Bacher vs. Prasad

In the event Plaintiff’s Counsel submits a declaration which confirms Defendants did not respond to the mediation communications, between February and June of 2022, the Court is inclined to find compliance with the mediation requirement.

While it is true that Defendants agreed to participate in mediation, on December 16, 2021 (¶7 of Knierim Declaration and Exhibit 5 thereto; See also ¶5 of Mehta Declaration and Exhibit A thereto), a subsequent failure to respond to Plaintiff’s mediation-related communications would indicate Defendants were unwilling to follow through with their earlier agreement. Thus, while Plaintiff did not

schedule mediation, the same is reasonable in response to an apparent rejection of the request.

In opposing the motion, Defendants offer an email from Plaintiff’s Counsel dated September 14, 2022, wherein Plaintiff again offered mediation; however, Defendants attach an email from former Defense Counsel Patricia Welling, wherein Ms. Welling states “despite Mr. Trester’s request for mediation last month, you indicated that the client is now not interested in mediation.” (¶7 of Mehta Declaration and Exhibit C thereto.)

Defendants suggest the above evidence shows that Plaintiff refused to mediate after a request for mediation was made; however, the relevant contractual provision prohibits recovery of attorneys’ fees only where such a refusal occurs “before commencement of an action....” (¶3 of Knierim Declaration and Exhibit 1 thereto, at §11(A).) As the above emails were sent after an action was initiated, they are irrelevant for purposes of determining compliance with ¶11 of the BRAE.

Next, the Court finds that Plaintiff is not entitled to recover fees incurred solely as the result of litigation against Defendants Agarwal Markarian Holdings, Inc. and Inderjit Ghusar (“Broker Defendants”), as no contractual right to attorneys’ fees has been shown, as against these parties.

Instead, the relevant agreement provides only for fees incurred in a proceeding “between Buyer and Broker regarding the obligation to pay compensation under this Agreement....” (¶3 of Knierim Declaration and Exhibit 1 thereto, at §9.) This language does not encompass litigation incurred against third-parties to the contract.

“Where a cause of action based on the contract providing for attorney’s fees is joined with other causes of action beyond the contract, the prevailing party may recover attorney’s fees under section 1717 only as they relate to the contract action.” (Amtower v. Photon Dynamics, Inc. (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1582, 1603, citing Reynolds Metals Co. v. Alperson (1979) 25 Cal.3d 124, 129-130.)

“Attorney fees, however, ‘need not be apportioned when incurred for representation on an issue common to both a cause of action in which fees are proper and one in which they are not allowed.” (Brown Bark III, L.P. v. Haver (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 809, 829.) “The governing standard is whether the ‘issues are so interrelated that it would have been impossible to separate them into claims for which attorney fees are properly awarded and claims for which they are not....” (Id. at pp. 829-830.)

While Plaintiff asserts all fees are interrelated, a clear division is discernable in the record of this action.

Defendants Agarwal Markarian Holdings, Inc. and Inderjit Ghusar were not added to the Complaint until April 18, 2023 (ROA No. 77) and did not make an appearance in this action via an Answer, until June 7, 2023. (ROA No. 505.)

While this action was pending against both sets of Defendants, a review of the record indicates Plaintiff filed multiple discovery motions, directed solely at the Broker Defendants. (See ROA Nos. 104, 125, 126, 183 and 191.) Plaintiff offers no explanation as to why the Client Defendants should be held finically responsible for fees incurred by Plaintiff, when the Broker Defendants did not comply with their discovery obligations.

Thereafter, on October 31, 2024, the Court adjudicated Plaintiff’s first cause of action for breach of contract, in his favor, against the Client Defendants. (ROA No. 224.) While Plaintiff filed a second Motion for Summary Adjudication against the Client Defendants on January 29, 2025 (ROA No. 279), the same was denied, given the claim was duplicative. (See ROA No. 316.) Subsequently, Plaintiff dismissed the second cause of action. (ROA No. 357.)

After the above, all litigation in this action has proceeded solely against the Broker Defendants, with the sole exception of a Motion for Entry of Judgment filed on August 1, 2025 (ROA No. 373) and the instant Motion for Attorneys’ Fees (ROA No. 462).

In contrast to the authorities cited by Plaintiff, a clear line of demarcation exists, between the litigation pursued against the Client Defendants (for whom a contractual attorney’s fee provision exists) and litigation against the Broker Defendants (for whom fees are not recoverable.)

“A litigant may not increase his recovery of attorney’s fees by joining a cause of action in which attorney’s fees are not recoverable to one in which an award is proper.” (Erickson v. R.E.M. Concepts, Inc. (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 1073, 1083- 1084.)

Given the above, Plaintiff is ordered to resubmit his billing, with all entries relating solely to litigation against the Broker Defendants removed. Counsel for Plaintiff is also ordered to provide a summary of the work performed, similar to the summary offered within ¶25 of the Knierim Declaration, limited to the work performed against the Client Defendants.

Plaintiff is ordered to file and serve the above, no later than 16 court days prior to the continued hearing date. Defendants may provide a limited response to the above, no later than 9 court days prior to the continued hearing date. Defendants’ response shall be limited to identifying any charges Defendants believe were incurred solely in connection with litigation against the Broker Defendants. No other objections can be raised.

Plaintiff to give notice.

56 Fiore vs. Wagon Wheel Canyon Community Association

24-01397793 Motion for Attorney Fees

Defendant/Cross-Complainant/Cross-Defendant Wagan Wheel Canyon Community Association (“Association”) motion for attorneys’ fees is DENIED.

If authorized by statute, attorney fees may be awarded to a prevailing party. (Code of Civ. Proc. §§ 1032, subd. (b), 1033.5, subds. (a)(10)(B) & (c)(5).) Code of Civil Procedure section 1032 is the general cost recovery statute for civil lawsuits. “Attorney fees are not normally recoverable costs.” (Riverside Mining Limited v. Quality Aggregates (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 269, 275.) However, recoverable costs may include attorneys’ fees where authorized by contract, statute, or another law. (See Code Civ.

Proc., § 1033.5, subd. (a)(10); see also Santisas v. Goodin (1998) 17 Cal.4th 599, 606 [attorneys’ fees are recoverable as costs “if, but only if” the party seeking such fees has “a legal basis, independent of the cost statutes and grounded in an agreement, statute, or other law, upon which to claim recovery of attorney fees”].) Civil Code section 5975, subdivision (c), contains a mandatory reciprocal fee shifting provision: “In an action to

enforce the governing documents, the prevailing party shall be awarded reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.”

Regardless of the title of the various causes of action or allegations, an award of attorney fees to the prevailing party is appropriate under section 5975, subdivision (c), when the gravamen of the entire complaint is to enforce the governing documents. (Rancho Mirage Country Club Homeowners Assn. v. Hazelbaker (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 252, 259-260.) Here, it is undisputed that Plaintiff’s action was brought to enforce the Association’s Master Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, Restrictions and Reservation of Easements for Wagon Wheel Canyon, a Planned Development (the “CC&Rs”).

Plaintiff commenced this action on May 6, 2024 by filing a Complaint against the Association the Homeowner Defendants. (ROA 2, 15, 18.) On February 17, 2026, Plaintiff dismissed Homeowner Defendants Tina Alinaghian-Green and Terrence Alinaghian-Green (ROA 112) as well as the Association (ROA 113). On February 26, 2026, Plaintiff dismissed Homeowner Defendants Huang Jiehao and Liu Zhenming. (ROA 114.) Plaintiff also dismissed the entire action without prejudice. (ROA 115.)

A Mandatory Settlement Conference (“MSC”) was held on April 30, 2026. (ROA 144.) Attorney Wankel, counsel for the Association, stated all active parties have settled the matter. (Id.) The basic terms of the settlement are: “Parties agree to dismiss their cross-complaints without prejudice. Terrence Alinaghian-Green and Tina Alinaghian-Green agree to pay Huang Jiehao and Liu Zhenming a total of $15,000.00. As long as Huang Jiehao and Liu Zhenming own the subject property, they will trim the trees in question every 3 months, ongoing. Parties agree to waive all attorney fees and costs, as to the Crosscomplaints.” (Id.)

The Association argues it is the prevailing party because Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed all claims against the Association without prejudice. There was no settlement reached between Plaintiff and the Association, no judgment was entered, and no injunction was issued. The Association did not pay any money to Plaintiff, did not admit any wrongdoing, and did not undertake any obligations. Plaintiff contends that he obtained substantial relief when the Association’s enforcement action against the Homeowner Defendants resulted in the trees at issue to be cut within one foot from the ground. (ROA 145 at 6:25-26.)

Plaintiff asserts that Homeowner Defendants Huang Jiehao and Liu Zhenming’s agreement to quarterly trimming was substantial relief because there had been no previous interval trimming and trimming had not been enforced. (Id. at 8:6-8.) Additionally, a non-party neighbor removed some of the trees at issue. (Id. at 9:1-6.)

Citing Heather Farms, the Association contends that prevailing party determinations are evaluated by examining which party achieved its litigation objectives as between the parties and the claims at issue. Heather Farms, however, does not place this limitation on the Court’s analysis, and California law indicates otherwise.

Because the Davis-Stirling Common Interest Development Act does not define prevailing party, courts take a pragmatic approach to determine which party prevailed by considering the extent to which each party realized its litigation objectives. (Wohlgemuth v. Caterpillar Inc. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1252, 1264.) “[I]n determining litigation success, courts should respect substance rather than