Motion for Summary Judgment
(Homestead Sav. v. Sup.Ct. (Dividend Develop. Corp.) (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 494, 498.)
Knuppel failed to meet their initial burden of demonstrating the nonexistence of a triable issue of fact as to whether Plaintiff’s claims are time-barred pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 340.6, subdivision (a). The SAC alleges this action is brought “as a result of [defendants’] representation of Plaintiff in three probate actions brought in the Superior Court of Orange County, California.” (SAC ¶ 1; see also SAC ¶ 8.)
Knuppel’s motion, however, addresses only two probate actions – case numbers 30-2015-00802939 and 30-2016-00832674. (See Motion at pp. 7:10-12; 13:13-28; UMF 1, 19-22.) Knuppel failed to offer any argument or evidence pertaining to the third probate action as alleged in the SAC and thus failed to address the full scope of Plaintiff’s claims against them.
The pleadings serve as the “‘outer measure of materiality in a summary judgment motion.’” (White v. Smule, Inc. (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 346, 354.) Therefore, in order to obtain summary judgment, it was incumbent upon Knuppel to offer evidence showing the entirety of Plaintiff’s claims against them fails. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(p)(2).) Knuppel failed to do so and thus failed to meet their initial burden on this motion.
Plaintiff shall give notice.
302 Expandavision, Cross-Complainants Christine Collins (Collins) and LLC vs. Collins Miramar Wellness Spa PC’s (Miramar)(collectively referred to as Cross-Complainants) motion for summary judgment on their cross-complaint against Marco Tawachi and Expandavision, LLC (Cross-Defendants) is GRANTED as to Collins only.
Cross-Complainants’ request for judicial notice is GRANTED. (Evid. Code § 452, subd. (d).)
Collins has met her initial burden establishing the elements of intentional misrepresentation, concealment, violation of Business and Professions Code section 17200 et. seq. and declaratory relief. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 437c
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Code § 17200 borrows actionable conduct and makes it independently actionable]; Code of Civ. Proc. § 1060 [declaratory relief]; Cross- Complainants’ Separate Statement of Undisputed Material Facts 1-22.) The burden shifted to Cross- Defendants, but Cross-Defendants failed to oppose the motion and/or meet their shifted burden to show any material triable issue.
Miramar failed to meet its initial burden showing it suffered any damages or has standing to seek declaratory relief relating to the promissory note. (See Code of Civ. Proc. § 437c, subd. (p)(1).)
Cross-Complainants shall submit a proposed judgment within 5 days.
Cross-Complainants shall give notice.
304 Brilliant vs. Before the court is a motion for attorney fees and General Motors, costs (Motion) filed by plaintiff Steven L. Brilliant LLC (Plaintiff). The Motion is GRANTED.
Plaintiff is the prevailing party in this action after settling defendant General Motors, LLC (Defendant). Pursuant to Civil Code section 1794, subdivisions (d) and (e), as the prevailing party on a