclusive knowledge of material facts not known to the plaintiff, (3) when the defendant actively conceals a material fact from the plaintiff and (4) when the defendant makes partial representations but also suppresses some material facts.” (LiMandri v. Judkins (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 326, 336.)

Like in Dhital v. Nissan North America (2023) 523 P.3d 392, despite Plaintiff's purchase of his car from Fremont Chrysler Dodge Jeep Ram, co-Defendant and third-party dealership, the fact is FCA still provided an express warranty for the car, the dealership was FCA’s agent for the purpose of repairing FCA’s cars, and FCA therefore had a duty to disclose material facts about its cars with “known safety-related defects" to consumers. (Dhital v. Nissan North America

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

25CV114493: SHETH vs FCA US, LLC, et al. 06/17/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to Second Amended Complaint in Department 17 (2023) 523 P.3d 392; SAC, ¶ 37.)

Specifically, Plaintiff’s SAC provides a sufficient basis for disclosure without a transaction between the parties as it pleads (1) FCA had exclusive knowledge of material facts not known to Plaintiff via “pre-production and post-production testing data; early consumer complaints about the Engine Defect made directly to FCA and its network of dealers; aggregate warranty data compiled from FCA's network of dealers; testing conducted by FCA in response to these complaints; as well as warranty repair and part replacements data received by FCA from FCA's network of dealers, amongst other sources of internal information;” (SAC ¶ 32); and (2) concealment of this safety defect was material “in that a reasonable person would have considered them to be important in deciding whether or not to purchase the Vehicle.” (Id. at ¶ 95.)

Further, a relationship between Plaintiff and FCA may arise from a specific contractual connection – a warranty contract for a 2018 Pacifica Hybrid (the “Contract”). (See SAC, Ex. A.) The Contract applies to “warranty service . . . by an authorized Chrysler, Dodge, Jeep or Ram dealer.” (Complaint, Ex. A at p. 19.) The relationship arising from the warranty provided by FCA specifically to Plaintiff, after he took the car to an authorized repair facility, and not merely to the general public, constitutes a sufficient transactional connection to support a claim for failure to disclose. (See Scherer v. FCA US, LLC (S.D. Cal. 2021) 565 F.Supp.3d 1184, 1194 [discussion of Bigler-Engler case and holding that a failure to disclose claim is properly grounded on contractual relationship reflected in the warranty agreement]; SAC ¶ 15.)

Thus, Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged facts to show that Defendant had a duty to disclose the defective transmission to him before he purchased the vehicle. While it is true that as FCA states, the SAC fails to allege the names of the persons who concealed facts or knew of a transmission flaw, the California Supreme Court in Rattagan v. Uber Technologies, (2024) 324 Cal.Rptr.3d 433, did not specify that details of that nature are required in concealment cases as well as affirmative misrepresentation ones.

Rather, Rattagan focused on answering the question of whether under California law, a plaintiff could assert a tort claim for fraudulent concealment arising from or related to the performance of a contract. (Rattagan v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (2024) 324 Cal.Rptr.3d 433, 440.) The closest the court came to touching upon this was when it stated that “[i]If the duty allegedly arose by virtue of the parties' relationship and defendant's exclusive knowledge or access to certain facts, as Rattagan has alleged here, the complaint must also include specific allegations establishing all the required elements, including (1) the content of the omitted facts, (2) defendant's awareness of the materiality of those facts, (3) the inaccessibility of the facts to plaintiff, (4) the general point at which the omitted facts should or could have been revealed, and (5) justifiable and actual reliance, either through action or forbearance, based on the defendant's omission. '[M]ere conclusionary allegations that the omissions were intentional and for the purpose of defrauding and deceiving plaintiff[] ... are insufficient for the foregoing purposes.' [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 465.)

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s allegations as to the ‘who’ element meet the particularity requirement.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

25CV114493: SHETH vs FCA US, LLC, et al. 06/17/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to Second Amended Complaint in Department 17 For purposes of a demurrer, Plaintiff has also sufficiently pled that Defendant intended to defraud Plaintiff by intentionally concealing or suppressing the facts about the defects with his car. (SAC ¶¶ 10-11.) As Plaintiff has cured the defect previously identified by the Court as to the third element, Defendant’s demurrer to the Sixth cause of action is OVERRULED. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e).)

Defendant shall serve and file an Answer by July 17, 2026.

If a party does not timely contest the foregoing Tentative Ruling and appear at the hearing, the Tentative Ruling will become the order of the court.

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THROUGH ECOURT Notify the Court and all the other parties no later than 4:00 PM one court day before the scheduled hearing, and briefly identify the issues you wish to argue through the following steps: 1. Log into eCourt Public Portal 2. Case Search 3. Enter the Case Number and select “Search” 4. Select the Case Name 5. Select the Tentative Rulings Tab 6. Select “Click to Contest this Ruling” 7. Enter your Name and Reason for Contesting 8. Select “Proceed”

BY EMAIL Send an email to the DEPARTMENT CLERK and all the other parties no later than 4:00 PM one court day before the scheduled hearing. This will permit the department clerk to send invitations to counsel to appear remotely.

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