Jane Doe vs. Dignity Health

A Stipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) is required to be signed by each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the hearing, if not using a reporter from the Court’s Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list. Once the form is signed it must be filed with the clerk. If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away.

Once approved, the clerk will be forward the form

34-2021-00292375-CU-PO-GDS: Jane Doe vs. Dignity Health 08/14/2025 Hearing on Motion to Compel Regarding February 18, 2025 Deposition of Defendant Dignity Health's Person Most Qualified re: Gregory Harms in Department 53

to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided.

TENTATIVE RULING: The notice of motion does not provide notice of the Court’s tentative ruling system, as required by Local Rule 1.06. Moving counsel is directed to contact opposing counsel and advise him/her of Local Rule 1.06 and the Court’s tentative ruling procedure and the manner to request a hearing. If moving counsel is unable to contact opposing counsel prior to the hearing, moving counsel is ordered to appear at the hearing in person, by Zoom or by telephone.

The notice of motion does not comply with Code of Civil Procedure §1010 or CRC Rule 3.1110(a), requiring the moving party to state the grounds for the motion presented.

Moving counsel failed to comply with CRC Rule 3.1110(b)(4).

Plaintiff’s motion to compel the deposition of defendant Dignity Health’s (“DH”) person most qualified (“PMQ”) re: Gregory Harms is ruled upon as follows.

Factual Background

In this action, plaintiff seeks to recover damages resulting from a sexual assault allegedly committed by now-dismissed defendant Gregory Harms in December 2016, when the latter was a nurse employed by defendant DH. In her complaint, plaintiff alleges inter alia that defendant Dignity Health negligently hired, supervised and/or retained defendant Harms. Trial is currently set for 2/23/2026.

In 2021, Harms was convicted of the rape of two other women, one in 2011 while he was employed by Kaiser and the other in 2019 while he was employed by Vibra Hospital of Sacramento, but he was not convicted of raping plaintiff in 2016. Harms is currently appealing the convictions.

On 2/7/2025, plaintiff served a Second Amended Notice of Deposition of defendant DH’s PMQ on 30 different topics all of which relate to defendant Harms, along with 32 different requests for production of documents relating to defendant Harms. The PMQ deposition was noticed for 2/18/2025 and on 2/11/2025, DH timely served written objections to the deposition notice, not only to the 30 different topics but also the accompanying requests for production. Nevertheless, DH agreed to produce witnesses on several of the specified topics and the deposition commenced on 2/18/2025 but was ultimately suspended.

Moving Papers. Plaintiff states that the deposition was “contentious and unproductive,”

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

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with DH objecting “to every single proposed category of testimony” and “not produc[ing] a witness to any of the noticed categories without qualification.” Relying on “what Plaintiff contends is a narrow misreading of a prior order of the Court, [DH] insisted that no questions could be asked outside of the subject of actual prior complaints of sexual misconduct by Harms, a boundary so narrow as to largely prohibit Plaintiff from conducting any discovery at all into the central issues in the case.” According to plaintiff, “the witness was also prevented from testifying outside of prior first-hand knowledge, which frustrated the basic purpose of a person-most-qualified deposition” and “the witness was often simply not knowledgeable about the noticed categories.” Plaintiff concedes DH has “offered to reconvene the depositions with additional witnesses subject to various unilaterally-asserted qualifications and restrictions, Plaintiff believes that the Court should rule on the disputed objections before the parties attempt to proceed any further.” In the end, plaintiff moves to compel DH’s PMQ testimony relating to topic Nos. 1-25 and 29 as well as the documents responsive to requests for production Nos. 1, 3-19 and 26-31 and to have this Court “overrule the objections of [DH] as to these areas of inquiry, order the production of the requested documents, and order that the deposition be reconvened at the expense of the party being deposed.”

Opposition. Defendant DH opposes, conceding that “it is difficult to easily synthesize the discovery dispute before this Court” but identifying a threshold dispute over whether DH is required to produce a single PMQ “to discuss numerous areas of inquiry or categories of documents when there are multiple PMQs with personal knowledge of some, but not all topics/documents designated in the voluminous notice.” DH adds that there is also a dispute about whether plaintiff can compel an employer to produce irrelevant information which “constitutionally protected under an employee’s right to privacy” as well as whether “plaintiff can ignore repeated defense efforts to offer up competent individuals as PMQs for deposition, ignore numerous meet and confer letters, then move forward with a plan that frustrates the deposition in order to take a second bite at a previously failed discovery motion.” In the end, despite plaintiff’s “unorthodox approach,” DH’s “efforts to complete appropriate discovery have been genuine and designed to deliver competent witnesses to discuss discoverable, relevant, and admissible evidence about this lawsuit” and thus, plaintiff’s motion to compel should be denied.

Reply. Plaintiff characterizes the opposition as a disingenuous attempt to avoid the primary thrust of this motion, which is to determine what DH knew about Mr. Harms before he assaulted plaintiff, in order “to obscure [DH’s own] campaign to obstruct discovery as to information of central importance.” Because plaintiff’s efforts to elicit whether DH knew or should have known Harms was unfit to be employed, whether he was negligently hired or supervised, and whether DH falsely represented he not have a history of misconduct and complaints were “largely frustrated by the objections

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interposed by [DH’s] counsel,” these objections should be overruled and the deposition reconvened at the expense of DH. The reply proceeds to address several issues raised by the opposition from DH.

Discussion

At the outset, the Court reminds the parties that given the number of motions such as this which must be addressed on a daily basis, there are simply not enough judicial resources available to resolve each and every discovery dispute that could have and should have been resolved informally. This serves to highlight the critical need for all counsel’s legitimate, reasonable and good faith meet-and-confer efforts before filing any discovery motion. Although it dealt with a motion to compel answers to deposition questions, the decision of Townsend v.

Superior Court (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 1431 is instructive in that it clarifies that the meet-and-confer process is not intended to be some perfunctory formality but rather it “requires a serious effort at negotiation and informal resolution.” (Id., at 1438.) Indeed, Code of Civil Procedure §2016.040 specifies that a meet-and-confer declaration which is required for most discovery motions “shall state facts showing a reasonable and good faith attempt at an informal resolution of each issue presented by the motion.” (Underline added for emphasis.)

The Court has carefully reviewed and considered the parties’ respective papers, including the various letters and emails previously exchanged, and finds that the parties have not sufficiently met-and-conferred in an attempt to resolve the variety of issues presented by this motion. Thus, notwithstanding plaintiff’s stated preference to have this Court now rule on all of “the disputed objections” despite DH’s offer to reconvene the PMQ deposition, the hearing on this motion shall be continued in order to permit the parties to resume their meet-and-confer efforts.

These efforts shall be made either in person or by telephone (rather than by exchange of letters and/or emails) in an attempt to resolve without further judicial intervention their dispute relating to this PMQ deposition. The purpose of requiring “in person” or “telephone” meet-and-confer sessions is to maximize the prospects for resolution of disputes by fostering an open dialogue which is not constrained by the mere exchange of letters and/or emails.

In an effort to aid the parties’ further meet-and-confer efforts in person or by telephone, this Court provides the following guidance.

First, as a reminder, the standard for discovery in California is quite broad. “[A]ny party may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action or to the determination of any motion made in that action, if the matter either is itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” (Code Civ. Proc.

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§2017.010.) “In the absence of contrary court order, a civil litigant’s right to discovery is broad...[and] statutes governing discovery ‘must be construed liberally in favor of disclosure unless the request is clearly improper by virtue of well-established causes for denial.’ [Citation.]” (Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 541; see also Greyhound Corp. v. Superior Court (1961) 56 Cal.2d 355, 378 [“disclosure is a matter of right unless statutory or public policy considerations clearly prohibit it”].) Nevertheless, while civil discovery is broad, it is not limitless. (Board of Registered Nursing v. Superior Court (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 1011, 1039 [citing Calcor Space Facility v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 223].)

Confirming the existence of the limitation on this otherwise broad standard for discovery is the Court’s 8/13/2024 ruling on plaintiff’s prior motion to compel defendant DH’s further responses to requests for production, set two, which ruling was discussed at length in both the moving and opposing papers and which appears to have created undue confusion that has culminated in the present motion to compel. While the 2024 ruling includes legal analysis which should provide the parties with information useful to their soon-to-be resumed meet-and-confer efforts, the Court must reject DH’s overly broad suggestion that plaintiff “cannot use a PMQ deposition to sidestep” this 8/13/2024 order.

The 8/13/2024 ruling addressed a specific set of requests for production and in part turned on plaintiff’s failure to timely move to compel DH’s further responses to a prior set of requests. Moreover, while the Court also determined that a number of documents sought by plaintiff fell within the scope of Harms’ personnel file and therefore fell within his constitutional right to privacy, the Court specifically pointed out that plaintiff had failed to make the heightened showing necessary to obtain the production of such private records.

Among other things, the Court found that plaintiff had failed to establish that the information sought “cannot reasonably be obtained through depositions or from nonconfidential sources” (underline added for emphasis), which amounted to an implicit indication that plaintiff could and should seek such information through other less intrusive forms of discovery including depositions. In this way, plaintiff’s notice of this PMQ deposition re: Harms was likely to follow and thus, DH’s blanket suggestion that this PMQ deposition is somehow precluded by the 8/13/2024 order does not withstand scrutiny.

That said, to the extent plaintiff’s deposition notice for DH’s PMQ re: Harms includes among its 32 separate requests for production a request for DH’s PMQ to produce Harms’ “complete personnel file” (see, Sec. Am. PMQ Depo. Not., p.9:27-28) and/or other subsets of documents which are fairly construed as being part of Harms’ personnel file, the moving papers’ request that this Court now “order the production of [all] requested documents” (Not. of Mot., p.1:9) is in effect premature and improper since DH has again timely asserted objections based on Harms’ privacy rights and since plaintiff has not yet established that the information actually sought cannot be

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obtained through other less intrusive forms of discovery including depositions. After all, this motion is currently seeking to compel the very PMQ deposition which must be completed before this Court could consider finding that such less intrusive means of discovery have been exhausted. In this regard, it appears that several of the 32 requests the production included in plaintiff’s deposition notice are substantively indistinguishable from several of the requests for production which were specifically addressed in the Court’s 8/13/2024 ruling and which the Court found were not subject to discovery unless and until plaintiff has made the heightened showing needed to overcome privacy protections including but not limited to inability to obtain the information through other less intrusive forms of discovery including depositions. (8/13/2024 Ruling re RFP Nos. 69, 71, 85-104.)

Thus, plaintiff’s request for this Court to compel the production of all documents responsive to the 32 categories of documents sought in the PMQ deposition notice prior to her accepting DH’s offer to reconvene the PMQ deposition is essentially putting the proverbial cart before the horse. But the Court adds here that there may other documents responsive to the PMQ deposition notice which plaintiff is currently entitled to have during the deposition including those to which no objection has been asserted, and DH is expected to provide those so that they may be used during the course of the deposition to the extent plaintiff so desires.

Additionally, while plaintiff generally remains free to specify the individual topics on which PMQ testimony is sought, the reality is that a poorly-worded topic for testimony is not likely to be helpful to DH’s obligation to identify and produce a PMQ and is not likely to lead to a productive deposition session. Accordingly, plaintiff bears an initial obligation to clearly identify each particular topic on which testimony is sought and in the absence of a valid objection, DH then bears a burden of finding those individuals who are most qualified to address those subjects.

To the extent there is any uncertainty, DH should promptly reach out to plaintiff in an attempt at resolving such uncertainty or ambiguity and it appears that DH, to its credit, did just on several occasions in advance of the deposition session on 2/18/2025. However, the Court has reviewed the 26 different topics for PMQ testimony identified in the moving papers (i.e., topic Nos. 1-25, 29) and find that many remain unreasonably uncertain and unless and until further clarified, are likely to lead to ongoing disputes and additional motions.

For instance, the first 10 topics in plaintiff’s PMQ deposition notice seek testimony on the following:

1. DH’s hiring of Harms; 2. Harms’ application(s) for employment with DH; 3. Employment reference(s) provided to DH by Harms; 4. The reference check(s) performed by DH related to Harms; 5. DH’s retention of Harms, including the position(s) and role(s) he held.

6. The promotion(s) or demotion(s) Harms received while employed by DH; 7. All trainings DH provided to Harms during his employment;

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8. DH’s supervision of Harms during his employment; 9. All complaint(s) or concern(s) related to Harms which DH received prior to plaintiff’s assault; and 10. All complaint(s) or concern(s) related to Harms which DH received after plaintiff’s assault.

Aside from the fact that these 10 topics could be reasonably distilled down to just three (3) (i.e., the hiring of Harms (Nos. 1-4); his employment history (Nos. 5-8); and complaint(s)/concern(s) about Harms (Nos. 9-10)), it remains unclear to the Court what type of information plaintiff is actually seeking relating to the “hiring” of Harms, his employments application(s), his references and the reference checks which DH performed. Of course, as explained above, these topics cannot be used by plaintiff to obtain here the very documents in Harms’ personnel file which the Court has already determined are protected under his constitutional rights of privacy.

Moreover, topic Nos. 9-10 as well as Nos. 13-15, 19, 21 and 23 each appear to be premised on the existence of some “complaint(s) or concern(s)” and “documents or information” but DH’s objection to the PMQ deposition notice states that despite its diligent search and reasonably inquiry, no such matters have been found to exist. As such, it stands to reason that DH cannot produce a PMQ on such topics regardless of any asserted objections. Also problematic are PMQ topic Nos. 21, 22 and 29, which by their own terms seek testimony relating “any and all documents or information” or “reports,” but without plaintiff first identifying the specific “documents,” “information” or “reports” she wants testimony on, DH is forced to speculate on what plaintiff seeks and makes finding the PMQ virtually impossible.

These are just a few examples of shortcomings which the Court currently sees in plaintiff’s PMQ deposition notice and which likely contributed unnecessarily to the perceived justification for the present motion.

To the extent DH has identified and agreed to produce its PMQ on some of the 30 topics, plaintiff is permitted to question such witness on the relevant topic(s) and any attempt by DH to use the 8/13/2024 ruling on plaintiff’s requests for production, set two, as a basis to categorically limit the PMQ testimony would appear improper and unjustified for the reasons already explained. In short, while plaintiff may not be presently entitled to the actual documents contained in Harms’ personnel file, she is entitled to explore through deposition the information which may be contained therein so long as it is reasonably relevant to this case and otherwise discoverable, as was implied by the 8/13/2024 order.

Insofar as the present motion appears to argue that DH has asserted improper objections in response to particular questions which were put to the PMQ produced on 2/18/2025 and in some instances instructed the witness not to answer (see, e.g., Mov. MPA, p.3:17-18; p.10:5-p.11:9; p.12:1-27), a motion pursuant to Code of Civil

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Procedure §2025.480 to compel answers to those specific questions is required, along with a separate statement setting forth the exact questions and objections which are claimed to be improper (CRC Rule 3.1345(a)(4) and a certified copy of the relevant portions of the deposition transcript (Code Civ. Proc. §2025.480(h)), but plaintiff failed to do this here. Nevertheless, the Court has briefly reviewed the PMQ deposition excerpts included with the moving papers and is unable to conclude that all of DH’s objections and/or instructions not to answer were entirely improper given their context and had the parties engaged in a more serious meet-and-confer efforts, many of these issues could have and should have been resolved informally.

The Court adds that although the Notice of Motion cites Code of Civil Procedure §2025.480 in the caption and the body, the present motion otherwise appears to be a motion to compel deposition pursuant to §2025.450, which statute governs the situation where a party fails to appear for deposition without having served a valid objection. Indeed, the moving separate statement is effectively limited to a discussion about why plaintiff believes DH’s written objections to the PMQ deposition notice and the requests for production therein are inadequate, even though DH’s objections included a statement that a PMQ would be produced a number of the 30 topics identified by plaintiff.

Therefore, based on the present record, it does not appear that that DH actually failed to respond to plaintiff’s PMQ deposition notice or did so without having served a valid objection and several meet-and-confer confirm DH’s efforts to coordinate this and other PMQ depositions. This simply reinforces the Court’s belief that further meet-and-confer efforts are necessary at this juncture.

The Court notes the opposition’s claim that DH is not obligated to produce a single PMQ on all of the various individual topics included in plaintiff’s deposition notice. (Opp., p.7:2-p.8:10.) Although it is not clear that plaintiff actually contends otherwise, the Court finds the plain language of Code of Civil Procedure §2025.230 authorizes DH to produce different individuals on each of the numerous different PMQ topics identified in plaintiff’s deposition notice provided, of course, that DH has in good faith determined those individuals to be the PMQ on each of those topics.

Indeed, given the broad array of PMQ topics specified in plaintiff’s deposition notice, it would be unlikely that a single individual would be fairly characterized as the PMQ on all 30 topics. However, as several of the PMQ topics overlap with others, it would be reasonable to expect DH to produce a single individual to testify as the PMQ on a handful of the topics listed by plaintiff. According to the deposition transcript attached to the moving papers, the only individual produced for deposition on 2/18/2025 was Ms.

Weeden but it is readily apparent she was not being produced as the PMQ on all 30 topics specified in the deposition notice (see, e.g., Balogh Decl., Ex. J (2/14/2025 letter), p.4 [stating Ms. Weeden designated for testimony on topic Nos. 9-10, 13-17, 19-23, 29]) and for this reason as well, the Court is not persuaded that DH actually failed to respond to plaintiff’s PMQ deposition notice or did so without having served a valid objection.

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Thus, the Court is unable to determine from the present record if any other individual was to be produced for deposition on the same date as the PMQ on any of the remaining topics set forth in the deposition notice, so as to justify an order compelling DH to appear for deposition as sought by the present motion.

DH is also not obligated to contact former agents or employees and produce them as a PMQ on any topic but it certainly remains free to do so, if it chooses. Similarly, while DH is free to disclose to plaintiff in advance of the deposition the identity of the individual(s) being produced on one or more PMQ topics, it is not obliged to do so. Instead, all that is required is for the individual PMQ to be produced for questioning at the agreed upon time and location. To the extent DH has in the past requested that after it has identified a PMQ by name, plaintiff “send an amendment to [the deposition] notices and simply identify the name, place, and time of the individual PMQ ” (see, e.g., Balogh Decl., Ex. J (2/14/2025 letter)), plaintiff not required to do so but she clearly may (and should) do so to the extent this was previously agreed upon.

The Court adds that since plaintiff has clearly noticed pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure §2025.230 the deposition DH’s PMQ on the identified topics, the testimony to be provided by the various individuals DH ultimately designates is not properly limited to their own personal, first-hand knowledge on the particular topic or in response to a particular question (provided, of course, the question reasonably falls within the scope of the topic for which that individual has been designated as PMQ).

Indeed, according to §2025.230, DH is effectively obligated to produce those individuals “who are most qualified to testify on its behalf as to those matters to the extent of any information known or reasonably available to the deponent.” (Underline added for emphasis.) In short, plaintiff is entitled to explore the extent of the PMQ’s knowledge on a specific topic regardless of whether the PMQ obtained the responsive information from any other individual (aside from DH’s counsel), from any other document, and/or from any other source.

Still, while it is true that a PMQ’s testimony is not limited to his/her own personal knowledge, it is incumbent upon plaintiff to clearly delineate the topics on which testimony is sought so that the PMQ has a reasonable opportunity to obtain from other sources the array of information that is actually sought.

The Court acknowledges that DH has concerns about its PMQ providing “inaccurate deposition testimony based on hearsay, faulty memorization, etc.” (Opp., p.8:5-6), but these do not appear to be valid grounds for precluding or limiting the witnesses’ testimony on the various topics. If they were, few depositions would ever be completed.

The preceding discussion should confirm that in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, DH is required to designate and produce a PMQ on the various identified topics regardless of whether DH also agrees to produce one or more witnesses with

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personal, first-hand knowledge on any of the PMQ topics. However, the Court finds that serious, good faith meet-and-confer efforts between counsel could significantly streamline the process given the substantial number of topics plaintiff apparently desires to explore and the fact most of the events at issue occurred many years ago, lightening the burden on both sides and minimizing the need for judicial intervention on avoidable disputes. Plaintiff should also recognize that under the unique circumstances of this case, DH’s PMQ on certain subjects may ultimately have limited responsive information and may not be able to provide all the information which plaintiff seeks but this does not necessarily mean that DH has failed to fulfill its obligations under Code of Civil Procedure §2025.230.

With these comments in mind, the parties are now directed to meet-and-confer either in person or by telephone in an attempt to resolve without further judicial intervention their disputes relating to plaintiff’s PMQ deposition notice re: Harms and in the event these in-person and/or telephonic meet-and-confer efforts are successful in resolving the variety of issues presented by the current motion to compel, moving counsel shall promptly notify the Court by telephone and letter that this motion may be dropped from calendar.

If the meet-and confer efforts are unsuccessful, no later than 10 court days before the continued hearing date specified below, the parties shall file a single joint statement which must provide the following:

(1) A brief description of the in-person and/or telephonic meet-and-confer efforts which have taken place; (2) A clear identification of each individual PMQ topic and/or document request found in plaintiff’s PMQ deposition notice re: Harms which remains in dispute; (3) A clear and concise description of the nature of the remaining dispute(s) regarding each individual PMQ topic and/or document request which requires resolution by the Court; and (4) A clear and concise explanation of each party’s last position with respect to the particular PMQ topic and/or document request at issue.

The parties shall format this joint statement in a manner which will enable the Court to most efficiently rule on each unresolved issue pertaining to this PMQ deposition re: Harms without an unnecessary consumption of finite judicial resources.

Disposition

For the reasons explained above, this motion to compel PMQ deposition re: Gregory

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Harms is on the Court’s own motion CONTINUED to 10/15/2025 at 1:30 p.m. in Department 25 to permit the parties to meet-and-confer in person and/or by telephone and to file the joint statement described above. (Should the parties require additional time to complete their meet-and-confer efforts and/or file the joint statement, they may submit a request via letter to this department, specifying the reasons why additional time is needed as well as the amount of additional time sought.)

This minute order is effective immediately. No formal order or other notice is required. (Code Civ. Proc. §1019.5; CRC Rule 3.1312.)