Jane Doe et al vs Cottage Health

" Conditional Dismissal During Repayment. The Parties agree that the court may conditionally dismiss this action and retain jurisdiction pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure Sec. 664.6 to enforce the terms of this Settlement Agreement." (Agreement, P. 3.)

" Default. If payments are not received in the amounts and by the dates set forth in this Settlement Agreement or if payments are received but returned for 'non-sufficient funds' or otherwise 'bounce,' then Plaintiff may immediately file a noticed motion, together with a declaration regarding such non-payment under this Settlement Agreement, for entry of judgment for the Account Balance shown in paragraph 1, less credit for any payment received under this Settlement Agreement, plus court costs associated with filing and serving this action and any application or motion to obtain judgment as provided by this Settlement Agreement, and/or any other adjustments or credits, as applicable." (Agreement, P. 5.)

" General Appearance. Defendant stipulates that his/her/its signature hereon and the filing of this Settlement Agreement shall, if Defendant has not already made his/her/its first appearance, constitute Defendant's general appearance." (Agreement, P. 7.)

The agreement is signed by counsel for plaintiff as well as by defendant.

"A settlement agreement is a contract, and the legal principles which apply to contracts generally apply to settlement contracts." (Ibid.)

"In order for acceptance of a proposal to result in the formation of a contract, the proposal " 'must be sufficiently definite, or must call for such definite terms in the acceptance, that the performance promised is reasonably certain.' " [Citation.] A proposal " 'cannot be accepted so as to form a contract unless the terms of the contract are reasonably certain. [P.] The terms of a contract are reasonably certain if they provide a basis for determining . . . the existence of a breach and for giving an appropriate remedy.' " [Citation.]

If, by contrast, a supposed " 'contract' " does not provide a basis for determining what obligations the parties have agreed to, and hence does not make possible a determination of whether those agreed obligations have been breached, there is no contract. (See, e.g., 1 Williston on Contracts (4th ed. 1990, Lord) Sec. 4:18, p. 414 ["It is a necessary requirement that an agreement, in order to be binding, must be sufficiently definite to enable the courts to give it an exact meaning."]; see also Civ.

Code Sec. 3390, subd. 5 [a contract is not specifically enforceable unless the terms are " 'sufficiently certain to make the precise act which is to be done clearly ascertainable.' "])" (Id. at pp. 811-812.)

The stipulation contains definite terms that are reasonably certain. The parties entered into an enforceable contract. Defendant defaulted by failing to make all payments and owes $2,453.24 in principal balance. Plaintiff also seeks court costs of $283.24 associated with filing and service or process. The motion will be granted.

Tentative Ruling: Jane Doe et al vs Cottage Health Tentative Ruling: Jane Doe et al vs Cottage Health Case Number 23CV03679 Case Type Civil Law & Motion Hearing Date / Time Fri, 05/22/2026 - 10:00 Nature of Proceedings Motion: Approval Tentative Ruling

On November 14, 2025, plaintiffs Laureen Clavecilla, Steve Crozier, and three other individuals whose identities are sealed due to confidentiality concerns, filed an unopposed motion for an order granting preliminary approval of a proposed Settlement Agreement and Release between plaintiffs and defendant Cottage Health.

On March 20, 2026, the court issued a minute order denying that motion, without prejudice, and continued the matter to April 24, 2026, upon plaintiffs' request to allow time for the parties to finalize an amended settlement agreement and for plaintiffs to file a revised motion for preliminary approval of any amended agreement.

On April 16, the court signed and filed an order granting a joint stipulation by the parties to continue the hearing to May 22, 2026.

The court's records show that plaintiffs have not filed any revised motion for preliminary approval of an amended settlement agreement. Therefore, the court will, at this stage of the proceedings, order the matter off-calendar, without prejudice to the filing of any future motion for preliminary approval of any amended settlement agreement that may be finalized by the parties. The Clerk of the Court is directed to give notice of the court's ruling herein.

Tentative Ruling: Jay Gill vs Falk & Blacksberg Inc et al Tentative Ruling: Jay Gill vs Falk & Blacksberg Inc et al Case Number 21CV05028 Case Type Civil Law & Motion Hearing Date / Time Fri, 05/29/2026 - 10:00 Nature of Proceedings Petition: Confirm Arbitration Tentative Ruling

For all reasons stated herein, on or before June 26, 2026, the parties shall file a joint statement that (1) attaches a true and correct copy of the judgment entered in the San Luis Obispo Superior Court action, Jay Gill v. Hysen-Johnson Ford, Inc., et al., 21CV-0728 (SLO Action), and (2) sets forth the parties' respective positions on how this judgment and the recent ruling on plaintiff's petition to vacate in the SLO Action impacts defendants' petition in this action.

The hearing on defendants' petition to confirm arbitration is continued to July 31, 2026.

Background: On December 23, 2021, plaintiff Jay Gill (Gill) initiated this action by filing a complaint against defendants Falk & Blacksberg, Inc., dba Perry Ford Mazda Santa Barbara, Falk Properties Santa Barbara, LLC, and Deborah Falk Properties Santa Barbara LLC (collectively, Defendants).

On February 8, 2022, Gill filed his operative first amended complaint (FAC) setting forth three causes of action for: (1) breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, real estate purchase agreement; (2) breach of contract, asset purchase agreement; (3) breach of good faith and fair dealing, asset purchase agreement.

As alleged in the FAC: Gill sought to enter exclusive and unique automotive markets currently occupied by Defendants in Santa Barbara and San Luis Obispo. (FAC, P.P. 1-4)

Defendants agreed to sell Gill certain automotive sales operations in these geographic areas. (Ibid.)

The deal is comprised of four agreements: (1) a real estate purchase agreement relating to the Perry Ford and Perry Mazda automobile dealerships in Santa Barbara, (2) an asset purchase agreement relating to the Perry Ford and Perry Mazda automobile dealerships in Santa Barbara (collectively, the Santa Barbara Agreements), (3) a real estate purchase agreement relating to the Perry Ford Lincoln San Luis Obispo dealership, and (4) an asset purchase agreement relating to the Perry Ford Lincoln San Luis Obispo dealership (collectively, the SLO Agreements). (Ibid.)

The Santa Barbara Agreements are at issue in this action. (FAC, P. 4)

The SLO Agreements are subject to a separate but related specific performance action filed by Gill in San Luis Obispo County Superior Court, Case No. 21CV-0728 (the SLO Action). (Ibid.)

The Santa Barbara Agreements consist of (1) Real Estate Purchase Agreement for 440 Hitchcock Way, Santa Barbara, California, dated August 20, 2021 (REPA); and (2) the Agreement for Purchase and Sale of Automobile Dealership Assets, dated August 20, 2021 (APA). (FAC, P. 5, Exs. 1-2.)

Although all conditions under the REPA and APA had been satisfied prior to the agreed upon closing date, Defendants refused to proceed with closing, thereby breaching both agreements. (FAC, P.P. 9, 10.)