Motion to have Plaintiff declared a vexatious litigant and for pre-filing order
to the oral terms.” (Canaan Taiwanese Christian Church, supra, 211 Cal. App. 4th at 1122, FN 3; citing Elyaoudayan, supra, 104 Cal. App. 4th at 1431.) However, as stated above, the HOA has not established that the terms of the Settlement Agreement were orally agreed upon before the Court. The HOA has not cited any authority that the Court may use inherent powers to force a party to sign a settlement agreement where there is no mutual consent to all material terms. Accordingly, the Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement is denied.
The HOA requests attorney’s fees incurred in connection with the present Motion. Since the HOA has not established that Plaintiff agreed to the proposed Settlement Agreement, either in writing or orally before the Court, the Motion lacks merit. As the Motion was denied, the request for attorney’s fees is likewise denied.
2. CASE # CASE NAME HEARING NAME MOTION (VEXATIOUS LITIGANT) TO HAVE PLAINTIFF DECLARED A MEJIA VS COUNTY OF CVRI2500547 VEXATIOUS LITIGANT AND FOR RIVERSIDE PRE-FILING ORDER PROHIBITING THE FILING OF NEW CASES Tentative Ruling:
Summary of Ruling: The Court grants the motion to declare Plaintiff a vexatious litigant. The Court grants Defendant’s request for a prefiling order prohibiting Plaintiff from filing any new litigation in California courts in propria persona without leave of court.
Factual/Procedural Context
Complaint & Allegations
Plaintiff Ruben Mejia alleges that Defendant County of Riverside (the “County”), acting through its employees David Huff, Warren Chu (“Chu”), and Chief County Counsel, intentionally subordinated perjury and conspired with other agencies to deprive Plaintiff of his constitutional rights. He contends that County made defamatory statements to public defenders and private attorneys representing Plaintiff, including assertions that Plaintiff was involved in events surrounding the death of his children’s mother.
He contends that these falsehoods lead to his counsel abandoning their ethical duties and misrepresenting Plaintiff in court, which resulted in Plaintiff having to represent himself. He alleges that Chu collaborated with social workers Michelle Leflore (“Leflore”), Amanda Young (“Young”), and Plaintiff’s own family members to fabricate false allegations against Plaintiff. He argues that he has been divorced for ten years from his ex-wife, Adriana Melendez. However, County used false testimony from her during a hearing to try and establish a past history of domestic violence.
Plaintiff argues that this testimony was used to justify the wrongful removal and potential adoption of his children. The Complaint alleges that Justin Janzen was aware of his colleagues’
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malicious conduct and wrongfully filed an anti-SLAPP motion CVRI2306762 in an attempt to get one of Plaintiff’s lawsuits against the County dismissed.
There are no causes of action separately set out in the Complaint. However, the caption indicates that Plaintiff seeks claims for subordinating perjury, malicious prosecution, defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, conspiracy to deprive constitutional rights under color of law, and deprivation of constitutional rights under color of law.
On May 6, 2025, Defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion was granted, and the case was dismissed with prejudice. Plaintiff appealed the ruling, which was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on November 12, 2025 due to Plaintiff’s failure to file a brief after notice was given. Remittitur was issued on January 16, 2026.
Motion
County now moves to have Plaintiff declared a vexatious litigant and for pre-filing order prohibiting the filing of new cases pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 391 et seq, including 391.7. County asserts within the last 7 years, Plaintiff filed at least 8 lawsuits and appeals and at least 4 federal cases against various defendants that have been determined against him. County argues this more than meets the 5-case requirement to declare Plaintiff a vexatious litigant.
Plaintiff filed an opposition (the “Opposition”) to County’s motion on April 9, 2026 and a “Response to Motion to Declare Plaintiff a Vexatious Litigant” (the “Response”) on April 14, 2026. In the Opposition, Plaintiff argues the dependency proceeding is the originating event that governs all subsequent litigations. Plaintiff asserts the Court of Appeal determined the underlying dependency proceeding was affected by an abuse of discretion and ordered further evidentiary development in Case No. E087282.
Plaintiff argues the present motion “is an attempt to restrict litigation arising from a dependency proceeding that has already been found defective on appeal and that now forms the basis of active federal jurisdiction.” (Opp., pg. 5.) Plaintiff claims there is a jurisdictional conflict involving the appellate layer, federal layer, and trial court layer. (Id. at pgs. 3-4.) In Plaintiff’s Response, Plaintiff argues that a motion to declare a litigant vexatious may only be brought within a currently pending action.
Plaintiff points out that because this case has been fully dismissed, this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear this motion. Oddly, in contradiction of Plaintiff’s argument that this Court lacks jurisdiction, Plaintiff requests the Court to take judicial notice of the dismissal in this case and the opinion in the appellate case E0872821.
In reply, County generally argues Plaintiff’s opposition discusses irrelevant cases and a non-existent jurisdictional conflict, all without legal or factual support, instead of opposing the motion on the merits. County asserts Plaintiff’s Response lacks legal basis to be allowed to be filed. County points out the Court retains jurisdiction to declare an individual a vexatious litigant after the case has been dismissed, and Plaintiff does not
1 California Rules of Court, rule 3.1113(l) requires any request for judicial notice to be made in a separate
document. Plaintiff failed to comply. The Court can deny the request.
dispute or address the 8 cases that were determined adversely against him in the last 7 years.
Analysis
I. Request for Judicial Notice
County requests judicial notice of Exhibits A-O, which are court documents for various lawsuits that Plaintiff filed. The Court grants this request pursuant to Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (d).
In his Response, Plaintiff requested judicial notice of the fact this action was dismissed. Plaintiff also requests judicial notice of the opinion in appellate case E087292. However, California Rules of Court, rule 31113(l) requires any request for judicial notice to be made in a separate document. Plaintiff failed to comply. As to the fact this case was dismissed in May 2025 following the Court granting the motion for anti-SLAPP, the Court has authority to look through its own file. (See Davis v. Southern California Edison Company (2011) 236 Cal.App.4th 619, 632, fn. 11 [judicial notice of document included in appellate record is unnecessary].) The Court declines to take judicial notice. As to the opinion in appellate case E087292, the Court denies the request as irrelevant to the motion at bar.
II. Standard
Code of Civil Procedure section 391 defines a vexatious litigant as a person who, while acting in propria persona: (1) has commenced, prosecuted, or maintained at least five litigations in the preceding seven years that were finally determined adversely or remained pending without trial for at least two years; (2) repeatedly relitigates or attempts to relitigate claims or issues that were previously determined; (3) repeatedly files unmeritorious motions, pleadings, or other papers, or engaged in frivolous tactics intended to cause delay; or (4) has previously been declared a vexatious litigant by a state or federal court based on substantially similar facts. (Code Civ. Proc., § 391, subd. (b)(1)-(4).)
III. Merits
a. Jurisdiction
Plaintiff argues in Response that under Code of Civil Procedure section 391.1, this Court lacks jurisdiction to declare him a vexatious litigant because this action has already been dismissed. In reply, County points out that Plaintiff did not address this argument in Opposition but raises this claim in Response, which was not authorized by the Court to be filed. However, because County raises this argument in motion, it will be addressed.
Plaintiff’s fails to cite legal authority for his assertion that this Court lacks jurisdiction in light of the dismissal. “[E]very brief should contain a legal argument with
citation of authorities on the points made. If none is furnished on a particular point, the court may treat it as waived, and pass it without consideration.” (Sprague v. Equifax, Inc. (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 1012, 1050.) Regardless, Plaintiff is incorrect.
County’s motion is based on Code of Civil Procedure section 391.7. The Court in Pittman v. Beck Park Apartments (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 1009 specifically addresses this issue and held that “the ability to declare an individual a vexatious litigant must survive even after the action has been dismissed”. (Id. at 1024.) Thus, the Court has jurisdiction to proceed on the merits of the motion.
b. 7 Lawsuits
Here, Plaintiff has commenced, prosecuted, or maintained at least seven lawsuits in pro per that were finally determined adversely to him within the past seven years in Riverside County, to wit:
(1) CVRI2305277: filed October 5, 2023 and dismissed on May 1, 2024 with prejudice (2) CVRI2304911: filed September 19, 2023 and dismissed August 23, 2024 with prejudice (3) CVRI2500547: filed February 10, 2025 and dismissed May 6, 2025 following an order granting anti-SLAPP motion; dismissed on appeal on November 12, 2025 (E086064) (4) CVRI2305277: filed June 6, 2025 and dismissal on appeal in E083652 (5) CVRI2306762: filed December 18, 2023 and dismissed July 2, 202 with prejudice (6) CVRI2406817: filed December 13, 2024 and dismissed on August 18, 2025 following a ruling granting demurrer without leave to amend (7) CVRI2401196: filed March 6, 2024, removed to federal court on April 11, 2024, and judgment against Plaintiff on September 18, 2025. Plaintiff’s complaint was dismissed without prejudice.
(See RJN Exhs. A-O.) Based on the above, Plaintiff meets the definition of vexatious litigant under section 391, subdivision (b)(1).
Plaintiff does not dispute the foregoing cases were filed and adversely ruled against him. Rather, Plaintiff argues every case is derivative of the dependency case and is one continuous controversy. This argument is irrelevant to the determination of the instant motion and lacks merit. The record reflects a range of adverse outcomes, including not only court-ordered dismissals without prejudice and a dismissed appeal based on Plaintiff’s failure to file a brief, but also substantive summary judgment. Plaintiff offers no court orders, declarations, or other competent evidence to dispute any of the documented adverse dispositions.
Accordingly, the Court declares Plaintiff a vexatious litigation under section 391, subdivision (b)(1).
c. Pre-filing Order
A prefiling order is a second remedy that “authorizes the court to ‘enter a prefiling order which prohibits a vexatious litigant from filing any new litigation in the courts of this state in propria persona without first obtaining leave of the presiding judge of the court where the litigation is proposed to be filed.’” (Holcomb v. U.S. Bank Nat. Assn. (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1494, 1499-1500 [quoting Code of Civil Procedure section 391.7, subdivision (a)].)
County requests a prefiling order prohibiting Plaintiff from filing any new litigation. Because Plaintiff meets the definition of a vexatious litigant, a prefiling order is warranted. The Court grants the County’s request. Under section 391.7(f), the clerk of the court shall provide to the Judicial Council a copy of this prefiling order. The VL-100 Form has been signed by the Judicial Officer for that purpose.