Motion for Attorney Fees
enforce the governing documents, the prevailing party shall be awarded reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.”
Regardless of the title of the various causes of action or allegations, an award of attorney fees to the prevailing party is appropriate under section 5975, subdivision (c), when the gravamen of the entire complaint is to enforce the governing documents. (Rancho Mirage Country Club Homeowners Assn. v. Hazelbaker (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 252, 259-260.) Here, it is undisputed that Plaintiff’s action was brought to enforce the Association’s Master Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, Restrictions and Reservation of Easements for Wagon Wheel Canyon, a Planned Development (the “CC&Rs”).
Plaintiff commenced this action on May 6, 2024 by filing a Complaint against the Association the Homeowner Defendants. (ROA 2, 15, 18.) On February 17, 2026, Plaintiff dismissed Homeowner Defendants Tina Alinaghian-Green and Terrence Alinaghian-Green (ROA 112) as well as the Association (ROA 113). On February 26, 2026, Plaintiff dismissed Homeowner Defendants Huang Jiehao and Liu Zhenming. (ROA 114.) Plaintiff also dismissed the entire action without prejudice. (ROA 115.)
A Mandatory Settlement Conference (“MSC”) was held on April 30, 2026. (ROA 144.) Attorney Wankel, counsel for the Association, stated all active parties have settled the matter. (Id.) The basic terms of the settlement are: “Parties agree to dismiss their cross-complaints without prejudice. Terrence Alinaghian-Green and Tina Alinaghian-Green agree to pay Huang Jiehao and Liu Zhenming a total of $15,000.00. As long as Huang Jiehao and Liu Zhenming own the subject property, they will trim the trees in question every 3 months, ongoing. Parties agree to waive all attorney fees and costs, as to the Crosscomplaints.” (Id.)
The Association argues it is the prevailing party because Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed all claims against the Association without prejudice. There was no settlement reached between Plaintiff and the Association, no judgment was entered, and no injunction was issued. The Association did not pay any money to Plaintiff, did not admit any wrongdoing, and did not undertake any obligations. Plaintiff contends that he obtained substantial relief when the Association’s enforcement action against the Homeowner Defendants resulted in the trees at issue to be cut within one foot from the ground. (ROA 145 at 6:25-26.)
Plaintiff asserts that Homeowner Defendants Huang Jiehao and Liu Zhenming’s agreement to quarterly trimming was substantial relief because there had been no previous interval trimming and trimming had not been enforced. (Id. at 8:6-8.) Additionally, a non-party neighbor removed some of the trees at issue. (Id. at 9:1-6.)
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Citing Heather Farms, the Association contends that prevailing party determinations are evaluated by examining which party achieved its litigation objectives as between the parties and the claims at issue. Heather Farms, however, does not place this limitation on the Court’s analysis, and California law indicates otherwise.
Because the Davis-Stirling Common Interest Development Act does not define prevailing party, courts take a pragmatic approach to determine which party prevailed by considering the extent to which each party realized its litigation objectives. (Wohlgemuth v. Caterpillar Inc. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1252, 1264.) “[I]n determining litigation success, courts should respect substance rather than
form, and to this extent should be guided by ‘equitable considerations.’ ” (Hsu v. Abbara (1995) 9 Cal.4th 863, 877 [italics omitted].)
In Silver v. Boatwright Home Inspection, Inc. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 443, the Court of Appeal reiterated the principle that trial courts have discretion to base attorney fee awards on a pragmatic evaluation of the extent to which each party realized its litigation objectives. (Id. at p. 451; see also Santisas v. Goodin (1998) 17 Cal.4th 599, 622.) In Silver, the plaintiffs bought a home pursuant to a purchase agreement containing a fee provision. (Silver, supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at pp. 445–447.) The plaintiffs sued the sellers, an inspection firm, and other parties for breach of contract, negligence, fraud, and breach of fiduciary duty, asserting that they had suffered approximately $70,000 in damages. (Id. at pp. 446–448, 118 Cal.Rptr.2d 475.)
After the plaintiffs settled their claims against all the defendants except the inspection firm, they voluntarily dismissed the inspection firm. (Id. at pp. 447–448.) The inspection firm requested a contract-based fee award as the prevailing party, which the trial court denied. (Id. at p. 448.) The Court of Appeal affirmed, concluding that despite the judgment in the inspection firm’s favor, it had not prevailed, as the plaintiffs’ settlements secured most of the relief that they sought. (Id. at pp. 452–453.)
Here, Plaintiff and the Association obtained their litigation objectives. In bringing this action, Plaintiff sought, inter alia, Defendants’ compliance with the governing documents, an order: (1) mandating that Defendants cut or remove the offending trees; (2) enjoining the Homeowner Defendants from allowing the offending trees to grow past the fence height; and (3) requiring the Association to mandate compliance by the Homeowner Defendants. (ROA 2 [Complaint].) Plaintiff has obtained this relief. (ROA 145; see also ROA 144.) Plaintiff also received $10,000.00 from the Alinaghian-Green Homeowner Defendants. (ROA 145.) For its part, the Association settled with the Homeowner Defendants and was voluntarily dismissed by Plaintiff. (See ROA 113 and ROA 144.)
Moreover, a conclusion that Plaintiff and the Association realized their litigation objectives encourages the public policy of settlement of cases. It is wellestablished that settlements are “highly favored as productive of peace and good will in the community, and reducing the expense and persistency of litigation.” (McClure v. McClure (1893) 100 Cal. 339, 343.) An award of attorney fees under the circumstances could increase the likelihood of litigation solely to establish a prevailing party.
Moving party to give notice.
58 Joslin vs. Fidelity National Law Group
24-01440293 Demurrer to Amended Complaint & Motion to Strike Portions of Complaint
Defendants, Commonwealth Land Title Insurance Company (erroneously named and served as Fidelity National Law Group) (“CLTIC”) and Brian Edwards (“Edwards”) (collectively, “Defendants”)’s demurrer to Plaintiff Jeff A. Joslin’s (“Plaintiff”) First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) is OVERRULED.
Defendants’ motion to strike is GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND as to the punitive damages allegations and request for punitive damages, and DENIED in all other respects.
Defendants’ request for judicial notice of the documents filed in Third Laguna Hills Mutual v. Michael Cohen, et al. (OC Case No. 30-2017-00957937-CU-CO-
NJC), is GRANTED, but as to the existence and legal effect of the orders, finding and judgment entered, and not to the truth of any factual matters asserted therein. (Fremont Indemnity Co. v. Fremont Gen. Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 113.)
1. Demurrer
First Cause of Action for Breach of Fiduciary Duty:
“[A] breach of fiduciary duty is a species of tort distinct from a cause of action for professional negligence.” (Slovensky v. Friedman (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1518, 1534.) The elements of a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty are the existence of a fiduciary relationship, its breach and damage caused by that breach. (Meister v. Mensinger (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 381, 395.)
“The attorney-client relationship is a fiduciary relation of the very highest character imposing on the attorney a duty to communicate to the client whatever information the attorney has or may acquire in relation to the subject matter of the transaction. [Citations.]” (Beery v. State Bar (1987) 43 Cal.3d 802, 813.) “An attorney owes all clients . . . duties of undivided loyalty and diligence, among other fiduciary duties.” (White Mountains Reinsurance Co. of America v. Borton Petrini, LLP (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 890, 902.)
A client’s unilateral right to control the outcome of the client’s case includes the “right to settle or refuse to settle a claim.” (Matter of Guzman (Rev.Dept. 2014) 5 Cal. State Bar Ct.Rptr. 308, 314; see CRPC 1.2(a); Amjadi v. Brown (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 383, 388-389—attorney’s settlement of case over client’s objection was voidable by client, and clause in retainer agreement giving attorney “sole discretion” to evaluate and accept settlement offer was void.)
The FAC alleges the existence of an attorney-client relationship giving rise to fiduciary duties of loyalty, disclosure, communication, and avoidance of conflicts of interest. (FAC, ¶¶ 7-9.) The FAC further alleges that Defendants breached those duties by failing to disclose conflicts of interest, concealing material information and communications, attempting to force Plaintiff to accept a settlement contrary to his express instructions, and executing and concealing a purported settlement agreement without Plaintiff’s knowledge or consent. (FAC, ¶¶ 10-16.)
These allegations concern breaches of duties of loyalty, disclosure, and conflict-free representation, rather than merely the quality of Defendants’ legal services, and are sufficient to support a claim for breach of fiduciary duty. Plaintiff further alleges that, as a result of Defendants’ unauthorized settlementrelated conduct and concealment of material information, he lost the ability to recover attorney’s fees and litigation costs, incurred additional legal expenses, suffered reputational and business harm, and jeopardized a potential malicious prosecution claim. (FAC, ¶¶ 17(A)-(E), 18.)
Defendants argue that the FAC fails to adequately allege breach, causation, or damages because judicially noticeable records purportedly establish that the dismissal of the underlying complaint was unilateral and that counsel’s signature was not required to effectuate the dismissal. However, Plaintiff’s claim is not based solely on the dismissal itself. Rather, the FAC alleges that Defendants entered into and concealed an unauthorized settlement-related agreement without Plaintiff’s knowledge, consent, or authorization, despite his express instructions not to settle the case. (FAC, ¶¶ 10, 15-17.)