SALAS-SANTACRUZ vs UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY, et al.

Although not directly on point, for purposes of considering Plaintiff’s standing, Plaintiff’s position appeared to be similar to an “unpaid intern,” which the Legislature considered to be 22CV022013: SALAS-SANTACRUZ vs UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY, et al. 06/12/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment filed by The Regents of the University of California (Defendant) CRS# A-22013-015 in Department 520 protected under FEHA in addition to traditional employees. (Stats. 2014, ch. 302, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 2015; see Hirst v. City of Oceanside (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 774, 791, 187 Cal.Rptr.3d 119 [discussing legislative history].) (Walton v. Victor Valley Community College Dist. (2026) 119 Cal.App.5th 1164, 1172, as modified on denial of reh'g (Apr. 14, 2026), review filed (May 26, 2026).)

As a doctoral student with Defendant’s Graduate School of Education, Plaintiff was in a position akin to the plaintiff in Walton who was a “postsecondary nursing student . . . doing a clinical rotation at a hospital" and allegedly sexually harassed by her nursing program director during one of her clinical rotations. (Ibid.) In other words, Plaintiff’s “student status does not deprive [them] of FEHA protection.” (Ibid.) Defendant does not challenge this point except to argue that Plaintiff has not sufficiently connected the harassment and discrimination they allege they experienced to their work (as opposed to as a student.) However, the Court is more persuaded by Plaintiff’s argument that their work as a student and as an employee "are by definition highly intertwined.” (Oppo., p. 20:4-5.)

First/ Second Causes of Action: Retaliation/ Hostile Work Environment

Summary adjudication is granted as to the first cause of action for retaliation. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).)

Plaintiff alleges that there was a causal connection between “protected activity” they engaged in (including their internal complaints to the Office for the Prevention of Harassment and Discrimination (“OPHD”) and filing their administrative complaint with the CRD) and any adverse employment actions taken against them, including "being isolated [summer or in or around May 2016], marginalized in publication [2018-2022], and subjected to dehumanizing slurs [Spring of 2017 and 2019], Omi had to find a new advisor [May 2017], then petition for a second new advisor [Fall 2019], and ultimately had to petition the Office of the President directly to bypass the departmental nomination gatekeeping [2021][.]” (See UMF 44; Yanowitz v. L'Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028, 1042; Gov. Code § 12940(h).)

Although close proximity in time between protected activity and the adverse action is one way to demonstrate a causal link, such a link may also be inferred from direct or other circumstantial evidence of a retaliatory motive. Here, there does not appear to be a causal connection between the complaints made in October 2018 (UMFs 22-25) and 2022 (FAC, Ex. A), which allegedly expressly concern “instances of misgendering and other negative experiences based on their gender identity,” and the alleged retaliation (citing to portions of the Chan Declaration, which does not appear to be filed).

Defendant has demonstrated that Plaintiff is unable to establish causation. Plaintiff fails to demonstrate a triable issue of fact as to whether they were retaliated against in the above

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

22CV022013: SALAS-SANTACRUZ vs UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY, et al. 06/12/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment filed by The Regents of the University of California (Defendant) CRS# A-22013-015 in Department 520 manner because of their complaints. Plaintiff submits no evidence, for example, to demonstrate that OPHD shared the confidential July 6, 2021 Notice of Outcome or report to “multiple professors and administrators,” presumably including beyond just the “University” and the College of Education (UMF 176) to include specific individuals such as Lupe Gallegos, who removed Plaintiff from the Latino graduation listserv and from sign-up notifications (AMFs 167- 168) and Dan Perlstein who was adversarial and at times transphobic (AMF 186) who allegedly then engaged in retaliation against them. (AMF 147.)

As to the second cause of action, “[t]he FEHA makes it an unlawful employment practice for an employer to harass an employee because of the employee's ‘sex, gender, gender identity, gender expression, [or] sexual orientation.’ (§ 12940, subd. (j)(1).)” (Taylor v. Nabors Drilling USA, LP (2014) 222 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1235-36.) A claim for hostile work environment harassment arises “when a workplace is ‘permeated with “discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult” [citation] that is “sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment”....’ ” (Jones v. Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1367, 1377.)

“The working environment must be evaluated in light of the totality of the circumstances: ‘[W]hether an environment is “hostile” or “abusive” can be determined only by looking at all the circumstances. These may include the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance.’ ” (Lewis v. City of Bencia (2014) “[T]he conduct must be both objectively and subjectively offensive[.]” (Jones, supra, 152 Cal.App.4th at p. 1377.)

Defendant argues that Plaintiff is unable to establish any gender identity-based harassment that they faced or that the conduct was sufficiently severe and pervasive. Plaintiff accused Professor Patricia Baquedano-López of harassing behavior by dehumanizing them, “making fun of Plaintiff in front of their students; and sending Plaintiff to the center at really random hours when it’s not even open.”[BC1.1] (AMF 81, citing to Salas-SantaCruz Depo. Vol. II, 207:22-25, 208-19-22.) However, Plaintiff fails to articulate how this conduct is based on or because of “people [or a person] identifying as non-binary.” (FAC, ¶ 51.)

Plaintiff also fails to identify any alleged harassing conduct after the first complaint. In addition, it appears that, before the OPHD report came out in 2018, Baquedano-López was replaced as Plaintiff’s advisor by the second advisor, Professor Michael Dumas. (UMFs 17, 32, AMFs 109, 186.)

In Opposition, Plaintiff, without specific citation to direct supporting evidence, argues, for example, that they faced harassment in the form of, among others, receiving "sub-par" recommendation letters from faculty after their complaint(s). (AMF 104, citing to announcement emails in which they received a Ford Foundation Predoctoral 2016 “honorable mention”.) However, with this example, 2016 predates any complaints Plaintiff made. Thus, even if writing recommendation letters may fall within the scope of the job duties for Defendant's employees,

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

22CV022013: SALAS-SANTACRUZ vs UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY, et al. 06/12/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment filed by The Regents of the University of California (Defendant) CRS# A-22013-015 in Department 520 this conduct (based on the 2016 honorable mention) cannot constitute conduct that establishes a claim for harassment.

Plaintiff's claims, in the aggregate, also fail to establish sufficient severity or a pervasiveness. Even if the various alleged work-related decisions are considered within the totality of the circumstances, Plaintiff identifies various incidents occurring, for example, in 2017, 2019 (Professor Perlstein, AMF 186), and 2022 (AMF 174), roughly five years apart. “The requirement that the conduct be sufficiently severe or pervasive to create a working environment a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive is a crucial limitation that prevents sexual harassment law from being expanded into a ‘general civility code.’ ” (Jones, supra, 152 Cal.App.4th at p. 1377; FAC, ¶ 29.)

Defendant's motion for summary adjudication as to Plaintiff's second cause of action is granted.

Third Cause of Action: Failure to Prevent Discrimination and Harassment

In light of this being a derivative cause of action of the first and second causes of action, summary adjudication is granted as to the third cause of action for failure to prevent discrimination and harassment. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).)

Fifth Cause of Action: Gender Discrimination

As Defendant points out, Plaintiff appears to fail to meaningfully address Defendant’s arguments as to the fifth cause of action in their Opposition - or, at most, encompasses any opposition within the general arguments related to harassment and retaliation. The Court therefore interprets Plaintiff’s apparent lack of Opposition as a concession to the arguments raised by opposing counsel.

Summary adjudication is GRANTED as to the fifth cause of action.

OBJECTIONS TO EVIDENCE

The Court did not rely on the Alvaro Soria Declaration and therefore does not rule on Plaintiff’s objections to portions of it.

The original Winifred Chan Declaration is not filed so the Court cannot rule on objections thereto.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

22CV022013: SALAS-SANTACRUZ vs UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY, et al. 06/12/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment filed by The Regents of the University of California (Defendant) CRS# A-22013-015 in Department 520

Notwithstanding the late filing of Defendant’s Reply, it shall be considered, although all parties must comply with all local rules, California rules of Court and statutory requirements.

Defendant’s objections to portions of the David Ratner and Omi Salas-Santacruz Declarations are overruled.

NOTICE: This tentative ruling will automatically become the court’s final order on June 12, 2026 unless, by no later than 4:00 P.M. on June 11, 2026, a party to the action notifies BOTH: 1) the court by emailing Dept520@alameda.courts.ca.gov; AND 2) all opposing counsel or selfrepresented parties (by telephone or email) that the party is contesting this tentative ruling.

The subject line (RE:) of the email must state: “Request for CONTESTED HEARING: [the case name], [number].” When a party emails to contest a tentative ruling, the party must identify the specific holding(s) within the ruling they wish to contest via oral argument.

The court does not provide court reporters for hearings in civil departments. A party who wants a record of the proceedings must engage a private court reporter. (Local Rule 3.95.) Any privately retained court reporter must also participate via video conference. Their email must be provided to the court at the time the Notice of Contest is emailed.

ALL CONTESTED LAW AND MOTION HEARINGS ARE CONDUCTED VIA REMOTE VIDEO unless an in person appearance is required by the court. Invitations to participate in the video proceeding will be sent by the court upon receipt of timely notice of contest. A party may give email notice that they will appear in court in person for the hearing, however all other counsel/parties and the JUDGE MAY APPEAR REMOTELY.