LANDUCCI VS UCKER

In the summary proceedings on a motion to compel arbitration, “the trial court sits as a trier of fact, weighing all the affidavits, declarations, and other documentary evidence, as well as oral testimony received at the court's discretion, to reach a final determination.” (Engalla v. Permanente Medical Group, Inc. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 951, 972.)

Defendant, Airbnb, argues that this Court lacks jurisdiction to determine the scope and enforceability of the arbitration agreement based on Plaintiff, Michael’s AA with Airbnb that contains a delegation clause.

The general rule is that the courts decide disputes about arbitrability unless the parties agree to delegate the issue of arbitrability to the arbitrator. (Aanderud v. Superior Court (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 880, 891-892.)

To be effective, the language “must be clear and unmistakable” and there must be no “contract defense such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability.” (Id. at 892, 894.)

This is a heightened standard of proof. (Id. at 892.)

Here, the AA, which includes a delegation clause, provides:

22.4 Agreement to Arbitrate. You and Airbnb mutually agree that any dispute, claim or controversy arising out of or relating to these Terms of the applicability, breach, termination, validity, enforcement or interpretation

thereof, or any use of the Airbnb Platform, Host Services or any Content (collectively, “Disputes”) will be settled by binding arbitration on an individual basis (the “Arbitration Agreement”). If there is a dispute about whether this Arbitration Agreement can be enforced or applies to a Dispute, you and Airbnb agree that an arbitrator will decide that issue. (Motion, p. 3:14-18; see also, Dec. Pfeiffer ¶¶ 10-12 Ex. “E”, Terms of Service [TOS] dated 5/19/24 § 22.4, [p. 48 of 91].)

The AA also clearly references the FAA. (Id. at Dec. Pfeiffer, ¶¶ 10-12, Ex. “E”, § 22.6 [p. 48 of 91].)

Here, the subject AA shows a clear and unmistakable agreement to send the issue of arbitrability to the arbitrator.

However, “[t]he FAA does not require enforcement of an arbitration clause for “disputes unrelated to the contract in which the provision appears.” (Knight, CPG: Alternative Dispute Resolution (TRG 2026) §5:74.1 citing Mortiz v. Universal City Studios, LLC (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 238, 248; see also Banc of Calif., Nat’l Ass’n v. Sup. Ct. (N977CB Holdings, LLC) I2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 357, 369 [after claims arising from contract with delegation clause were dismissed, court, not arbitrator, must decide parties’ intent to arbitrate remaining claims based on contract without delegation clause.])

When a court is required by a valid delegation clause to refer disputes about arbitrability to an arbitrator, it has no power to decide the arbitrability issue “even if the court thinks the argument that the arbitration agreement applies to a particular dispute is “wholly groundless.”” (Moritz, supra. Id. citing, Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer & White Sales, Inc., 586 U.S. 63, 68 (2019).) (emphasis added.)

But, Schein presupposes a dispute arising out of the contract or transaction, i.e., some minimal connection between the contract and the dispute.

That is so because under the FAA, contractual arbitration clauses are “valid, irrevocable, and enforceable” if they purport to require arbitration of any “controversy thereafter arising out of such contract.” (Citations.)

Schein expressly understood that the act requires enforcement of arbitration clauses with respect to disputes “thereafter arising out of such contract.” (Citations.)

The FAA requires no enforcement of an arbitration provision with respect to disputes unrelated to the contract in which the provision appears.

Appellants’ argument that an arbitration provision creates a perpetual obligation to arbitrate any conceivable claim that Moritz might ever have against them is plainly inconsistent with the FAA’s explicit relatedness requirement. (Moritz, supra. at 348.) (emphasis added.)

In this case, there is no dispute that Plaintiff signed an AA with Airbnb.

However, the allegations in Plaintiff’s Complaint do not concern that agreement.

Plaintiff declares that he was injured on 9/13/24 when he fell due to a dangerous condition on the premises where he was staying – an unmarked, unguarded, and concealed pool catch basis consisting of a large, open hole in the walking surface. (Compl. p. 4 of 6, ¶ 2.)

In the motion, Airbnb acknowledges that the incident occurred during his visit to an Airbnb rental reserved by the Booking Guest (Teela Caldwell). (Motion, p. 1:26-27; Dec. Michael Landucci ¶¶ 2-4.)

The rental was not secured by Plaintiff through his own Airbnb account, nor was Teela acting as his agent. (Id. ¶¶ 9-14.)

Plaintiff did not pay for the reservation, did not log onto Airbnb for the reservation for the premises involved in this lawsuit. (Id. ¶¶ 5-7.)

Plaintiff’s claims arise from injuries he sustained due to a dangerous condition of property, not for breach of Airbnb’s TOS. (Id. ¶¶ 15-16.)

Moreover, Plaintiff cannot be required to arbitrate his personal injury claims, which are unrelated to his account with Airbnb. (Moritz, supra.)

Airbnb’s position that Plaintiff is required to arbitrate all disputes he has or may ever have with Airbnb even when the dispute has no nexus to his own Airbnb contract, is untenable.

In fact the TOS itself refers to “any dispute, claim or controversy arising out of or relating to these Terms”. (Motion, p. 3:14-18; see also, Dec. Pfeiffer ¶¶ 10-12 Ex. “E”, Terms of Service [TOS] dated 5/19/24 § 22.4, [p. 48 of 91].) (emphasis added.)

Defendant, Airbnb acknowledges that Plaintiff is a non-signatory to the arbitration agreement but, it argues the agreement covers Plaintiff through the principles of agency and estoppel.

However, since Plaintiff’s claim is not subject to the arbitration agreement in his Airbnb contract, as discussed above, he cannot be compelled to arbitration.

Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay Proceedings DENIED.

Case Management Conference confirmed for 7.30.26.

4. CASE # CASE NAME HEARING NAME DEMURRER ON COMPLAINT FOR WRONGFUL TERMINATION OF JOHN DOE VS WILMA AND DOE BY WILMA AND FRIEDA'S, INC., CVPS2600950 FRIEDA'S, INC. LANDMARK 99 ENTERPRISES, INC., LEVI TOPHAM, KELLY LORENE MCFALL Tentative Ruling: “The names of all parties to a civil action must be included in the complaint.” (Department of Fair Employment & Housing v. Superior Court (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 105, 109.)

This is important for two reasons.

First, there would be significant constitutional concerns if the plaintiff’s identity is not known to the defendants. (Id at 110.)

Moreover, the First Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees public access to court proceedings, which necessarily includes the right to know the identity of the parties. (Id at 110-111)

However, due to “the inherently sensitive nature of some proceedings, statutes specifically allow for keeping certain parties’ identities confidential.” (Id. at 110.)

“Even in the absence of a statute, anonymity for parties may be granted when necessary to preserve an important privacy interest.” (Id.)

Pseudonyms may be used to protect a person from harassment, injury, ridicule or personal embarrassment. (Does I thru XXIII v. Advanced Textile Corp. (2000, 9th Cir.) 214 F.3d 1058, 1067-1068.)

A plaintiff seeking to file a complaint anonymously must file it conditionally using the pseudonym and then move for an order granting permission to proceed with the pseudonym. (Department of Fair Employment & Housing, supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at 111, fn. 1.)

“If the request is granted, the initial pleading can remain. If pseudonym use is denied, the pleading must be amended to state the party’s true name.” (Ibid.)

“Before a party to a civil action can be permitted to use a pseudonym, the trial court must conduct a hearing and apply the overriding interest test: A party’s request for anonymity should be granted only if the court finds that an overriding interest will likely be prejudiced without use of a pseudonym, and that it is not feasible to protect the interest with less impact on