Crystal Hernandez et al vs Alan Moelleken et al

Chronicle Publishing Co. (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1379, 1382.) Pence appears to seek fees related to many things that are not solely fees for the motion to strike, including a motion to quash service, to set aside default, the filing of an ex parte motion, attending other parties' hearings on motions, communications with plaintiff's counsel, etc. Pence's motion does not provide the court, or opposing counsel, with nearly enough information to assess his attorney fee request as it relates to the motion to strike.

"Although an award of attorney fees is mandatory under the anti-SLAPP statute, the amount of such fees is discretionary. See Metabolife, 213 F.Supp.2d at 1222. " 'The reasonableness of attorney fees is within the discretion of the trial court, to be determined from a consideration of such factors as the nature of the litigation, the complexity of the issues, the experience and expertise of counsel and the amount of time involved. [Citation.]' " [Citation.]. The Court must have " 'substantial evidence' " to support the fee award. [Citations.].

The party petitioning for attorneys' fees necessarily bears the burden of persuasion on the elements of that claim. [Citation.] An attorney fee award should be reduced if claimed hours are " 'excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary,' " [Citation.]. Reasonableness depends in part on " 'the success of the attorney's efforts.' " [Citation.]" (Kearney v. Foley and Lardner (S.D. Cal. 2008) 553 F.Supp.2d 1178, 1184-1185.)

" 'As the moving party, the prevailing defendant seeking fees and costs ' " 'bear[s] the burden of establishing entitlement to an award and documenting the appropriate hours expended and hourly rates.' " [Citation.] To that end, the court may require [a] defendant[] to produce records sufficient to provide " ' "a proper basis for determining how much time was spent on particular claims." ' " [Citation.] The court also may properly reduce compensation on account of any failure to maintain appropriate time records. [Citation.]" ' [Citation.] The evidence should allow the court to consider whether the case was overstaffed, how much time the attorneys spent on particular claims, and whether the hours were reasonably expended. [Citation.]' " [Citation.]" (City of Colton v. Singletary (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 751, 784.)

Pence does not produce any invoices in support of his motion, claiming that they are confidential and proprietary. While not strictly required on a motion seeking attorney fees, Pence, at the very least, is required to adequately summarize the specific tasks undertaken by each attorney and specify how much time each attorney spent on any given task. He has not done so.

The court will continue the hearing on the motion and order Pence to either produce verified billing invoices, which may be redacted to remove any truly privileged communications contained therein, or to provide a detailed summary of all activities in the preparation and filing of the Anti-SLAPP motion. Plaintiff will be given an opportunity to file an additional opposition that solely relates to the submitted invoices or detailed summary.

Finally, the court will note that it finds the hourly rates charged by Pence's attorneys to be reasonable. While the Laffey Matrix provided by Pence reflects rates for the San Francisco Bay Area, and reasonable rates need to be assessed using the prevailing hourly rate in the community for similar work (see PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095), the requested rates do align with the prevailing rates in Santa Barbara County.

Tentative Ruling: Crystal Hernandez et al vs Alan Moelleken et al

Tentative Ruling: Crystal Hernandez et al vs Alan Moelleken et al

Case Number 24CV00261

Case Type Civil Law & Motion

Hearing Date / Time Fri, 06/12/2026 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings CMC; Motion Approval

Tentative Ruling Crystal Hernandez v. Alan Moelleken, et al.

Case No. 24CV00261

Hearing Date: June 12, 2026

HEARING: Motion of Plaintiff Crystal Hernandez for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement and PAGA Settlement

ATTORNEYS: For Plaintiff Crystal Hernandez: Jonathan P. LaCour, Lisa Noveck, Jameson Evans, Amanda M. Thompson

For Defendants Carrillo Surgery Center, Inc., Central Valley Surgery Center, Inc., OSF Medical Group of California, Inc., California Medical and Surgical Management Group, Inc., and Alan Moelleken: Jeffrey A. Dinkin, Jared W. Speier, Lindsay L. Bowden, Stradling Yocca Carlson & Rauth LLP

TENTATIVE RULING: For all reasons stated herein, the motion of plaintiff Crystal Hernandez for preliminary approval of class action settlement and PAGA settlement is ordered off-calendar. Plaintiff may file a new motion supported by a full set of new supporting papers if a revised settlement is executed by the parties.

Background: On January 18, 2024, plaintiff Crystal Hernandez (Plaintiff) filed this action (Individual/PAGA Case) against defendants Carrillo Surgery Center, Inc., Central Valley Surgery Center, Inc., OSF Medical Group of California, Inc., California Medical and Surgical Management Group, Inc., and Alan Moelleken (collectively, Defendants).

The complaint sets forth 13 causes of action (COAs) for: (1) failure to pay minimum wages in violation of Labor Code sections 1194, 1194.2, and 1197, and wage order No. 5; (2) failure to furnish wage and hour statements, Labor Code sections 226 and 226.3; (3) failure to maintain payroll records, Labor Code sections 1174 and 1174.5; (4) failure to provide meal and rest period compensation, Labor Code section 226.7; (5) failure to pay overtime compensation, Labor Code section 1194; (6) failure to pay wages in a timely manner, Labor Code section 204; (7) waiting time penalties, Labor Code sections 201, 202, and 203; (8) violations of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) based on pregnancy, sex, and disability, Government Code section 12940, et seq.; (9) failure to provide reasonable accommodations in violation of Government Code section 12940 et seq.; (10) failure to engage in a good faith interactive process in violation of Government Code section 12940 et seq.; (11) FEHA violations based upon retaliation; (12) unfair competition, Business and Professions Code section 17200 et seq.; and (13) wrongful constructive termination in violation of public policy.

On March 11, 2024, Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint (FAC) which added a 14th COA for recovery of civil penalties under the Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA).

As alleged in the FAC: Plaintiff is a registered nurse who worked for Defendants to provide pre-operation and post-operation care. (FAC, P.P. 19-22.) Defendants failed to provide uninterrupted meal breaks or required rest breaks, and never paid Plaintiff the required premium pay for missed or interrupted breaks. (FAC, P.P. 23-24.) Plaintiff was required to perform unpaid, off-the-clock work. (FAC, P. 25.) On March 24, 2023, Plaintiff informed Defendants that she was pregnant. (FAC, P. 26.) Defendants failed to accommodate Plaintiff's pregnancy by rejecting reasonable work restrictions and ultimately terminating Plaintiff because of her pregnancy. (FAC, P.P. 27-45.)

On June 28, 2023, Defendants emailed Plaintiff and told her that she was no longer permitted to come into work because of Defendants' concern over patient safety. (FAC, P. 33.) Plaintiff was ultimately required to seek alternative employment. (FAC, P.P. 46-47.)

On May 29, 2025, Plaintiff filed a separate class action complaint in Santa Barbara Superior Court, case No. 24CV00261 (Class Action Case), against the same Defendants. The complaint in the Class Action Case set forth nine COAs for: (1) failure to pay minimum wages in violation of Labor Code sections 1194, 1194.2, and 1197, and wage order No. 5; (2) failure to furnish wage and hour statements, Labor Code sections 226 and 226.3; (3) failure to maintain payroll records, Labor Code sections 1174 and 1174.5; (4) failure to provide meal and rest period compensation, Labor Code section 226.7; (5) failure to pay overtime compensation, Labor Code sections 512 and 1194; (6) failure to pay wages in a timely manner, Labor Code section 204; (7) waiting time penalties, Labor Code sections 201, 202, and 203; (8) violation of Business and Professions Code section 17200, et seq.; and (9) failure to indemnify/reimburse necessary business expenditures incurred during discharge of work duties, Labor Code section 2802.

The complaint in the Class Action Case asserts similar wage and hour claims to those asserted by Plaintiff in the Individual/PAGA case. The putative class is alleged to include all persons who were employed by Defendants during the relevant time period with any similar title who were non-exempt or misclassified exempt employees subject to similar wage violations.

On July 7, 2025, the parties participated in a full-day mediation pertaining to all claims in the Individual/PAGA Case and the Class Action Case. (LaCour Decl., P. 10, Ex. A at P. 5.) All of the claims in these two actions were settled at mediation. (Ibid.) The settlement was memorialized in a memorandum of understanding dated July 7, 2025. (Ibid.) A long-form agreement was executed by the parties between July 17 and July 22, 2025 (Settlement Agreement). (LaCour Decl., Ex. A at pp. 38-39.)

On July 25, 2025, pursuant to the parties' stipulation, the court consolidated the Individual/PAGA Case and the Class Action Case for all purposes.

On November 12, 2025, Plaintiff filed a motion for preliminary approval of the Settlement Agreement.

On April 17, 2026, the court noted various substantive issues with the proposed settlement and continued Plaintiff's motion to this hearing of June 12.

On May 26, 2026, Plaintiff filed a brief in response to the issues raised in the court's April 17 minute order.

On June 1, 2026, Plaintiff submitted a declaration from counsel describing the current status of a negotiated revised settlement.

Analysis: The court has reviewed Plaintiff's May 26 and June 1 filings. It appears that the parties are currently negotiating a revised settlement agreement to address the issues raised by the court and to address other issues. Given these circumstances, the court will order this motion off-calendar. If a revised settlement is finalized and executed, Plaintiff may file a new motion with new supporting papers as to the revised settlement.

Tentative Ruling: Velocity Investments LLC vs Paul Ramirez

Tentative Ruling: Velocity Investments LLC vs Paul Ramirez

Case Number 24CV02105

Case Type Civil Law & Motion

Hearing Date / Time Fri, 05/15/2026 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings Motion: Judgment

Tentative Ruling For all reasons discussed herein, the motion to enter judgment pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6 is granted in the amount of $9,541.60. Costs are awarded in the amount of $308.95 for a total judgment of $9,850.55. The court intends on signing the proposed order and judgment submitted by plaintiff.

Background: This action commenced on April 15, 2024, by the filing of the complaint by plaintiff Velocity Investments, LLC against defendant Paul Ramirez for breach of contract and money lent, paid, or expended. By way of the complaint, plaintiff alleges that defendant borrowed money from FinWise Bank and that they purchased the debt. Plaintiff alleges that, at the time the complaint was filed, defendant owed $9,996.60.

Plaintiff and defendant settled the case by entering into a settlement agreement wherein no judgment would be entered against defendant so long as defendant paid an agreed settlement about in monthly installments. (Penuela decl., P. 4 & Exh. 1.)

The terms of the stipulation require defendant to make a minimum payment of $454.00 on or before June 18, 2024, and thereafter pay a minimum of $454.00 on or before the 18th day of each consecutive month through and including March 18, 2026, followed by a final payment, by April 18, 2026, of $8.60. (Exh. 1, P. 1.)

Under the terms of the stipulation, as of January 20, 2026, defendant should have paid $8,172.00, but plaintiff