STROTHERS VS FORD MOTOR COMPANY

On October 20, 2026, Plaintiff filed its Motion to Substitute Plaintiff Cynthia Strothers in as Plaintiff George Strothers successor-in-interest. (Id. at ¶ 7.) In its motion Plaintiff informed Ford that Plaintiff George Strothers had passed away and requested that Plaintiff Cynthia Strother be substituted in as a plaintiff in this case. (Ibid.) Plaintiffs motion was granted on January 15, 2025. (Ibid.) During the hearing on January 15, 2025, the court also continued trial to July, 31, 2026, specifically in reference to Plaintiff Cynthia Strothers being substituted into the case and the need to conduct her deposition prior to the motion for summary judgement deadline. (Id. at ¶ 7, N, O.)

On January 15, 2026, counsel for Ford emailed Plaintiff’s counsel in an attempt to meet and confer regarding Plaintiff’s deposition. (Id. at ¶ 8, Ex. P.) On January 23, 2026, Plaintiff’s counsel emailed counsel for Ford offering for Plaintiff’s deposition to take place on March 10, 2026, March 12, 2026, or March 13, 2026. (Ibid.) On February 3, 2026, after meeting and conferring with Plaintiff’s counsel regarding Plaintiff’s availability, Ford Served a Sixth Amended Notice of Deposition for Plaintiff George Strothers to appear for deposition on March 12, 2026. (Id. at ¶ 8, Ex. Q.) That same day, Ford realized its mistake in naming the deceased Plaintiff and served a Seventh Amended Notice of Deposition for Plaintiff Cynthia Strothers to appear for deposition on March 12, 2026. (Id. at ¶ 8, Ex. R.)

On March 11, 2026, the day before Plaintiff was scheduled to appear for their mutually agreed deposition, Plaintiff’s counsel emailed counsel for Ford, informing Ford that Plaintiff would be cancelling the deposition set for March 12, 2026, due to scheduling conflicts. (Id. at ¶ 9, Ex. S.)

On March 11, 2026, Plaintiff also served an objection to Ford’s Seventh Amended Notice of Deposition stating that “[d]ue to scheduling conflicts, Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s Counsel are no longer available for the noticed date.” (Id. at ¶ 10, Ex. T.) The objection stated that Plaintiff would not appear for the set date and that Plaintiff would meet and confer with Ford to reschedule the deposition. (Ibid.) Plaintiff did not provide any alternative availability, nor did Plaintiff ever reach out on this matter. (Id. at ¶ 10.)

Additionally, Plaintiff’s counsel cancelled at least 127 (it is unclear how this is calculated but this is what the declaration says) confirmed depositions scheduled to occur between January 1, 2026, and March 27, 2026. (Id. at ¶ 11.) Included in this figure Plaintiff’s counsel cancelled at least 41 confirmed depositions scheduled to occur between March 1, 2026, and March 27, 2026. (Ibid.) Many of these cancellations occurred under the same excuse of “scheduling conflicts” and occurred at the last

minute. (Id. at ¶ 11, Exs. U, V.) It has become clear that Plaintiff’s counsel has made a habit of either offering deposition dates it had no intention on producing their clients on or intentionally overbooks its calendar knowing that their firm does not have the capacity to appear for each of the depositions it has scheduled. (Ibid.) This tactic has led to counsel for Ford wasting precious time preparing for depositions that will not take place and the need to prepare various motions to compel, similar to this one. (Ibid.)

Despite this Ford made one final attempt to meet and confer with Plaintiff’s counsel before filing the instant Motion. (Id. at ¶ 12.) On January 2, 2026, Ford’s counsel emailed Plaintiff’s counsel in an attempt to meet and confer with them regarding Plaintiff’s availability for deposition. Ford asked Plaintiff’s counsel to provide Ford with dates for Plaintiff’s deposition to occur prior to March 26, 2026, given Ford’s April 11, 2026, Motion for Summary Judgement deadline. (Id. at ¶ 12, Ex. W.) However, as of the filing of this motion, Ford has not heard back from Plaintiff. (Id. at ¶ 12.)

Defendant now moves to compel Plaintiff’s deposition and imposing monetary sanctions against Plaintiff and their attorneys of record, Strategic Legal Practices, APC, jointly and severally, in the sum of $560 as the reasonable costs and expenses, including attorney fees, incurred in obtaining the foregoing order.

This Motion is made pursuant to section 2025.450(a) of the California Code of Civil Procedure on the grounds that Plaintiff’s deposition has been properly noticed on seven occasions, including on one occasion after Plaintiff Cynthia Strothers was substituted in as a Plaintiff in this matter; Plaintiff objected to six notices on the grounds of them being unilaterally noticed and being unavailable; Plaintiff objected to their mutually agreed deposition due to a scheduling conflict; Ford has requested Plaintiff’s availability on numerous occasions, but Plaintiff has never meaningfully responded to any of Ford’s requests; and to date, Plaintiff has failed to appear for any of their properly noticed depositions. Plaintiff’s failure to appear for their deposition is a violation of their obligations under the Code, is plainly dilatory, and stands to prejudice Ford’s ability to prepare its case and bring a motion for summary judgment should it be necessary.

Ford further moves the Court pursuant to section 2023.030(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure and Rule 3.1348(a) of the California Rules of Court for an order awarding monetary sanctions against Plaintiff Cynthia Strothers and their attorneys of record, Strategic Legal Practices, APC, jointly and severally, in the amount of $560 for costs and expense in bringing this Motion on the grounds that Plaintiff has failed to submit to an authorized method of discovery without substantial justification.

In Opposition, Plaintiff contends her counsel has offered dates on two occasions. (Declaration of Tyson Smith (“Smith Decl.”), ¶¶ 6-9, Exs. C and D). Plaintiff says that she offered dates on two occasions. (Smith Decl. ¶¶ 6-9, Exs. C and D). On March 20, 2026, Plaintiff’s Counsel emailed Defendants offering new deposition dates for Plaintiff Cynthia Strothers’ deposition to take place on May 21, 2026, or May 22, 2026, to which Defendants refused to consider. (Smith Decl. ¶ 6, Ex. C). On May 27, 2026, Counsel emailed Defendants offering new deposition dates for Plaintiff Cynthia Strothers’ deposition to take place on either June 1, 2026, June 2, 2026, June 4, 2026, June 5,

2026, or June 8, 2026. (Smith Decl. ¶ 7, Ex. D). As of the date of this opposition, Plaintiff’s Counsel has received no response from Defendants. (Smith Decl. ¶ 8)

Plaintiff contends that this motion is unnecessary since Plaintiff was always willing to be deposed. Plaintiff also contends that sanctions are not appropriate because Plaintiff was always willing to be deposed; at no point in time has Plaintiff or Plaintiff’s counsel indicated that Plaintiff Cynthia Strothers was unwilling to be deposed. Plaintiff’s Counsel has offered dates on two occasions. If Defendant’s had accepted a date in May of 2026, this matter could have been resolved by now. (Smith Decl. ¶ 9).

In Reply, Defendants contend that Plaintiff never explained or justified their repeated delays to schedule a deposition, and it wasn’t until May 2026 that they offered dates. They contend that the CCP authorizes a motion to compel the deposition of Plaintiff who repeatedly failed to appear for their properly noticed deposition.

Plaintiff in their opposition does not attempt to argue that their objections were valid, only that they have offered dates of two occasions after Ford filed its motion. (See Plaintiff’s Opp. at 2:25.) To be clear, Plaintiff’s counsel first offered that Plaintiff’s deposition be taken on March 12, 2026, however Plaintiff cancelled that deposition the day before it was set to take place. (Pisciotta Decl. ¶ 10.) Then, since filing its motion, Plaintiff offered for Plaintiff’s deposition to be taken over a month after Ford’s deadline to file its motion for summary judgement. (See Plaintiff’s Opp. at 2:4- 6.) Ford has since accepted Plaintiff’s offer for their deposition to take place on June 8, 2026. However, if Plaintiff fails to appear on June 8, 2026, then Plaintiff is ordered to appear for their deposition within two weeks of the hearing on this motion.

Analysis

I. Standard

Service of a proper deposition notice obligates a party to attend and testify, and produce documents designated in the deposition notice. (CCP § 2025.280(a).) If such party deponent fails to appear or produce documents, without having served a valid objection under CCP § 2025.410, the party giving the notice may move for an order compelling the deponent’s attendance and testimony and production of documents. (CCP § 2025.450(a).) Importantly, the motion must be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Section 2016.040, or when the deponent fails to attend the deposition, by a declaration stating that the moving party has contacted the deponent to inquire about the nonappearance. (CCP § 2025.450(b)(2).)

Implicit in the requirement is that counsel make a good faith attempt to resolve the issue by rescheduling the deposition. (Leko v. Cornerstone Building Inspection Service (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th. 1109, 1124.)

Here, the parties have agreed for Plaintiff’s deposition to take place on June 8, 2026, a day before this hearing on June 9, 2026. If deposition takes place on June 8, 2026, then this motion is moot except for the issue of sanctions. If the deposition does

not take place on June 8, 2026, the Court orders the deposition to take place within two weeks of this hearing.

Sanctions. Plaintiff does not justify the delay in setting a deposition date in this matter and the Court does not find the delays were justified. Accordingly, sanctions are imposed in the amount of $560 payable within 30 days of this order.

3. CASE # CASE NAME HEARING NAME MOTION FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION ON COMPLAINT FOR BREACH OF CVRI2404704 AULLS VS FCA US, LLC. CONTRACT/WARRANTY (OVER $35,000) OF ERIC M AULLS BY FCA US, LLC. Tentative Ruling:

Moving party: Defendant FCA US LLC Responding party: Plaintiffs Eric M. Aulls and Leah V. Aulls

This is a Song-Beverly action. Plaintiffs Eric M. Aulls and Leah V. Aulls (“Plaintiffs”) allege that they leased a 2022 Jeep Wrangler Unlimited on 7/8/22, with transmission defects, engine defects, electrical defects, and brakes defects. The operative complaint, filed 8/21/24, asserts against Defendant FCA US LLC (“FCA”): (1) Civil Code §1793.2(d); (2) Civil Code §1793.2(b); (3) Civil Code §1793.2(a)(3); (4) breach of implied warranty. Trial is set for 7/10/26.

Defendant now moves for summary adjudication of the 2nd and 3rd causes of action. On the 2nd cause of action, Defendant argues that there is no evidence any repair representation was not commenced within a reasonable time or that any single repair visit exceeded 30 days. On the 3rd cause of action, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs have no evidence any repair was delayed due to a lack of replacement parts or service literature. Defendant asserts that Plaintiffs have failed to identify which specific parts or literature were withheld or not provided.

In opposition, Plaintiffs argue that Defendant’s evidence is inadmissible because it is introduced solely through the declaration of its attorney, who lacks the personal knowledge or foundation to authenticate repair orders. On the merits, Plaintiffs argue that the 2nd cause of action does not require a single 30-day repair visit, but rather a failure to repair the vehicle “so as to conform to the applicable warranties within 30 days.” (Civ. Code, § 1793.2(b).) They argue that unsuccessful repairs, or repairs that addressed one problem but introduced another defect, create a triable issue. For the 3rd cause of action, Plaintiffs argue that the court should infer a lack of sufficient literature from the dealer’s inability to “duplicate” the brake concern and the failed repairs creating new problems.